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ABSTRACT 





Advisor: Weilei Shi 
This dissertation focuses on an important but largely ignored phenomenon in the strategic 
decision literature which I refer to as the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-
making. I define the superstitious heuristic as a decision shortcut based on one’s beliefs in the 
existence of forces or essences that transcend the boundary between the mental/symbolic and 
physical/material realities in a way that is unsupported by contemporary science. The use of 
superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making is prevalent in major economies and 
influences firms’ strategic behaviors and performance. In this dissertation, I first explored the 
concept of the superstitious heuristic and developed scale instruments to measure it. Then I 
investigated the antecedents and consequences of the use of superstitious heuristics in the 
strategic decision context. With a global sample of respondents from over sixty national cultures, 
I developed a positive and a negative Superstitious Heuristics Scale (SHS). Both scales 
demonstrated psychometric soundness and measurement equivalence across culture and 
language. To investigate the causes and effects of the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic 
decision-making, I administered an experiment and a survey study to a sample of Chinese middle 
managers and top executives, respectively. The results 1) provide insights in the role of decision 
uncertainty, decision importance, and superstitious thinking as positive antecedents of the use of 
superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making, and 2) shed light on the positive indirect 
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effects (through decision speed and collective efficacy) and mixed direct effects of the use of 
superstitious heuristics on both decision performance and firm performance. 
This dissertation offers theoretical, empirical, and practical contributions. In the 
theoretical respect, it first contributes to behavioral strategy by advancing research on the 
behavioral aspect of strategic decision-making and, in particular, research on heuristics in 
strategic management. Through investigating a prevalent but understudied phenomenon in 
strategic decision practice, this research expands our understanding of heuristics and strategic 
decision-making and offers a new angle to explain firms’ strategic behavior and performance. 
This dissertation further contributes to behavioral decision literature by adding a new family of 
decision heuristic and opening up new avenues for behavior decision theory to facilitate the 
inquiry of decision-making in various research disciplines. The dissertation also contributes to 
superstition literature by extending superstitious research to the strategic decision setting. In the 
empirical aspect, this dissertation contributes to behavioral strategy by enabling the study of the 
phenomenon of interest through providing a validated construct and measurements of the 
superstitious heuristic for the strategic decision context. The multidimensional nature of the 
superstitious heuristic opens up research opportunities to derive the superstitious heuristic profile 
of the firm and explore its performance consequences under diverse contingencies. The 
dissertation also contributes to behavioral decision literature and superstition research by 
offering measurements of the superstitious heuristic that are applicable to different cultures and 
decision settings. In the practical regard, the dissertation provides managerial implications 
regarding strategic decision-making and interfirm competition and cooperation. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
How firms make strategic decisions has been an important research topic in behavioral 
strategy (Powell, Lovallo, & Fox, 2011) over decades. Starting from the seminal work of the 
Carnegie School by Simon (1947) and Cyert and March (1963), behavioral decision theory 
(Kahneman, 2003a; Schwenk, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) highlights the notion of 
bounded rationality and the use of heuristics to simplify decision tasks in complex and uncertain 
environments. Applying behavioral decision theory to strategy research, the heuristics research 
in strategic management has advanced along three lines. The first line of research examines the 
use of universal heuristics that has been studied by cognitive psychologists (e.g., Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974) in the context of firm executives and strategic decision-making (Busenitz & 
Barney, 1997; Clapham & Schwenk, 1991; Anne S. Huff & Schwenk, 1990; Lovallo & 
Kahneman, 2003). A second line focuses on firm executives’ non-logical decision-making based 
on expert intuition (Barnard, 1938; Khatri & Ng, 2000; Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 2004; Simon, 
1987). More recently, a third line has emerged to investigate idiosyncratic simple rules that firms 
develop to facilitate decision process (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011, 2014; Bingham, Eisenhardt, 
& Furr, 2007; Eisenhardt & Sull, 2001; Maitland & Sammartino, 2015). Despite these significant 
progresses, heuristics research in strategic management remains relatively limited (Hodgkinson 
& Sparrow, 2002; Powell et al., 2011). At the same time, there is a type of heuristic that plays an 
important role in strategic decision-making in many cultures yet has not received much attention 
in the literature. I label this type of heuristic a “superstitious heuristic” and define it as a decision 
shortcut based on one’s beliefs in the existence of forces or essences that transcend the boundary 
between the mental/symbolic and physical/material realities in a way that is unsupported by 
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contemporary science. In this dissertation, I investigate the use of superstitious heuristics in 
strategic decision-making.  
The use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making is worth research 
attention for several reasons. First, this phenomenon commonly exists in many cultures. For 
example, Hong Kong tycoons often consult feng shui masters before making big investment 
decisions. Japanese managers often seek advice from their Shinto gods, and many Indian 
businessmen comply with principles of Vaastu Shastra for luck (Tsang, 2004a, 2004b). In the 
United States, stock market behavior is found to be influenced by eclipses (Lepori, 2009) and a 
tendency to avoid making decisions on Friday the thirteenth results in about $900 million lost in 
business on these days (Palazzolo, 2005). In Europe, statistics from UK suggested that 32 
percent fewer properties sold on the 13th of the month than any other day and 34 percent fewer 
properties sold with the number 13 than other numbers (Soteriou, 2012). Similar concerns for the 
number 13 are evident in Russia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America (Antipov & 
Pokryshevskaya, 2015; Lever, 2011). Worldwide, an increasing number of firms follow feng shui 
principles in business (Cisek, 2012; Gunn, 1997). As such, the use of superstitious heuristics in 
strategic decision-making is a global phenomenon that is observable in different cultures and 
pervasive in major economies.  
Second, based on limited research touching upon the phenomenon (Tsang, 2004a, 2004b) 
and observations of real-world practices as mentioned above, the use of superstitious heuristics 
in strategic decision-making appears to influence firms’ strategic behaviors and performance. 
However, few studies have systematically investigated this phenomenon. As a result, much is 
unknown. It is unclear where the boundary lies between the superstitious heuristic and the other 
types of heuristics or decision practices. It is also unclear whether the superstitious heuristic is 
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unidimensional or can be meaningfully distinguished between different categories. Moreover, we 
do not know for certain what factors contribute to the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic 
decision-making and how that affects performance consequences. The study of this phenomenon 
can help answer these questions and provide a new angle in theory to explain and predict firm 
strategic behavior and performance. In doing so, the study can advance heuristics research in the 
strategy domain and, consequently, contribute to the psychological grounding of strategic 
management. Insights from investigating the phenomenon can also provide managerial 
implications to improve strategic decision-making, performance, and interfirm competition and 
cooperation.  
Third, the superstitious heuristic extends our understanding of heuristics. In current 
literature, scholars generally consider heuristics as the product of cognitive errors (Kahneman, 
2003a; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) or the result of practice and feedback learning over time 
(Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Eisenhardt & Sull, 2001; Simon, 1987). In examining how 
heuristics influence performance, researchers often compare the use of heuristics with rational 
decision-making. Heuristics are deemed to outcompete the latter through efficiency and 
effectiveness (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Eisenhardt & Sull, 2001; Gigerenzer, 2008) or lead 
to worse outcomes due to sacrifice of comprehensiveness and accuracy (Holcomb, Ireland, 
Holmes Jr, & Hitt, 2009; Piattelli-Palmarini, 1994; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974). The 
superstitious heuristic, as a heuristic based on a belief system, provides additional insights into 
the picture. The superstitious heuristic is not necessarily a product of cognitive errors but can be 
motivated by strong psychological desires. It is not necessarily a result of feedback learning 
either but can be driven solely by one’s superstitious belief system which, in many cases, is 
resistant to feedback (Festinger, Riecken, & Schachter, 1956; Tsang, 2004a, 2004b). In addition, 
 4 
the superstitious heuristic can influence performance not only through the mechanisms 
commonly shared with the other heuristics, but also through additional, psychological 
mechanisms that are uniquely associated with its superstitious property. The study of the 
superstitious heuristic, therefore, can extend our current understanding of heuristics.   
This dissertation consists of two parts. In the first part, I drew upon literature on 
superstition and heuristics to conceptualize the core construct of the superstitious heuristic. To 
measure the construct, I also developed and validated two Superstitious Heuristic Scales (SHSs) 
that can be applied to different cultures and research settings (Study 1). In the second part of the 
dissertation, I examined the use of superstitious heuristics in the strategic decision context to 
answer the following questions: 1) What factors lead to the use of superstitious heuristics in 
strategic decision-making? 2) How does the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-
making affect performance? Drawing upon behavioral decision theory and superstition research, 
I predicted that decision uncertainty, decision importance, and the decision-maker’s superstitious 
thinking may independently and interactively increase the use of superstitious heuristics in 
strategic decision-making. Synthesizing literature on heuristics, superstition, strategic decision-
making, and cultural psychology, I hypothesized that the use of superstitious heuristics in 
strategic decision-making may be positively associated with performance through decision speed 
and collective efficacy, and the mediated effects may be moderated by environmental 
unanalyzability and holistic reasoning, respectively. To test my hypotheses, I conducted an 
experiment (Study 2) and a survey study (Study 3) in China to take advantage of the country’s 
pervasiveness and variation in the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making.  
This dissertation offers theoretical and empirical contributions to the existing literature. It 
first contributes to the behavioral strategy research. The use of superstitious heuristics in 
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strategic decision-making is an important phenomenon that commonly exists in many cultures 
including major economics and influences firm strategic behaviors and performance. However, 
the phenomenon has been neglected in the literature and, as a result, the nature, causes, and 
effects of the phenomenon are unclear. The dissertation fills the gap by conceptualizing the 
superstitious heuristic, identifying its dimensionality, and exploring its antecedents and 
consequences in the strategic decision context. In doing so, the dissertation sheds light on an 
important phenomenon in the strategic decision process and offers a new angle to explain firms’ 
strategic behavior and performance. This dissertation contributes to the behavioral aspect of 
strategic decision-making and, in particular, advances the heuristics research in strategy to which 
more research attention is called for (Hodgkinson & Sparrow, 2002; Powell et al., 2011; 
Schoemaker, 1990). This study of the superstitious heuristic does not only draw attention to a 
new type of heuristic, but it also challenges and expands the current understanding of heuristics 
by revealing new mechanisms uniquely associated with the superstitious nature of the 
superstitious heuristic. Beyond heuristics research, the study of the superstitious heuristic also 
informs other research streams in behavioral strategy such as aspiration levels and risk taking 
(Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 1998, 2003; Harris & Bromiley, 2007), exploitation versus 
exploration (March, 1991; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008; Tushman & O’Reilly, 1996), and 
conflicts and politics in strategic decision process (Cyert & March, 1963; Eisenhardt & 
Bourgeois, 1988; March, 1962). Overall, this dissertation contributes to the behavioral strategy 
research in response to the call for more research endeavors that build the psychological 
foundation of strategic management (Powell et al., 2011; Schoemaker, 1990).  
Empirically, the development and validation of the SHSs enables the empirical 
investigation of the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making. The validated 
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multidimensional nature of the superstitious heuristic enables further exploration into the 
interplay between different dimensions and strategic decisions. It also provides opportunities to 
derive firms’ superstitious heuristic profiles and explore their influences on performance under 
diverse contingencies.  
The dissertation also contributes to the behavioral decision theory. By coining the term 
“superstitious heuristic”, the dissertation adds a new family of heuristics to the behavioral 
decision literature that is globally observable but has not been systematically investigated. Like 
the traditional heuristics studied in behavioral decision literature (Gigerenzer, 2008; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974), the superstitious heuristic can be applied to a variety of research fields such as 
human resource management, marketing, finance, economics, political science, and media 
studies. Furthermore, this dissertation provides validated scale instruments to enable empirical 
investigations of the use of superstitious heuristics in those contexts. The dissertation thereby 
opens up new avenues for behavioral decision theory to facilitate decision research in various 
research disciplines.   
The dissertation also contributes to the superstition literature. Whereas most superstition 
research investigates superstitious beliefs or practices in general, the dissertation advances the 
research on the determinant role of superstition in decision-making. In addition, the existing 
superstition research has largely focused on the general population or particularly superstitious 
occupational groups. This dissertation extends superstition research to a new group (i.e., firm 
executives) and a new setting (i.e., firm strategic decision-making). Empirically, most of the 
existing scale instruments in the superstition literature measure beliefs and are applicable only to 
a single culture or a bundle of similar cultures. This dissertation offers two validated scales that 
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measure superstitious behaviors in the decision-making context and are applicable across 
cultures.  
2 THE SUPERSTITIOUS HEURISTIC 
The concept of the superstitious heuristic was developed by synergizing the knowledge 
and understanding from two research fields – heuristics and superstition. In this section, I briefly 
review these two bodies of literature and establish the core concept of the superstitious heuristic.  
2.1 The Literature on Heuristics 
Neoclassical economics assumes that humans possess omniscient rationality and always 
pursue utility maximization in making choices. Dissatisfied with this unrealistic description of 
human choice behavior, Simon (1947) proposed the notion of “bounded rationality” and argued 
that people are boundedly rational in that they do not have perfect knowledge of all possible 
alternatives and outcomes. Rather than maximizing utility through finding the best solution, 
people in reality “satisfice,” that is, search and stop at a satisfactory and sufficient solution. To 
satisfice is to use heuristics which Simon defined as cognitive shortcuts that emerge when time, 
information, and processing capacity are limited (Newell & Simon, 1972). Since Simon (1947, 
1955), the notion of bounded rationality along with the concept of heuristics have inspired 
research ideas in a variety of fields including cognitive psychology, economics, finance, and 
strategic management, to name a few (Kahneman, 2003a, 2003b; Powell et al., 2011). In this 
section, I review existing heuristics research in two major disciplines that are most relevant to 
this dissertation – cognitive psychology and strategic management.  
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2.1.1 Heuristics Research in Cognitive Psychology  
Stemming from Simon’s (1947, 1955) theory of bounded rationality, a rich body of 
literature on heuristics at the individual level has emerged in cognitive psychology. Three major 
research communities can be identified. The well-known heuristics-and-bias tradition focuses on 
universally observable decision shortcuts under uncertainty, and views heuristics as the products 
of cognitive biases that lead to systematic errors (Kahneman, 2003a; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974). Classic heuristics that have been identified in this research line include representativeness 
(in which probabilities are assessed by resemblance or similarity), availability (in which 
probabilities are judged by the extent to which occurrences can easily come to mind), and 
anchoring (in which estimates are made starting from an initial value and ending biased toward 
that value) (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). These heuristics demonstrate human’s overconfidence 
and biases in judgmental tasks due to bounded rationality. Recently, an additional type of 
heuristic – the affect heuristic, which refers to a judgment or decision strategy based on affect 
associated with objects and events – has attracted much research attention (Slovic, Finucane, 
Peters, & MacGregor, 2007).  
A second community of heuristics research in cognitive psychology, namely, the fast-
and-frugal heuristics program, also focuses on universal heuristics. However, scholars from this 
camp emphasize that heuristics can be more efficient and effective than formal, systematical 
analysis under appropriate conditions or environment (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Goldstein 
& Gigerenzer, 2002). A core notion in this research line is ecological rationality, or the fit 
between the structure of a heuristic and that of the environment where the heuristic is applied. 
Typical heuristics examined along this line include Take-the-Best (in which only the most valid 
cue is used in evaluation), the recognition heuristic (in which evaluations are made based on 
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familiarity), and tallying (in which different cues are given the same weight in evaluation) 
(Gigerenzer, 2008; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). 
A third research community of heuristics in cognitive psychology – although its members 
may not necessarily consider their research as “heuristics” but rather “naturalistic decision-
making” or “expert intuition” – focuses on skilled intuitions of experts and professionals and 
explores the cues that they use to make rapid judgements and decisions under uncertainty and 
time constraint (Crandall, Klein, & Hoffman, 2006; Kahneman & Klein, 2009). Classic cases 
examined in this line of research include master chess players who are able to rapidly recognize 
most promising moves (Chase & Simon, 1973) and fire ground commanders who can make 
quality decisions under tremendous time pressure (Klein, Calderwood, & Clinton-Cirocco, 
2010). Researchers from this community consider intuition as patterns that are acquired through 
learning from direct and vicarious experience (Chase & Simon, 1973). Different from the 
heuristics-and-bias and fast-and-frugal approaches which focus on universal, generic heuristics 
across individuals, research on expert intuition examines heuristics that are specific to experts 
and domains.  
2.1.2 Heuristics Research in Strategic Management  
Originating from Simon’s theory of bounded rationality, heuristics research has emerged 
in strategy literature which applies the concept of bounded rationality to business organizations. 
Three major research categories can be identified. The first examines universal heuristics 
(particularly heuristics studied in the heuristics-and-biases literature) observed in the particular 
sample of firm executives. For example, Busenitz and Barney (1997) investigate overconfidence 
and representativeness heuristics among entrepreneurs and managers in large organizations. 
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Lovallo and Kahneman (2003) examine how firm executives’ overoptimism, which is a 
demonstration of anchoring and representativeness heuristics, resulted in problematic 
forecasting. Strategy researchers have also examined biases in causal attribution (e.g. egocentric 
overestimation of one’s own contributions) which finds its root in availability heuristics 
(Clapham & Schwenk, 1991; Anne S. Huff & Schwenk, 1990). Other heuristics examined in this 
literature include reasoning by analogy, single outcome calculation, and inferences of 
impossibility (Schwenk, 1984).  
The second category investigates the role of expert intuition in executive decision-
making. This research traces back to Barnard (1938) who observed that firm executives rely 
largely on intuition rather than rational analysis when making their decisions. Barnard 
distinguished between “logical” and “non-logical” decision processes by associating the former 
with conscious thinking or reasoning and the latter with cognitive operations that cannot be 
expressed in words or symbols. Simon (1987) linked executives’ “non-logical” decision-making 
to expert intuition, a same mechanism also observed among chess players (Chase & Simon, 
1973). In Simon’s (1987) view, expert intuition is “analyses frozen into habit and the capacity 
for rapid response through recognition” (p.63). This line of research has triggered theoretical 
(e.g., Dane & Pratt, 2007) and empirical endeavors (e.g., Elbanna & Child, 2007; Hough & 
Ogilvie, 2005; Khatri & Ng, 2000; Sadler-Smith, 2004) in unfolding the role of intuition in 
strategic decision-making. To name a few empirical studies, Khatri and Ng (2000) found that 
intuitive decision-making was positively (negatively) associated with performance in an unstable 
(stable) environment. Hough and Ogilvie (2005) found that the use of intuition increased the 
number of high-quality decisions in a simulated strategic decision-making environment. In a 
 11 
nonprofit setting, executive intuition was observed a positive predictor of both financial 
performance and public support (Ritchie, Kolodinsky, & Eastwood, 2007).   
The third research category of heuristics in strategy investigates firms’ idiosyncratic 
heuristics in decision-making under uncertainty. The behavioral theory of the firm suggests that 
business decision-makers usually use short-term decision rules to avoid uncertainty and reduce 
the burden of perfectly predicting the future (Cyert & March, 1963). More recently, a number of 
scholars used case studies to identify idiosyncratic heuristics that are developed by individual 
firms. Examples include Intel’s rules for decisions on manufacturing (Burgelman, 1994) and 
Yahoo’s rules for decisions on strategic alliance (Rindova & Kotha, 2001). Eisenhardt and Sull 
(2001) label these decision rules simple rules and argue that firms often develop simple rules to 
facilitate opportunity pursuit in turbulent and unpredictable markets. In the context of 
internationalization, Bingham and Eisenhardt (2011) and Maitland and Sammartino (2015) have 
examined how managers develop and rely on unique simple heuristics to deal with  highly 
uncertain processes of internationalization. Bingham and Eisenhardt (2011) further suggest that 
firms’ unique heuristics are the outcomes of organizational learning. Firms learn heuristics 
through experiences and continuously modify heuristics based on performance feedback. These 
simple rules provide instructions for similar situations while leaving room to improvise specifics 
(Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Eisenhardt & Sull, 2001). Empirical evidence has shown that 
simple rules exert a positive effect on firm performance (Bingham et al., 2007; Davis, 
Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2009; Gary & Wood, 2011). 
 12 
2.1.3 The Mapping of Existing Literature on Heuristics 
The review of the existing literature on heuristics in cognitive psychology and strategic 
management suggests a possible way to map the literature along two dimensions – 1) individual 
level versus firm level and 2) universal heuristics versus specific heuristics (Table 1). The first 
dimension is based on the unit of analysis of the study, that is, whether the outcome of interest 
(e.g., the dependent variables in empirical studies) is of the individual or the firm. The second 
dimension is based on the nature of the heuristic under study, that is, whether the heuristic is 
universal or specific to individuals or firms.     
Along these two dimensions, existing heuristic research from cognitive psychology and 
strategy research can break into four quadrants. Quadrant 1 contains research on universal 
heuristics at the individual level. The heuristics-and-biases and fast-and-frugal heuristics 
programs fall into this quadrant. These two research streams, despite their opposite views 
towards heuristics, both identify heuristics that are commonly used across ordinary individuals. 
By contrast, Quadrant 2 contains research on specific heuristics at the individual level. 
Belonging to this segment is the naturalistic decision-making literature. As noted earlier, skilled 
intuitions investigated in this research line are heuristics held by experts and applicable to 
specific domains. Quadrant 3 contains research on universal heuristics at the firm level. Studies 
that examine firm executives’ use of universal heuristics (e.g., representativeness, availability, 
anchoring) and its influences on firm’s strategic decisions and performance fit in this segment. 
Quadrant 4 contains research on specific heuristics at the firm level. Studies on executive use of 
expert intuition as well as firms’ idiosyncratic, simple decision rules fall into this quadrant.  
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It is worth clarifying that this mapping practice is not a categorization of heuristics but 
heuristics research based on the unit of analysis and the nature of heuristics under study. While 
research from the four quadrants commonly centers on heuristics, some research streams label 
heuristics under different names. For example, heuristics are referred to as expert intuition in the 
field of naturalistic decision-making and named simple rules in the simple rules program. This 
mapping of the existing heuristics literature provides an overview of research that has been 
conducted in major fields germane to the dissertation over the past decades. In a later section, the 
map serves to locate the proposed construct of superstitious heuristic in the existing literature.  
2.2 The Literature on Superstition 
2.2.1 The Concept, Terminology, and Definition of Superstition 
According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, superstition is “a belief or practice 
resulting from ignorance, fear of the unknown, trust in magic or chance, or a false conception of 
causation.” In research literature, however, it is not easy to identify a consistent definition of 
superstition. Worse still, different terms – superstitious, magical, and paranormal – have been 
used in the literature to describe beliefs or practices that fit Merriam-Webster’s definition of 
superstition. Several examples are listed below to illustrate the diversity in both terminology and 
definition. 
Superstition –  
Beliefs or practices groundless in themselves and inconsistent with the degree of 
enlightenment reached by the community to which one belongs (Marmor, 1956, p. 119); based on 
the definition in Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th edition) 
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The subset of paranormal beliefs that are pragmatic: used to bring about good luck or 
avoid bad (Vyse, 2013, p. 24) 
Magical thinking –  
The belief that (a) transfer of energy or information between physical systems may take 
place solely because of their similarity or contiguity in time and space, or (b) that one’s 
thoughts, words, or actions can achieve specific physical effects in a manner not governed by the 
principles of ordinal transmission of energy or information (Zusne & Jones, 2014, p. 13). 
A cognitive intuition or belief in the existence of imperceptible forces or essences that 
transcend the usual boundary between the mental/symbolic and physical/material realities, in a 
way that (1) diverge from the received wisdom from the technocratic elite, (2) serves important 
functions, and (3) follows the principles of similarity and contagion (Nemeroff & Rozin, 2000, p. 
5). 
Paranormal beliefs – 
A proposition that has not been empirically attested to the satisfaction of the scientific 
establishment but is generated within the nonscientific community and extensively endorsed by 
people who might normally expected by their society to be capable of rational thought and 
reality testing (Irwin, 2009, pp. 16–17).  
The terms superstitious, magical, and paranormal do address slightly distinct phenomena 
following the traditions in different research disciplines. According to Lindeman and Svedholm 
(2012), the use of magic-related terms originates from anthropologists’ research on traditional 
societies, whereas the term of superstition is more often used by psychologists studying beliefs in 
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luck and illusory correlations in the Western culture. The concept of paranormal is usually used 
to address phenomena such as psychic abilities or precognition that are of interest to psychical 
researchers. Nevertheless, after a comprehensive review of the conceptual and operational 
definitions of the three terms in literature, Lindeman and Svedholm (2012) find that most 
researchers have used these terms interchangeably or connected two of the three together (e.g., 
“superstitious and magical beliefs”). Superstitious, magical, and paranormal beliefs and practices 
have also been similarly defined by researchers as unfounded (Tylor, 1873), not based on reason 
or knowledge (Ng, Chong, & Du, 2010), violating the fundamental principles of science (Broad, 
1953), scientifically impossible (Irwin, 2009; Risen, 2016), outside the bounds of established 
science (Hines, 1988), breaking scientific laws of causality (Keinan, 1994), erroneous 
perceptions of causality or correlation (Haselton & Nettle, 2006; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008; 
Zebb & Moore, 2003), irrational behaviors without supporting scientific evidence (Ciborowski, 
1997) (See Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012 for a review). The authors thus conclude that the use of 
the three terms reflects “the etymological histories of the concepts more than any theoretical 
underpinnings” (p.247). In other words, they basically refer to the same thing. Therefore, to 
avoid confusion, I follow Lindeman and Aarnio (2007) and Vyse (2013) to use superstition in its 
broad sense to refer to all superstitious, magical, and paranormal beliefs and practices identified 
in the literature.              
An observation from the definition review is that it is necessary to define superstitious 
beliefs in a way that differentiates them from other types of beliefs. Most of the definitions of 
superstitious beliefs rest on their essential nature as false ideas that lack empirical evidence or 
contradict contemporary scientific knowledge. However, beliefs such as vitamin C prevents flu 
or penguins can fly, although also wrong beliefs without empirical evidence or contradicting 
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scientific knowledge, are generally not considered as superstitious beliefs. Therefore, the 
definition of superstition should not only capture the erroneous nature of superstition, but also be 
able to exclude other types of unfounded ideas. Some researchers have argued that the critical 
difference lies in the unique characteristic of superstitious beliefs, that is, superstitious beliefs 
blur the distinctions between mental versus physical, and living versus lifeless realities 
(Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007; Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012; Nemeroff & Rozin, 2000). In 
agreement with these researchers, I borrow from Nemeroff and Rozin (2000) to define 
superstition as beliefs or practices of such beliefs in the existence of forces or essences that 
transcend the boundary between the mental/symbolic and physical/material realities in a way 
that is unsupported by contemporary science.  
It is important to further clarify some of the terms included in the definition. Forces refer 
to existences that are regarded as exerting influence or power (e.g., paranormal beings such as 
witches, ghosts). Essences refer to the quality or nature of an existence (e.g., positive energy, 
luck). Mental is relating to the mind, including consciousness, thoughts, perceptions, feelings, 
desires, and memory. Symbolic is relating to symbols, or something that stands for or suggests 
something else. Physical or material is relating to matter, or existences that are perceptible 
through senses and subject to the law of nature. Contemporary suggests that the benchmark used 
to assess beliefs is current or established science, not future science. Scientific knowledge 
advances continuously and, thus, it is not unusual that new findings come out and falsify old 
theories. History has shown that today’s science could be tomorrow’s superstition (e.g., alchemy) 
and today’s superstition can be tomorrow’s science (e.g., the germ theory) (Nemeroff & Rozin, 
2000). As such, superstitious beliefs should be judged against contemporary science and remain 
considered as superstitious until new scientific evidence is found to support the belief. Being 
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unsupported by contemporary science can be either the situation where empirical evidence 
supporting a belief is absent or the situation where empirical evidence contradicting a belief 
exists. Both cases are recognized in the superstition literature (e.g., Zebb & Moore, 2003). 
Additionally, unsupported is used here as a factual, objective observation regardless of 
subjective perception. There are situations where individuals genuinely believe that certain 
superstitious beliefs are truths or have real-world efficacy. Nevertheless, if the beliefs are 
factually unsupported by contemporary science, the beliefs and practices of such beliefs are 
objectively considered as superstition in this dissertation. This position is in line with the 
convention in superstition research (Broad, 1953; Hines, 1988; Nemeroff & Rozin, 2000; Risen, 
2016; Vyse, 2013) and is based on practical considerations. An objective benchmark is needed to 
define and study the phenomenon of superstition. If superstition is defined based on subjective 
perceptions which vary by individuals, it would be difficult to find a common ground upon 
which the phenomenon can be identified and studied across individuals. However, it is worth 
noting that using science as the benchmark is not to say that science is perfect. As already 
mentioned, science constantly advances and, thus, what is believed to be truth today may be 
falsified by new evidence tomorrow. Moreover, what phenomena to study can be socially 
structured or biased by scientists’ personal preferences and choices. It is possible that a belief is 
considered superstition simply because it has not been scientifically studied, or because 
contemporary science, given its current stage of advancement, is unable to verify or falsify it.  
 
2.2.2 The Accounts of Superstition 
Psychologists and anthropologists have studied the phenomenon of superstition since the 
1800s (Vyse, 2013). For over a century, superstition and magical thinking have been understood 
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as the product of cognitive deficits in research of traditional societies (Frazer, 1922; Lévy-Bruhl, 
1926; Tylor, 1873) and children (Piaget, 1929). This traditional view claims that people engage 
in magical thinking because their minds are too “primitive” or underdeveloped to think properly 
– a result of lacking scientific knowledge and the capabilities of rational reasoning (Frazer, 1922; 
Lévy-Bruhl, 1926; Piaget, 1929; Tylor, 1873). Similar cases of “primary minds” can be observed 
in animals such as Skinner’s (1948) pigeons which attempted to affect the automatically 
controlled food feeder by their own superstitious rituals. 
More recent research, however, has shown that this traditional explanation of superstition 
is not necessarily true. Superstition is found to commonly exist in the so-called “highly evolved” 
Western cultures and among individuals that are highly intelligent and well-educated (Subbotsky 
& Quinteros, 2002; Vyse, 2013). For example, during a national poll conducted by CBS news in 
2012, about half of the American respondents self-reported as superstitious to some extent and 
over half of them admitted knocking on the wood (Vyse, 2013). One-third of surveyed college 
students admitted to regularly engage in superstitions related to exams (Albas & Albas, 1989). A 
very interesting example can be found in Niels Bohr who, although a Nobel laureate in Physics, 
was witnessed to have a horseshoe hanging on the door for good luck (Risen, 2016).  
Researchers have examined demographic factors and psychological characteristics to 
account for individual differences in superstitiousness. Women were found to hold stronger 
superstitious and paranormal beliefs than men in the 2007 Gallup Poll (A. M. Gallup & Newport, 
2008). Protestant Christians and Jews are reported less likely to believe in paranormal 
phenomena than the whole sample in the 2009 Harris poll (Vyse, 2013). Empirical studies have 
also shown that people with a relatively external locus of control, lower self-efficacy, and a more 
intuitive reasoning style tend to show stronger superstitious and paranormal beliefs (Pennycook, 
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Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012; Tobacyk, 2004; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983). In 
addition, Neuroticism and Openness to experiences from the Big Five personality model are 
found to predict superstitious and paranormal beliefs (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006; Swami, 
Pietschnig, Stieger, & Voracek, 2011; Thalbourne, Dunbar, & Delin, 1995).  
Other accounts of superstition have focused on people’s psychological needs. Research 
suggests that superstition provides a sense of understanding of the situation when information is 
limited to form accurate explanations (Agassi & Jarvie, 1973). This satisfies a natural desire of 
people to infer causal relationships (Heider, 1944). Superstition also provides a sense of control, 
which is another intrinsic human need (DeCharms, 1968; White, 1959). Related research has 
shown that superstition is more common under high uncertainty and stress – two conditions that 
amplify people’s desperation for control (Keinan, 1994; Malinowski & Redfield, 1948; Padgett 
& Jorgenson, 1982; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). On a related note, superstition serves to lower 
anxiety and increase confidence and self-efficacy in uncertain and stressful situations (Damisch, 
Stoberock, & Mussweiler, 2010; Tsang, 2004b, 2004a). 
The phenomenon of superstition has also been studied from a process perspective, 
especially in view of the dual-process theory of reasoning (Epstein, 1994; Jacoby, 1991; 
Stanovich & West, 2000). The dual-process approach distinguishes between two types of 
cognitive processes, labeled by Stanovich and West (2000) as System 1 and System 2, 
respectively. System 1 processes are characterized as rapid, automatic, effortless, and intuitive, 
whereas System 2 processes are typically slow, deliberate, effortful, and analytic (Stanovich & 
West, 2000). Researchers have suggested that the operations of System 1 serve as a default of 
reasoning and may or may not be corrected by System 2 (Kahneman, 2003a; Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002, 2005). Applying the dual process model to the phenomenon of superstition, 
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researchers have revealed that superstitious thinking is a product of intuitive reasoning of System 
1 (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2005; Epstein, 1994). When System 2 endorses superstitious thinking, 
either actively because of the individual’s strong superstitious beliefs or passively due to 
inattentiveness, superstitious thinking is maintained (Pennycook et al., 2012; Risen, 2016). Risen 
(2016) further refines the dual-process model by adding a path called “acquiescence,” a process 
in which people do detect an error but choose not to correct it. Risen (2016) uses the 
acquiescence process to explain a paradoxical phenomenon that people practice their 
superstitious and magical thinking when they consciously know that they should not.    
2.2.3 The Origins of Superstition 
A good question about superstition is where does superstition come from? Or in other 
words, is superstition innate or culturally learned? A direct, simple answer would be that the 
inclination of thinking superstitiously is innate, whereas the specific content of superstitious 
beliefs is culturally learned – just as Nemeroff and Rozin (2000) vividly describe, “Superstitious 
thinking is held at different levels of explicitness, ranging from spontaneous, vague, ‘as if’ 
feelings, all the way to explicit, culturally taught beliefs” (p.5). Regarding the innateness of 
superstition, the literature maintains that superstitious thinking is a very natural and intuitive way 
of thinking that is fundamental to human nature and universal in normal adults across cultures, 
educational levels, and age (Humphrey, 1996; Nemeroff & Rozin, 2000; Subbotsky & Quinteros, 
2002; Vyse, 2013). One perspective regarding the innate origin of superstition is that the 
tendency to think superstitiously is preprogrammed as a result of natural selection and this 
preparedness makes the learning of culturally specific superstitious concepts much more intuitive 
and ready than other concepts such as rational reasoning (Shweder, 1977). However, one does 
not need to accept the explanation of natural selection to agree that the inclination of thinking 
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superstitiously is innate. Regarding the learning aspect of superstition, an observation of 
superstitious beliefs in different countries can easily reveal that the same type of innate 
superstitious thinking is often manifested in culturally specific beliefs. For example, although the 
superstitious intuition that certain animals bring bad luck commonly exists in both Western and 
Eastern cultures, the specific belief object is black cats in the West and crows in the East.    
2.2.4 Superstitious Beliefs Relevant to Decision-making 
A literature review on superstition has revealed a list of superstitious beliefs that have 
been studied to date (See Table 2). It is worth mentioning that while there is a rich body of 
literature on superstition, a large portion of the research focuses on superstitious beliefs, or 
superstitious behaviors in general (e.g., carrying a luck charm or engaging in superstitious rituals 
for an important event). Research that specifically examines superstition in decision-making is 
relatively rare, expect for recent studies in marketing and finance about purchase preferences for 
lucky products or stocks (Hirshleifer, Jian, & Zhang, 2018; Ke, Chen, Lin, & Liu, 2017; Kramer 
& Block, 2007; Weng, 2018). Since the focus of this dissertation is on how superstitious beliefs 
affect decision-making, beliefs that are potentially relevant to decision-making are of research 
interest. These beliefs usually imply a causal link and can be used as means to achieve a 
particular end. I mark these beliefs with asterisks in Table 2.  
A close examination of these decision-related superstitious beliefs suggests that they 
largely fall into five categories which represents five major superstitious sources that are 
believed to exert influences on or provide insights into future events or people. The five 
superstitious sources include Birth Profile, Physical Attribute, Object/Act, Surrounding 
Environment, and Paranormal Revelation. These sources can be commonly observed among 
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decision-related superstitious beliefs from different cultures, although the specific content may 
vary by culture. For example, superstitious believers from most cultures commonly hold the 
view that one’s birth profile has a profound, determinant impact on one’s fortune and life path. In 
the East Asian culture, the timing of one’s birth is critical. Chinese and Korean Fortune-tellers 
make predictions and suggestions based on one’s ba zi, that is, the eight characters regarding the 
hour, day, month, and year of one’s birth. In the West, the position of the stars at one’s birth is 
deemed important. Astrologers provide predictions and advice based on the position of stars at 
one’s birth and the continuous movement of the stars in the present and future. The five 
categories of decision-related superstitious beliefs are listed below. They are also presented in 
the category column of Table 2 next to their respective belief objects. Some cells in the column 
are left empty because the corresponding belief objects are considered not directly relevant to 
decision-making. 
1) Beliefs in the influence of birth profile on future events or people 
• Examples: influences of the year, month, day, hour of birth (destiny calculation), 
                  influences of the position of the stars at one’s birth (astrology, horoscopes) 
2) Beliefs in the influence of physical attributes on future events or people 
• Examples: influences of facial appearance (physiognomy1), palm reading (palmistry), 
 
1 Physiognomy makes judgments about people’s character, personality, fortune, or fate based on 
the features of the face and the skull (Tsang, 2004b, 2004a). It is worth noting that some 
practices of physiognomy involving using facial expressions to make inferences about individual 
character, e.g., an eye that looks furtively or out of the corner reveals dishonesty (Vaught, 1902). 
Judging by facial expressions should not be considered as superstition because research on body 
language has found evidence that facial expressions can reveal one’s internal thoughts and 
emotions (Hartwig & Bond, 2014; S. Porter & Ten Brinke, 2008). However, a predominant 
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                   blood type 
3) Beliefs in the influence of objects or acts on future events or people 
• Examples: influences of numbers, words, colors, days, amulets, charms, animals, plants,  
                  phenomena, rituals, actions, karma, taboos, spells, curses 
4) Beliefs in the influence of surrounding forces or energies on future events or people 
• Examples: influence of surrounding environment (feng shui), cosmic forces, aura, 
pyramid power 
5) Beliefs in paranormal revelations about future events or people 
• Examples: revelations from card reading, dream reading, sign reading, casting of lots, 
consulting mediums or channelers, communication with the dead, itchy palm, itchy ear, 
twitching eyebrow, twitching eyelid 
This categorization of decision-related superstitious beliefs is used as guidelines for 
developing the typology of the superstitious heuristic in the following section.  
 
domain of physiognomy is making inferences about individual character or fortune by the shape 
of the face, parts of the face, and the skull, e.g., a person with ears square at the top and bottom is 
honest (Vaught, 1902) or a woman with a hump nose brings misfortune to her husband (in the 
culture of Hong Kong). Since most judgments of this type lack empirical support, they are 
generally considered as superstition by scholars (Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012; Tsang, 2004b, 
2004a). Although research has started to show that some personality such as masculinity and 
femininity can be accurately assessed by facial features such as the size of the jaw and the 
thickness of brows (Dabbs Jr, Carr, Frady, & Riad, 1995; Pound, Penton-Voak, & Surridge, 
2009; Smith et al., 2006), evidence is required to support the other supposed links between facial 
characteristics and personality. Until convincing scientific evidence is found, such beliefs remain 
considered as superstition.    
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2.3 The Concept of the Superstitious Heuristic 
2.3.1 The Definition of the Superstitious Heuristic 
Drawing upon the two bodies of literature on heuristics and superstition reviewed above, 
I coin the term superstitious heuristic and define it as a decision shortcut based on one’s beliefs 
in the existence of forces or essences that transcend the boundary between the mental/symbolic 
and physical/material realities in a way that is unsupported by contemporary science. To put it 
in a simpler way, the superstitious heuristic is a decision rule of thumb based on one’s 
superstitious beliefs. Below I clarify some of terms used in the definition.  
By decision shortcut it means that this decision tactic is a substitute for the rational, 
comprehensive decision approach. By based on it means that superstitious beliefs play a 
determinant role in the decision-making process. By one’s beliefs it emphasizes that the beliefs 
are held by the decision-maker, meaning that whether the decision-maker is a strong or half 
believer, s/he should endorse the superstitious beliefs to at least a minimum extent. There are 
cases where decisions are made based on others’ superstitious beliefs. For example, a company 
may design products in certain colors that are considered lucky by certain consumer groups. A 
CEO may decide to move the company to another location because the alleged bad feng shui of 
the current location has caused fear and anxiety to superstitious employees. In those scenarios, 
although the decisions are made based on superstitious beliefs, they are based on rational 
considerations. Since the purpose of the dissertation is to investigate a phenomenon arising from 
decision-makers’ bounded rationality, making decisions based on others’ superstitious beliefs is 
different from the focus of interest and is therefore not included in the scope of inquiry.      
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2.3.2 Typology of the Superstitious Heuristic 
Building upon the categorization of decision-related superstitious beliefs developed in the 
preceding section, I identify five potential categories of superstitious heuristics – superstitious 
heuristics related to 1) Birth Profile, 2) Physical Attribute, 3) Object/Act, 4) Surrounding 
Environment, and 5) Paranormal Revelation (See Table 3). Again, this categorization is based on 
major superstitious sources from which predictions and/or advice about future events or people 
can be supposedly derived. These five sources determine five different ways through which 
superstitious heuristics can be brought in during decision process. For instance, when deciding 
whether to build the headquarter of the company in a particular location, the business owner 
could 1) consult an expert on destiny calculation to find out if the location is in harmony with his 
or her birth profile (a superstitious heuristic related to Birth Profile), 2) consult a feng shui 
master to find out if the location attracts/keeps positive energies that lead to prosperity (a 
superstitious heuristic related to Surrounding Environment), or 3) consult a medium who claims 
to possess the ability of foreseeing the future (a superstitious heuristic related to Paranormal 
Revelation). All of the three practices can be considered as superstitious heuristics, but they are 
carried out in different ways, or along different dimensions of the superstitious heuristic. Below I 
introduce each of the categories/dimensions of the superstitious heuristic with real-world 
examples.      
A first category can be labeled as superstitious heuristics related to Birth Profile. Belong 
to this category are decision shortcuts based on theories, teachings, predictions, or suggestions 
related to supposed influences of one’s birth profile on his or her personality, character, and 
significant events in life. Typical superstitions involved in this category include destiny 
calculation (based on the year, month, day, and hour of one’s birth) as well as astrology and 
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horoscopes (based on the position of stars at one’s birth). As real-world examples, former U.S. 
president Ronald Reagan and his wife Nancy Reagan were witnessed to have made major 
decisions, including affairs of state, based on the advice of an astrologer in San Francisco 
(Regan, 1988). Managers in Hong Kong are said to seek advice from fortune-tellers during the 
Lunar New Year to check the degree of congruence between the nature of the new year and their 
birth profiles. If the new year is at odds with their birth profiles, they would employ defensive 
business strategies to reduce losses (Tsang, 2004b). 
A second category of superstitious heuristics can be labeled as superstitious heuristics 
related to Physical Attribute. This type of decision shortcuts is based on theories, teachings, 
predictions, or suggestions related to supposed influences of one’s physical attributes (e.g., facial 
characteristics, body shape, palm lines, and blood type) on his or her personality, character, and 
fate. Typical superstitions relevant to this category include physiognomy, anthroposcopy, 
palmistry, and blood typing. Essays on Physiognomy by the Swiss physiognomer Johann Lavater 
had remained a popular guidebook on hiring, making friends, and building business relations for 
over 150 years in Europe since it was first published in late 18th century (Vyse, 2013). Today in 
the modern Japanese society, many companies hire job candidates and assign job tasks to 
employees based on their blood types. Japanese politicians also disclose their blood type (if 
blood type A) to win support from voters (R. Evans, 2012). However, empirical evidence has 
failed to detect a relationship between blood type and personality (Nawata, 2014; Rogers & 
Glendon, 2003).        
A third category of superstitious heuristics can be identified as superstitious heuristics 
related to Object/Act. This family of decision shortcuts are based on theories, teachings, 
predictions, or suggestions related to supposed influences of objects or acts. Typical belief 
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objects include numbers, days, colors, amulets, rituals, taboos, human behaviors, animal 
behaviors, natural phenomena or events. Data from the Saint-Petersburg primary real estate 
market have shown that apartment buyers in Russia have a particular preference towards the 7th 
floor and a great disfavor toward the 13th floor (Antipov & Pokryshevskaya, 2015). In Taiwan, 
most companies consult the lunar calendar to pick an auspicious day and avoid inauspicious ones 
when opening a new business (Economist, 1993). 
A fourth category of superstitious heuristics can be named as superstitious heuristics 
related to Surrounding Environment. This type of decision shortcuts is based on theories, 
teachings, predictions, or suggestions related to supposed influences of forces or energies in the 
surrounding environment. Typical superstitious beliefs in this category include feng shui in the 
Chinese culture, Vaastu Shastra in India, and pyramid power in the West. As real-world 
examples, a five-star hotel in Shanghai hired a feng shui master rather than a management 
consultant to turn around their failing business (Tsang, 2004a). Another story about hotels – the 
current U.S. President Donald Trump consulted a feng shui expert before building his Trump 
International Hotel at Columbus Circle in New York City in 1990s. The silver metal globe in 
front of the hotel, the tea color of the building, and the orientation of the entrance toward the 
Central park are some of the decisions made accordingly (Oldershausen, 2016).  
The last category of superstitious heuristics can be labeled as superstitious heuristics 
related to Paranormal Revelation. Decision shortcuts along this category reply on theories, 
teachings, predictions, or suggestions related to supposed revelations from paranormal agents. 
Typical practices include card reading, dream reading, casting of lots, and consulting mediums or 
channelers. As real-world examples, American adherents regularly visit channelers – those who 
claim to speak the wisdom of people from ancient times (Vyse, 2013).  In Singapore and Hong 
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Kong, it is not uncommon for managers to make decisions based on results from the casting of 
lots (Tsang, 2004a).   
2.3.3 Mapping the Study of Superstitious Heuristics into the Heuristics Literature 
Since I propose the superstitious heuristic as a new type of heuristic of judgment and 
decision-making, it is important to locate where the study of superstitious heuristics fits in the 
heuristics literature. Recall that existing heuristics research in cognitive psychology and strategic 
management can be categorized along two dimensions – 1) individual level versus firm level and 
2) universal heuristics versus specific heuristics. Regarding the first dimension, since 
superstitious heuristics, as shown in the real-world examples, are widely adopted by both 
individuals regarding their personal decisions and firm managers regarding strategic decisions on 
behalf of the firm, the examination of superstitious heuristics taps on phenomena at both 
individual and firm levels. Concerning the second dimension, because superstitious beliefs and 
practices are culturally specific, and individuals and firms often develop their own idiosyncratic 
superstitions, superstitious heuristics should be considered as specific, not universal. For 
example, in the housing market, while the Russians favor the number 7 and dislike 13 (Antipov 
& Pokryshevskaya, 2015), the Chinese pay premiums for 8 and demand compensations for 4 
(Fortin, Hill, & Huang, 2014). As individual idiosyncratic heuristics, sports players are known to 
develop their own superstitions for good performance. A good example is baseball player Wade 
Boggs’ rule of never swinging at the first pitch, good or bad (Vyse, 2013). In terms of 
superstitious heuristics at the firm level, some companies hire feng shui experts while some 
others consult oracles in the temple (Tsang, 2004b, 2004a; Vyse, 2013). As such, the study of 
superstitious heuristics examines specific heuristics adopted by individuals and firms and thus 
falls into Quadrants 2 and 4 of Table 4.  
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2.3.4 Related Constructs 
Since the superstitious heuristic is proposed as a new category of heuristics, it is 
important to distinguish it from other heuristic types in the existing literature. In this section I 
compare the similarities and differences between superstitious heuristics and heuristics 
investigated in the communities of heuristics-and-biases, fast-and-frugal heuristics, naturalistic 
decision-making, and simple rules, respectively. 
Superstitious heuristics versus heuristics-and-biases. Superstitious heuristics and the 
heuristics examined in the heuristics-and-biases literature (e.g., representativeness, availability, 
anchoring) share in common that both categories are decision shortcuts deviating from the 
normative rational decision process which is comprehensive, deliberate, and sometimes 
computationally intensive. However, major distinctions exist in the following ways.  
First, while superstitious heuristics are specific, heuristics in the heuristics-and-biases 
literature are universal across individuals. Second, representativeness, availability, anchoring 
have been examined mainly in the context of judging the probabilities of uncertain events to 
demonstrate the discrepancies between statistical intuition and statistical knowledge (Kahneman, 
2003a). These heuristics are generally considered as the product of cognitive illusions 
(Kahneman, 2003a) rather than personal beliefs or preferences as in the case of superstitious 
heuristics.  
Third, heuristics examined in the heuristics-and-biases literature often occur 
unconsciously. In other words, they usually take place when System 2 fails to detect the bias 
produced by System 1 (Kahneman, 2003a; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). By contrast, 
superstitious heuristics can happen consciously in two situations (Risen, 2016). In the first 
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situation, System 2 detects the superstitious heuristic proposed by System 1 and endorses it. This 
is the case of strong superstitious believers who genuinely believe that superstitious heuristics 
are the right things to go with. In the second situation, System 2 detects the superstitious 
heuristic proposed by System 1 and acquiesces to it. This depicts the case of half believers who 
believe that superstitious beliefs are irrational yet acquiesce to them nevertheless. This cognitive 
dissonance in half-believing decision-makers is vividly evident in Tsang’s (2004a) interviews: “I 
feel shameful to tell my former finance professor that I rely more on god’s advice than 
discounted cash flow analysis when evaluating investment projects” (p.99).  
For these abovementioned reasons, the superstitious heuristic is different from the classic 
heuristics examined in the heuristics-and-biases literature. 
Superstitious heuristics versus fast-and-frugal heuristics. The first distinction between 
superstitious heuristics and fast-and-frugal heuristics (e.g., take-the-best, recognition, tally) also 
lies in the nature of the heuristic under investigation, with the former being specific while the 
latter universal. A second difference is that while fast-and-frugal heuristics, like heuristics-and-
biases, are less affected by personal beliefs and preferences than superstitious heuristics are. 
However, the two types of heuristics share in common that both can occur consciously. I have 
discussed in the previous paragraph how superstitious heuristics may take place consciously. In 
the case of fast-and-frugal heuristics, decision-makers can consciously pick from a toolbox of 
heuristics the so called ecologically rational heuristics that work best in the given environment 
(Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000).      
Superstitious heuristics versus expert intuition. Superstitious heuristics align with expert 
intuition in that both are rules of thumb developed by specific decision-makers for specific 
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purposes. However, major distinctions can be found between the two. First, expert intuitions are 
accumulated patterns acquired by experts through adequate experiences. Two conditions must be 
met for these intuitions to develop – 1) an environment with sufficient valid cues which reliably 
describe the causality in the structure of the environment, and 2) sufficient opportunity to 
practice the skill (Kahneman & Klein, 2009). By contrast, these conditions are not required to 
develop superstitious heuristics. People can quickly pick up superstitious heuristics with a one-
time experience or simply use them out of beliefs. Second, expert intuitions work through 
recognition, that it, they enable experts to identify a familiar pattern and apply the best solution 
stored in memory (Chase & Simon, 1973; Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Simon, 1987). By contrast, 
it does not necessitate recognition of familiar patterns for superstitious heuristics to be applied. 
Quite opposite, based on the superstition literature, people are more likely to resort to 
superstitious heuristics when situations fall outside of the familiar realm (Case, Fitness, Cairns, 
& Stevenson, 2004; Malinowski & Redfield, 1948).   
Superstitious heuristics versus simple rules. Superstitious heuristics and simple rules 
share in common that both are idiosyncratic decision shortcuts developed by specific entities. 
However, they are also different in major ways similar to what has been discussed in the 
previous paragraph. Simples rules are developed and modified based on valid performance 
feedback. It is a function of organizational learning from successes and failures. Recognition of 
similar situations is also required to some extent for the common structure of a simple rule to 
function effectively and efficiently. As already mentioned, superstitious heuristics do not 
necessitate these conditions. Some may argue that superstitious heuristics can also be developed 
through feedback learning. While the argument is not invalid, it is worth noting that feedback 
learning in the case of superstitious heuristics is more susceptible to confirmation and attribution 
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biases due to decision-makers’ personal beliefs as well as the inherent difficulties in verifying 
causality rooted in superstitious beliefs. Tsang (2004a, 2004b) suggests that decision-makers 
tend to favor and search for evidence that supports their superstitious beliefs. They are likely to 
attribute positive outcomes to their superstitious practices while ascribing negative outcomes to 
other factors such as misinterpretation of the superstitious advice or failures in carrying out the 
superstitious principles correctly. They also tend to defend the advice givers – “[Even] a good 
physician may sometimes give a wrong diagnosis” or “It’s a bad time to seek help when [gods] 
are having vacations outside their temples” (Tsang, 2004a, p. 98). As such, superstitious 
heuristics may be more resistant to negative feedback as compared to simple rules.  
2.3.5 Superstitious Heuristics in Strategic Decision-making 
As previously mentioned, strategy researchers have studied the role of heuristics in the 
strategic decision process. In regards to universal heuristics, strategy researchers have examined 
the universal heuristics adopted by firm executives and their influences on decision outcomes 
(Schwenk, 1984). These heuristics include representativeness, availability, anchoring, 
overconfidence, reasoning by analogy, simple outcome calculation, and so forth (Busenitz & 
Barney, 1997; Clapham & Schwenk, 1991; Anne S. Huff & Schwenk, 1990; Lovallo & 
Kahneman, 2003; Schwenk, 1984). As for specific heuristics, researchers have studied expert 
intuition adopted by executives as well as simple rules developed by firms in dealing with 
uncertain environment. None of these research streams have tapped on the possible impact of 
superstition in strategic decision-making. In fact, the superstitious aspect of firm executives has 
rarely caught academic attention among Western scholars. For instance, Vyse (2013) has 
identified various occupational groups that are susceptible to superstition, including athletes and 
college students. However, firm executives are not included in his list. Focusing on the Chinese 
 33 
culture, Tsang’s research (2004a, 2004b) is among the very first endeavors to investigate the 
phenomenon of involving superstition in managerial decision-making. His pioneering work 
makes significant contributions to this topic and provides rich first-hand insights from in-depth 
interviews. Nevertheless, the decision examples included in Tsang’s studies are not exclusively 
strategic. More importantly, superstition is not always used as a heuristic in the examples. In 
some cases, superstition is included as a complement to the comprehensive analysis that is 
already performed. In some other cases, superstition is used only for psychological purposes 
such as helping the decision-maker make rational decisions with a peaceful and clear mind. 
Moreover, Tsang’s (2004a, 2004b) qualitative studies are explorative in nature and the 
conclusions are drawn from a limited number of cases. Quantitative studies with large-scale 
samples are needed for further inquiry. Therefore, a systematic investigation of superstitious 
heuristics in strategic decision-making will hopefully help advance heuristics research in the 
strategy literature. 
3 ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF SUPERSTITIOUS HEURISTICS IN 
STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING 
3.1 Antecedents 
Strategic decision-making is characterized by uncertainty (Cyert & March, 1963; 
Schwenk, 1984) which derives from ambiguity and complexity of strategic problems and 
situations. The nature of uncertainty associated with strategic decision-making is especially 
prominent when the firm operates in an environment that consists of numerous variables and 
contingencies and/or changes rapidly and constantly. An environment with an extremely high 
level of uncertainty is characterized as turbulence and unpredictability (Eisenhardt & Sull, 2001). 
How would uncertainty affect top executives in making strategic decisions?  
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The behavioral decision theory (Schwenk, 1984; Simon, 1947, 1955; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974) suggests that decision-makers seek to simplify judgmental tasks under 
uncertainty. The underlying mechanism is bounded rationality (Kahneman, 2003a; Newell & 
Simon, 1972; Simon, 1947, 1955). In contrast to the unrealistic assumption of neoclassical 
economics that decision-makers possess omniscient rationality and always pursue utility 
maximization through searching for the optimal solution, the behavioral decision theory argues 
that decision-makers in reality often satisfice rather than searching for the optimal, especially 
when they are constrained by time, information, and process capacity (Newell & Simon, 1972). 
To satisfice is to search for and be content with a satisfactory and sufficient solution. It is a 
heuristic that simplifies the decision task under complexity and uncertainty. People simplify 
because they are boundedly rational, and their bounded rationality is manifested in two ways – 
cognitive limitation and cognitive laziness. Regarding the former, decision-makers do not always 
have perfect knowledge of all alternatives and probabilities of outcomes. In fact, their rationality 
is often limited by the lack of information and the capacity to process information (Simon, 1947, 
1955). With respect to the latter, people are by nature lazy thinkers. Instead of putting in 
cognitive effort to make an accurate judgment, people are often content with a plausible 
judgment that comes to mind quickly (Kahneman, 2003a, 2011; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). 
In either case, boundedly rational decision-makers engage in heuristics to simplify judgmental 
and decision-making tasks. The chance of simplification through heuristics is likely to increase 
as uncertainty increases in the decision setting. To sum it up, the behavioral decision theory 
suggests that decision uncertainty increases the likelihood of decision-makers’ use of heuristics 
as a result of bounded rationality.  
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The literature on superstition suggests that people resort to superstition when facing 
uncertainty. The underlying mechanism is desire for control. Being in control is an instinctual 
desire and fundamental need of human being (DeCharms, 1968; White, 1959). Uncertainty 
imposes a sense of lacking control or out of control, which causes a painful psychological state 
and an urge to get rid of the state through regain of control (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). 
Research has revealed that superstition is a frequently employed approach to regaining control 
under uncertainty (Case et al., 2004). People engage in superstition for purposes such as making 
sense of the situation, making predictions about the future, influencing chance, and sharing in the 
power of paranormal forces to reestablish control (Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982; Whitson 
& Galinsky, 2008). Specific to decision-making, Tsang (2004b) reported that decision-makers 
sought information from superstitious sources (e.g., paranormal revelations) to reduce 
uncertainty. Case et al. (2004) found that participants in a card-guessing game increasingly 
resorted to a psychic’s card selections when the uncertainty of guessing the correct card 
increased.         
Since people are prone to use heuristics out of bounded rationality and resort to 
superstition out of desire for control under uncertainty, it is reasonable to expect that, in the 
strategic decision context, top executives might combine these two approaches and engage in 
superstitious heuristics to manage uncertainty. The greater the decision uncertainty is, the greater 
the chance might be for superstitious heuristics to occur.   
Hypothesis 1: Decision uncertainty is positively associated with the use of superstitious 
heuristics in strategic decision-making. 
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Strategic decision-making is also featured by high stakes. Strategic decisions generally 
involve large resource commitment and exert profound impact on the firm’s long-term direction 
and performance (Mitchell, Shepherd, & Sharfman, 2011). This high-stakes nature of strategic 
initiatives makes strategic decision-making crucially important. The importance may be further 
amplified when the firm operates in a hostile industry with harsh conditions such as severe 
rivalry among competitors, strong buyer or supplier power, and high threat of new entries and 
substitutes (M. E. Porter, 1979). It would be further compounded by the firm’s limited resources 
and a lack of legitimacy, and worse still, when the firm performance is going downhill 
(Hambrick, Finkelstein, & Mooney, 2005). Strategic decisions become vital in these situations 
because a single wrong decision may jeopardize the survival of the firm. Executives who are to 
make such decisions are likely to experience stress (Xie & Johns, 1995). 
Behavioral decision research has revealed that stress negatively affects individuals’ 
cognitive process in decision-making. Specifically, high level of stress causes cognitive biases in 
information processing, manifested in a narrowing in the focus of attention, a simplification of 
the perceived situation and a reduction in alternatives considered (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 
1981). One explanation is bounded rationality in the sense of limited mental resources. 
Researchers suggest that cognitive and emotional efforts draw on a shared, limited pool of 
mental energy on which System 2 operates. Coping with stress demands both cognitive and 
emotional efforts. As these efforts compete for mental energy, the hold of System 2 on System 1 
will be undermined, which gives rise to heuristics (Kahneman, 2011). Echoing this argument, 
strategic management research (Hambrick et al., 2005; Moore, 1999) suggests that firm 
executives under high stress fail to be deliberate and comprehensive in strategic decision-
making, and the more vital is the decision, the more they rely on heuristics. For instance, 
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Hambrick and D’Aveni (1988) found that executives under the pressure to turn around 
deteriorating financial performance were more likely to take decision shortcuts and resort to 
actions that worked well in the past or for other firms. As such, the heuristics literature suggests 
that decision importance leads to the use of heuristics in strategic decision-making.   
The literature on superstition has identified high stakes as another driving factor of 
superstitious behaviors (Keinan, 2002). The underlying mechanism, again, is desire for control. 
Since in high stakes situations, consequences are vital for one’s primary need (Hamerman & 
Morewedge, 2015; Subbotsky & Quinteros, 2002), people strive to exert control over 
consequences, or outcomes. As already mentioned, one common way for people to seek control 
over outcomes is to use superstitious practices in an attempt to influence chance or manipulate 
powerful paranormal forces so as to maximize positive outcomes and minimize negative ones 
(Rothbaum et al., 1982). Indeed, some researchers have argued that superstitions are performed 
with an exclusive aim to produce desired results (Mauss, 1972; Vyse, 2013). The frequent 
adoption of superstition in high stakes situations is evidence in empirical studies. For instance, 
Malinowski (1948) noticed that deep-sea fishermen developed more elaborated superstitious 
rituals than shallow-water fishermen because of life-threatening weather and water conditions in 
deep sea. Similarly, Keinan (2002) found that people exposed to missile attacks during the Gulf 
War demonstrated more prevalent superstitious practices than those who were not exposed to 
such attacks. Specific to decision-making, managers in Tsang’s (2004a, 2004b) interviews 
articulated the positive relationship between high stakes and resorting to superstitious resources. 
Some managers admitted they always consulted superstitious sources when the decisions to 
make were important. Some others emphasized that they resorted to superstitious sources only 
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when the decisions were crucial – “You won’t bother Wong Tai Sin [a very famous Taoist god in 
Hong Kong] for tiny matters, right?” (Tsang, 2004a, p. 95).  
Based on the above discussions, since in high stakes situations people are prone to use 
heuristics due to bounded rationality and resort to superstition due to desire for control, it is 
reasonable to expect that, in the strategic decision context, top executives might combine both 
and engage in superstitious heuristics when the decisions to make are important. And the more 
important is the decision, the greater the chance for superstitious heuristics to occur.   
Hypothesis 2: Decision importance is positively associated with the use of superstitious 
heuristics in strategic decision-making. 
Behavioral decision researchers identify accessibility as a major mechanism underlying 
heuristics. The basic notion is that people are by nature lazy thinkers and are often satisfied with 
a plausible judgment that readily comes to mind (Kahneman, 2003a; Kahneman & Frederick, 
2002). As already stated, a heuristic occurs when, in the process of making judgment, people 
substitute readily accessible attributes for target attributes that require more mental efforts 
(Kahneman, 2003a). In the case of superstitious heuristics, the stronger a decision-maker holds 
certain superstitious beliefs, the more accessible such beliefs are in his or her mind, and the more 
likely for he or she to substitute a superstitious attribute for a target attribute in making 
judgment. This automatic process activated in System 1 may or may not be detected by System 
2. When System 2 fails to catch this error, the superstitious heuristic is employed unconsciously. 
When System 2 does catch the error, in the case that the decision-maker is strongly superstitious, 
System 2 endorses the error, and the superstitious heuristic is adopted consciously with approval.  
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As such, in the context of strategic decision-making, when the executive is highly 
superstitious, he or she is more likely to adopt superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-
making due to the high accessibility of superstitious beliefs in mind. 
Hypothesis 3: Superstitious thinking is positively associated with the likelihood of the use 
of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making. 
Because decision uncertainty, decision importance, and the decision-maker’s 
superstitious thinking are expected to cause the use of superstitious heuristics independently, and 
two or three of these factors can be simultaneously present in the real-world strategic decision 
process, it is reasonable to examine if there exists any form of interactions among them. Below I 
will first examine the three pairs of two-way interactions and then consider a potential three-way 
interaction.  
A first possibility is that decision uncertainty may strengthen the relationship between 
decision importance and the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making. 
According to the arguments developed for Hypothesis 2, decision importance increases the 
chance of using superstitious heuristics through two mechanisms – 1) bounded rationality 
manifested in limited mental resources and 2) desire for control manifested in motives to 
maximize positive outcomes and minimize negative outcomes. Decision uncertainty is likely to 
strengthen the positive effect of decision importance on the use of superstitious heuristics along 
these two lines. First, decision uncertainty evokes cognitive effort to search for and make sense 
of information so as to reduce ambiguity and complexity. Compared to low decision uncertainty, 
high decision uncertainty demands more cognitive effort and thus consumes more mental 
resources. As more mental resources are taken by the effort coping with uncertainty, less fuel is 
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left for System 2 to function properly, making it more vulnerable to heuristics. In this situation, 
the stress from high stakes of the decision is more likely to result in the use of heuristics. Second, 
decision uncertainty makes decision outcomes unpredictable, which makes it worse when the 
outcomes are high stakes. The executive who is already stressed due to the high stakes may 
become more anxious when decision uncertainty is also high. There is thus an increased chance 
for the executive to resort to superstition to control the outcomes. Combining these two lines of 
arguments, it is safe to predict a positive moderating effect of decision uncertainty on the 
relationship between decision importance and the chance of using superstitious heuristics in 
strategic decision-making. 
Hypothesis 4: Decision uncertainty strengthens the relationship between decision 
importance and the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making. 
In addition, superstitious thinking is likely to strengthen the effects of both decision 
uncertainty and decision importance on the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-
making. Since the rationales are similar in both relationships, my elaboration will only focus on 
decision uncertainty. According to the arguments developed for Hypothesis 1, decision 
uncertainty increases the use of superstitious heuristics through two mechanisms – 1) bounded 
rationality manifested in cognitive limitations (i.e., lack of information and process capacity) and 
cognitive laziness, and 2) desire for control manifested in the motive to get rid of the painful 
psychological state of feeling lacking control under uncertainty. Superstitious thinking is likely 
to strengthen the positive effect of decision uncertainty on the use of superstitious heuristics 
along these two lines. Since accessibility is a core mechanism underlying heuristic process, what 
readily comes to the executive’s mind determines what heuristic is likely to be used to simplify 
decision tasks under uncertainty. If the executive is strongly superstitious, superstitious beliefs 
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will be easily accessible and thus likely to be used as a heuristic attribute to replace target 
attributes in making the strategic decisions. If the executive is not as superstitious, superstitious 
beliefs will not be readily accessible and thus he or she may engage in other types of heuristics 
depending on whatever comes to mind more easily. With regard to desire for control, since a 
strongly superstitious executive genuinely believes in the instrumental efficacy of superstition, 
he or she will be more readily to resort to superstition as a way of regaining control as compared 
to less superstitious peers who may try to regain control in other ways. Combining these two 
lines of arguments, one can expect that, under the same level of decision uncertainty, strongly 
superstitious executives will be more likely to use superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-
making than less superstitious executives. The same rationales apply to the moderating effect of 
superstitious thinking on the relationship between decision importance and the use of 
superstitious heuristics.   
Hypothesis 5: Superstitious thinking strengthens the relationship between decision 
uncertainty and the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making. 
Hypothesis 6: Superstitious thinking strengthens the relationship between decision 
importance and the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making. 
Applying the same mechanisms, I further predict that superstitious thinking will 
strengthen the interactive effect of decision uncertainty and decision importance on the use of 
superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making. Recall that, based on the mechanism of 
bounded rationality, decision uncertainty amplifies the effect of decision importance on the use 
of superstitious heuristics. However, the extent to which the executive relies on superstitious 
heuristics should vary by his or her superstitiousness. If the executive is strongly superstitious, 
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s/he will have superstitious thinking more readily accessible and thus more readily engage in 
superstitious heuristics. Also recall that, based on the mechanism of desire for control, decision 
uncertainty amplifies the effect of decision importance on the use of superstition to seek for 
control over outcomes. An executive who holds strong confidence in the instrumental efficacy of 
superstition will more readily engage in superstition than in cases where there is less confidence 
and more doubts. Combining the arguments, there is likely a three-way interaction of decision 
importance, decision uncertainty, and superstitious thinking in affecting the use of superstitious 
heuristics in strategic decision-making.  
Hypothesis 7: Decision importance, decision uncertainty, and superstitious thinking 
interact to affect the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making. 
Specifically, the relationship between decision importance and the use of superstitious 
heuristics is the strongest when decision uncertainty and superstitious thinking are both 
high. 
The hypothesized main effects and interaction effects of the antecedents of the use of 
superstitious heuristics are illustrated in Figure 1.  
3.2 Consequences  
Regarding the effect of the use of superstitious heuristics on performance, two 
mechanisms are suggested in the literature. The heuristic aspect of superstitious heuristics is, 
according to the heuristics literature, likely to increase decision speed and thereby increase 
performance. The superstitious aspect of superstitious heuristics is, according to the superstition 
literature, likely to increase confidence and thereby increase performance. I explore the two 
mechanisms below. 
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The heuristic – decision speed link is intuitive. While positive and negative views of 
heuristics exist in the literature, both camps agree on the “speedy” nature of heuristics. As Simon  
(1972; 1955) suggested, heuristics are decision shortcuts that are likely to occur when the time 
available for decision-making is limited. By satisficing and going with the first satisfactory 
course of action rather than continuing searching for the optimal, heuristics shorten the decision-
making process and speed up the course reaching a solution. The fast-and-frugal program of 
heuristics research highlights the time efficiency of the use of heuristics in comparison with 
formal, systematical analysis which is generally more time consuming (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 
1996; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). Similarly, the heuristics-and-biases program understands 
heuristics as automatic judgments that quickly come to mind as the product of the fast operating 
System 1 process (Kahneman, 2003a). In heuristics research in strategic management, 
researchers have observed that firms use heuristics or fast-and-hard simple rules to accelerate 
decision-making in fast-moving markets (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2014; Brown & Eisenhardt, 
1997; Eisenhardt & Sull, 2001). As such, the link between heuristics and decision speed is well 
documented in the literature. It is therefore reasonable to expect that superstitious heuristics, as a 
specific type of heuristic, should be positively associated with decision speed like the other types 
of heuristics. 
A rich body of literature in strategic management has investigated the relationship 
between decision speed and performance. The majority empirical studies suggest that decision 
speed is positively linked to performance in dynamic and unpredictable environment (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Judge & Miller, 1991; Souitaris & Maestro, 2010). While acknowledging the role of 
environmental context, Baum and Wally (2003) argue that decision speed improves performance 
in most organizational settings and find support for a positive relationship between decision 
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speed and performance independent of environmental contingents. Decision speed improves 
performance in a variety of ways such as early launch of promising new products or 
technologies, fast adoption of superior business models or operational process, and first mover 
advantages in new markets (Baum & Wally, 2003; Jones, Lanctot Jr, & Teegen, 2001; 
Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). Overall, the essential role of decision speed is to seize and 
exploit opportunities before the windows are closed. While quick decision-making might 
undermine performance when decision accuracy and quality are compromised for speed, 
previous studies showed that decision speed does not necessarily sacrifice comprehensiveness 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Priem, Rasheed, & Kotulic, 1995). Synthesizing the existing findings, I 
believe that there is an overall positive link between decision speed and performance. Since 
superstitious heuristics increase decision speed while decision speed improves performance, it is 
reasonable to expect that superstitious heuristics improve performance through accelerated 
decision speed.  
Because opportunity seizing is the core mechanism through which speedy decision-
making leads to superior performance, the advantage of decision speed will be more salient in 
situations where opportunities disappear quickly. Empirical studies have shown that the 
relationship between decision speed and performance is stronger in high-velocity environment 
(Baum & Wally, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989; Judge & Miller, 1991). In addition, high-velocity 
environment is generally turbulent and unpredictable. Not only that opportunities fleet quickly, 
but the environment is also so complex and ambiguous that thorough understanding and accurate 
prediction become impossible and useless. Atuahene-Gima and Li (2004) described this kind of 
environment unanalyzable. In an unanalyzable environment, slowing down decision-making for 
comprehensive analyses is not beneficial. Rather, making fast decisions and stay flexible and 
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pivotable to instant changes could enable firms to better exploit opportunities and attain valuable 
organizational learning (Mosakowski, 1997). In this regard, the advantage of speedy decision-
making is more prominent in unanalyzable environment. Based on these arguments, I expect that 
the indirect effect of superstitious heuristics on performance through decision speed will be 
stronger in unanalyzable environment.  
H8. The use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making is positively 
associated with performance through decision speed.  
H9. The mediated relationship between the use of superstitious heuristics and 
performance through decision speed is strengthened by environmental unanalyzability. 
From the superstitious aspect, there are arguments suggesting that superstition could 
benefit performance. The literature on superstition has argued that superstitious beliefs and 
behaviors can positively affect one’s psychological states by bringing hope, offering a sense of 
prediction and control, reducing anxiety and fear, and increasing optimism and confidence 
(Darke & Freedman, 1997; Day & Maltby, 2003, 2005; Nemeroff & Rozin, 2000; Vyse, 2013). 
These psychological benefits of superstition are well documented in Tsang’s (2004b) interviews. 
Respondents in his study indicated that superstition made them less uncertain about the future 
and more confident in their decisions (Tsang, 2004a, 2004b). 
How would the psychological benefits of superstition affect performance? One way is 
through enhancing one’s self-efficacy, which refers to one’s belief in his or her capability to 
perform a specific task to a specific level of performance (Bandura, 1997). Self-efficacy theory 
suggests that “individuals are more likely to expect success when they are not beset by aversive 
[emotional] arousal than if they are tense and viscerally agitated” (Bandura, 1997, p. 199). 
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Typical aversive arousal identified in the theory includes stress, anxiety, and fear which 
correspond to the negative emotions that superstition can alleviate. Therefore, superstitious 
beliefs and practices may potentially increase one’s self-efficacy. Self-efficacy has been revealed 
as a significant and consistent predictor of performance (Bandura, 1997) through motivational 
factors such as setting more challenging goals (Zimmerman, 1995) and being more persistent in 
a task (Bandura & Schunk, 1981). Thus, one can assume a causal chain from superstition to self-
efficacy and from self-efficacy to performance. This causal chain has found support in a series of 
experiments conducted by Damisch et al. (2010). The researchers found that superstitious 
behaviors such as keeping one’s fingers crossed or carrying a lucky charm improved 
participants’ performance in a variety of tasks including golfing, motor dexterity, memory, and 
anagram games. They further revealed that superstition improved performance through enhanced 
self-efficacy.  
The positive effect of superstition on performance observed in individuals should be 
observable in the organization through the same mechanism. To explore this possibility, it is 
necessary to bring in the concept of collective efficacy. Collective efficacy is defined as “a 
group’s shared belief in its conjoint capabilities to organize and execute the courses of action 
required to produce given levels of attainments” (Bandura, 1997, p. 477). Collective efficacy was 
developed as an analogous concept of self-efficacy at the group level (Bandura, 1997; G. Chen & 
Bliese, 2002; Lindsley, Brass, & Thomas, 1995). Similar to self-efficacy, collective efficacy has 
been found to be affected by leadership in organizational settings (G. Chen & Bliese, 2002; Jung 
& Sosik, 2002) and positively related to group motivation and outcomes (Gully, Incalcaterra, 
Joshi, & Beaubien, 2002; Prussia & Kinicki, 1996). Applying the relationships among 
superstition, self-efficacy, and performance to the strategic decision context, it is reasonable to 
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expect that the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making may increase the 
collective efficacy of those who implement these decisions and thereby improve performance. 
As noted earlier, strategic decisions are often associated with high stakes and uncertainty. It is 
not uncommon that decision implementors might, to some extent, experience doubt and anxiety 
about the decisions and outcomes. Knowing that a decision is supported by superstitious sources 
or in accordance with superstitious principles may make implementors more confident in the 
decision and in their capabilities to attain the goals of the decision. The enhanced collective 
efficacy among the implementors may promote morale and task persistence in the 
implementation process and ultimately improve performance.    
However, one might reasonably argue that the strategic decision makers may be reluctant 
to openly share with the implementors that a decision is made based on superstitious beliefs. 
Additionally, the implementors may not necessarily agree to the idea of relying on superstitious 
heuristics in strategic decision-making. As such, whether the use of superstitious heuristics 
would increase collective efficacy depends on the culture. If the culture endorses superstitious 
beliefs, superstitious decision-makers may be more willing to share the use of superstitious 
heuristics. The implementors, immersed in the same culture, are also more likely to agree and 
resonate to the superstitious heuristics adopted. In this way, collective efficacy will be effectively 
enhanced.  
Among various cultural dimensions, holistic versus analytic reasoning (Nisbett, Peng, 
Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001) seems most relevant to superstition because this dimension taps into 
differences in views of nature and the world among diverse cultural groups (Henrich, Heine, & 
Norenzayan, 2010a; Nisbett et al., 2001). Analytic reasoning is an object-oriented cognitive 
process. It shows a tendency to detach the object from its context and use rules and categories to 
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understand, explain, and predict behaviors. This approach originates from the ancient Greek 
philosophy which emphasizes the power of the individual and favors formal logic and scientific 
procedures of knowledge acquisition (Nisbett et al., 2001). The approach was reemphasized 
during renaissance to boost the development of modern science and the formation of a scientific 
and rational view of the world. Cultures that feature analytical reasoning endorse the belief that 
all natural events are based on and governed by physical laws rather than magical or mythical 
forces (Frazer, 1922; Subbotsky & Quinteros, 2002; Tambiah, 1990). By contrast, holistic 
reasoning is a cognitive orientation to the field or context as a whole. It pays attention to the 
relationships between a focal object and the context and shows a preference to understand, 
explain, and predict behaviors based on such relationships. Holistic reasoning is embedded in 
intuitive understanding through direct perceptions, and generates a pattern of knowledge 
acquisition based on experience and concrete cases (Nisbett et al., 2001). The orientation towards 
the field resulted in rich concepts about “force over distance” in cultures featuring holistic 
reasoning (Peng & Nisbett, 1999). Such concepts make people in holistic cultures more tolerant 
of beliefs in mythical forces (Subbotsky & Quinteros, 2002). For instance, a typical belief from 
holistic reasoning is that everything, known or unknown, is somehow intertwined through 
causality (Choi, Koo, & Choi, 2007). As such, a culture characterized by holistic reasoning, 
compared to those featured by analytical reasoning, is more likely to endorse superstitious 
thinking. Accordingly, the use of superstitious heuristics is likely to enhance collective efficacy 
and performance in a holistic reasoning culture.   
Hypothesis 10: The use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making is 
positively associated with performance through collective efficacy. 
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Hypothesis 11: The mediated relationship between the use of superstitious heuristics and 
performance through collective efficacy is strengthened by holistic reasoning. 
The hypothesized relationships between the use of superstitious heuristics and its 
consequences are illustrated in Figure 2. The performance consequence will be examined 
through both decision performance and firm performance.  
4 EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
This dissertation includes three empirical studies. In Study 1, two scales for the construct 
of the superstitious heuristic were developed and validated. As mentioned earlier, although there 
are many superstitious belief scales in the literature, there does not exist a scale to measure 
superstitious behavior in decision-making. Therefore, scale development was a critical first step.  
After the scales were developed, an experiment (Study 2) and a survey study (Study 3) 
were administered to investigate the antecedents and consequences of the use of superstitious 
heuristics in strategic decision-making. A combination of experimental and survey studies was 
designed to ensure both internal and external validity (Schwenk, 1984). Studies 2 and 3 were 
conducted in China to take advantage of the country’s prevalence and variance in the use of 
superstitious heuristics in strategic decision practice.  
4.1 Study 1 
The goal for Study 1 was to develop and validate a scale measure for the superstitious 
heuristic. Since there is a rich body of research on superstition, I employed the deductive 
approach to scale development. The deductive approach is suitable when theory exists to guide 
the development of the definition and the dimensions of the construct of interest (Hinkin, 1998). 
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 According to the standard of the American Psychological Association, a quality new 
measure must demonstrate satisfactory construct validity, which indicates the extent to which the 
scale measures the construct that it is purported to measure (Hinkin, 1998). Construct validity is 
critical in scale development as it corresponds the empirical operationalization with the theory. 
Construct validity is established through the demonstration of content validity, convergent 
validity, and discriminant validity (American Psychological Association, 2014). In this 
dissertation, I followed Hinkin’s (1998) general instructions for scale development and 
validation.  
4.1.1 Item Generation 
4.1.1.1 Pretest 1 
As previously noted, a thorough review of the literature suggested five potential 
categories of superstitious heuristics. To determine if the five categories exhaustively capture all 
possible superstitious heuristics used in different cultures, I conducted a first pretest using the 
student pool at Baruch College. The use of Baruch students for the pretest was based the 
consideration that Baruch College is recognized as one of the most culturally diverse campuses 
in the United States, with the student body representing more than 170 countries (Baruch 
College, 2018). The student pool at Baruch College should therefore provide a relatively 
comprehensive view of various superstitious heuristics that are practiced in different cultures.   
A sample of 144 undergraduate students were recruited to participate in the pretest. After 
dropping responses that failed to follow instructions, the final sample included 118 respondents 
(58 men, age: M = 21.9, SD = 3.48). These respondents were from over 30 self-identified 
national/ethnic cultures, including 33 specified and 6 unspecified cultures.  
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In the first step, respondents read the definition of superstitious beliefs, examples of 
superstitious beliefs, and examples of making decisions based on superstitious beliefs. Next, they 
were required to provide five examples of people making decisions based on superstitious beliefs 
in the culture they most identify with. A total of 360 examples were provided by the respondents 
(Table 5 presents a sample of the examples). While the majority of the examples were related to 
decision-making as instructed, some respondents framed their responses as beliefs or principles, 
such as “6 is a good and lucky number” or “Don’t split the pole or you’ll have bad luck.” These 
examples were considered as invalid.   
I went through the valid examples to check if any of them could not be assigned to the 
five theoretically derived categories. The results suggested that all the examples were included in 
the five categories. Since the results were based on a survey to more than 33 self-identified 
national/ethnic cultures, they served as an indication that the five theoretically derived categories 
were exhaustive.  
4.1.1.2 Item Generation 
After the dimensions of superstitious heuristics were confirmed in Pretest 1, initial items 
were generated to tap each of the dimensions. All items were worded to assess the extent to 
which a certain consideration is used as a decision rule in the decision-making process. A 5-point 
Likert scale was used: 1 = Not at all, 2 = Slightly, 3 = Moderately, 4 = Considerably, 5 = A great 
deal.  
Research on scale development has suggested that a retention of four to six items for each 
dimension in the final scale is ideal considering the length of the measure and the internal 
consistency reliabilities of the items (Harvey, Billings, & Nilan, 1985; Schmitt & Stuits, 1985; 
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Schriesheim & Hinkin, 1990). Anticipating that a large portion of the initial items could be 
eliminated during the validation process (Hinkin, 1998), a total 86 items were generated. 
Because the scale under development was purported to be applicable across cultures, culturally 
specific contents were avoided whenever possible. For example, “a certain number” was used 
instead of “7” or “13.”  
Some superstition researchers have recently suggested that positive superstitions and 
negative superstitions should be considered as different categories as they might be driven by 
different factors and have different effects (Fluke, Webster, & Saucier, 2014; Vyse, 2013; 
Wiseman & Watt, 2004). I thus generated a positive and a negative version for each item and 
thereby changed each item into an item pair. For example, in the item pair regarding numbers, 
the positive item stated, “Whether a certain number is lucky” and the negative item stated, 
“Whether a certain number is unlucky.” A complete list of the negative initial items is exhibited 
in Table 6. The positive items are omitted because they are identical with their counterparts 
except for the valence.  
4.1.1.3 Pretest 2 
After the initial items were generated, I conducted Pretest 2 to assess the content validity 
of these items. Participants for Pretest 2 were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). 
MTurk is a crowd sourcing website where requestors can post a Human Intelligence Task (HIT) 
which MTurk workers complete for pay. MTurk has been increasingly used by researchers in 
social science as a platform to administer online surveys (Weinberg, Freese, & McElhattan, 
2014). Results from cross-sample investigations in various research domains have shown that 
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MTurk samples tend to be more diverse and produce better quality data than traditional 
participant pools (Weinberg, Freese, & McElhattan, 2014).  
A group of 100 individuals were recruited to participate in the pretest. After dropping 
those who missed at least one attention check, 92 participants were included in the final analyses 
(33 men; age: M = 36.91, SD = 12.42). The sample size was considered adequate for content 
analysis according to the literature (Behrend, Sharek, Meade, & Wiebe, 2011; Goodman, Cryder, 
& Cheema, 2013; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010; Summerville & Chartier, 2013; 
Weinberg et al., 2014).  
Because the positive and negative items from the same pair share identical content, only 
the 86 negative items were used in the pretest. Following MacKenzie, Podsakoff, and Fetter 
(1991), I provided the definition and examples of each superstitious heuristic dimension and 
asked participants to assign each of the items to the category that they considered most relevant. 
The items were presented to participants in random order to eliminate order bias (Schwarz, 
1999). In addition to the five categories, I included an “other” category for participants to assign 
items they deemed not belonging to any of the five dimensions. This was aimed to make sure 
participants would match the items and dimensions only when they felt truly relevant.  
Items that were correctly assigned by over 70 percent of the participants were considered 
representative of its dimension. As shown in table 6, 11 items fail to reach this threshold. There 
were four items from the dimension of “Object/Act” – “Whether a particular day is unlucky” 
(67%), “Whether particular colors hurt the luck of important individuals related to the decision, 
including myself” (67%), “Whether a particular word or name is unlucky” (69%), “Whether a 
person may bring bad luck to important individuals related to the decision, including myself” 
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(55%). I suspected that some participants failed to correctly assign these items because, in an 
ordinary sense, a day, color, word/name, or person are not typically considered as an “object.” I 
therefore decided to keep these items and leave them up to examinations in next steps. As a 
result, 79 out of the 86 negative items passed content validity test. Bringing in their positive 
counterparts, a total of 158 items were retained for further examination.  
4.1.2 Questionnaire Administration 
The aim of this step was to collect data for the initial development of the scale and the 
assessment of its psychometric properties, including factor structure, consistency reliability, 
convergent validity, discriminant validity, and nomological validity. A questionnaire was 
developed to include all the 158 superstitious heuristic items and scales that were to be used in 
the validation process (all the scales are presented in Appendix A). It is worth noting that, to 
avoid respondent fatigue, only a random subset of the validation scales was presented in data 
collection. The scales for criterion-related validity were included in a separate questionnaire and 
administered four weeks later after the main questionnaire. 
4.1.2.1 Measures 
Superstitious heuristic item pool. The 158 superstitious heuristic items that survived 
Pretest 2 were presented to all respondents. The leading question stated, “When making a 
decision, to what extent do you base your decision on the following considerations as decision 
rules?” The response anchor ranged from 1 = “Not at all” to 5 = “A great deal.” 
Scales for convergent validity test. Convergent validity refers to the extent to which the 
new scale correlates with established measures of the same or similar constructs (Schwarz, 
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1999). Because there are no existing scales for superstitious heuristics or superstitious behaviors 
in general, scales that measure superstitious beliefs were used instead to evaluate the convergent 
validity of the new scale. Specifically, the widely used Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (RPBS) 
(a = 0.9472) (Tobacyk, 2004) and the recently developed Belief in Superstition Scale (BSS) (a = 
0.862) (Fluke et al., 2014) were included in the English version of the questionnaire. The 
frequently used Fatalistic Superstition Belief inventory (FSBI) (a = 0.926) (Yang, 2007) was 
included in the Chinese version of the questionnaire. The reason to administer the questionnaire 
in two different languages are explained later in this section.  
Scales for discriminant validity test. Discriminant validity refers to the extent to which 
the new scale does not correlate with the measures of dissimilar constructs (Hinkin, 1998). The 
discriminant validity of the new scale was examined using the operationalizations the three 
classic heuristics in the literature, i.e., representativeness, availability, and anchoring. The Big 
Five scales were also included to assess the discriminate validity of the scale from personality. 
Since there are no existing Likert scales for representativeness, availability, and anchoring, and 
these heuristics were typically measured with probabilities questions in lab experiments 
(Bazerman & Moore, 2008; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), three 
sets of questions per heuristic were selected from the literature to construct an overall score for 
each of the heuristics. Changes were made to one set of the questions for anchoring (See details 
in Appendix A). The mini-IPIP scales (Donnellan, Oswald, Baird, & Lucas, 2006), which are a 
short version of the 50-item International Personality Item Pool, were used to measure the Big 
 
2 The Cronbach’s alphas reported in this section are based on the sample for developing the 
positive SHS. 
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Five factors of personality. The Cronbach’s alpha was 0.776, 0.706, 0.609, 0.718, and 0.709 for 
Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness, respectively. 
Scales for nomological validity. Nomological validity assesses the extent to which the 
new scale correlates with the measures of constructs that are theoretically correlated with 
(Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). A nomological network of the use of superstitious heuristics would 
include constructs that predict it (i.e., antecedents) and constructs that are predicted by it (i.e., 
consequences). Regarding the antecedents, the superstition literature suggests that individuals 
with an external locus of control and less use of analytical thinking tend to be more superstitious 
(See a review by Vyse (2013)). These variable measures were included in the questionnaire. 
Locus of control was measured using the scale developed by Rotter (1966) (a = 0.713). 
Analytical thinking was measured by the cognitive reflection test (CRT) developed by Frederick 
(2005) (a = 0.765). In addition to these psychological constructs, demographic questions 
including gender, age, education, and religion were included in the questionnaire. Lastly, as 
culture plays an important role in shaping one’s perception and understanding of the world, 
questions about self-identified culture were also included. These questions were to be used to 
operationalize holistic versus analytic cultures (E. E. Buchtel & Norenzayan, 2009; Nisbett et al., 
2001; Subbotsky & Quinteros, 2002).    
As for the consequences, the superstition literature suggests that superstitious beliefs and 
practices can effectively increase individuals’ perceived control, confidence, self-efficacy, and 
task performance (Case et al., 2004; Damisch et al., 2010; Keinan, 2002; Nemeroff & Rozin, 
2000; Vyse, 2013; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). In addition, the heuristics literature suggests that 
by definition the use of heuristics increases decision speed and decreases decision 
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comprehensiveness. I thus used perceived control, decision confidence, self-efficacy (in decision 
implementation), decision effectiveness, decision speed, and decision comprehensiveness for the 
evaluation of the new scale’s criterion-related validity, or predictive validity.  
Perceived control was measured from two angles; perceived control in general and 
perceived control specific to luck. Perceived control in general was measured using two items 
adapted from original questions. The two items are “In general, how much control do you think 
you have over the outcomes of your decisions?” (Case et al., 2004) and “By making your 
choices, how much control do you think you have exerted over the outcomes of your choices?” 
(Blackmore & Trościanko, 1985) (a = 0.799). Perceived control specific to luck was measured 
by two items I created based on the superstition literature. The items are “By making your 
choices, how much control do you think you have exerted over your luck?” and “By making 
your choices, how much control do you think you have exerted over chance?” (Fluke et al., 
2014; Rothbaum et al., 1982) (a = 0.753). Decision confidence was measured likewise. Decision 
confidence in general was measured using two items, “In general, to what extent do you feel 
confident that the outcomes of your decisions will be satisfactory?” (Zakay & Tsal, 1993) and 
“In general, to what extent do you feel confident that you are making the right choice?” (Dean & 
Sharfman, 1993) (a = 0.790). Decision confidence specific to luck was measured with two items 
I created based on the superstition literature. The items are “In general, to what extent do you 
feel confident that your choices will bring good luck?” and “In general, to what extent do you 
feel confident that your choices will avoid bad luck?” (Vyse, 2013) (a = 0.851). Self-efficacy in 
decision implementation was measured using a 8-item scale adapted from Chen et al.’s (2001) 
NGSE scale. A sample item was, “Generally speaking, in carrying out my decisions, I will be 
able to successfully overcome many challenges” (a = 0.898). Decision effectiveness was 
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measured using three items adapted from the original questions. These items are “In general, 
how effective are the results of your decisions?” (C. M. Ford & Gioia, 2000), “In general, how 
successful are the results of your decisions?” (Dean & Sharfman, 1996) and “In general, how is 
the overall quality of your decisions?” (Amason, 1996) (a = 0.880).  
Decision speed was measured using a 3-item scale adapted from Souitaris and Maestro 
(2010). A sample item is “I prefer and tend to take my time when making decisions” (a = 0.649). 
Decision comprehensiveness was measured using a 5-item scale adapted from Atuahene-Gima 
and Li (2004). A sample item is “I search extensively for possible alternative courses of action” 
(a = 0.879).  I measured the use of heuristics with three items I generated based on the heuristics 
literature. These three items are “I use simple decision rules to simplify decision tasks,” “I use 
rules of thumb to make decisions quickly,” and “I use decision shortcuts to find good enough 
solutions.” (Eisenhardt & Sull, 2001; Simon, 1955) (a = 0.650). 
4.1.2.2 Sample and Procedure 
The initial plan was to recruit respondents solely from Amazon Mturk. Because the scale 
under development was aimed to be applicable in different decision settings and cultures, the 
diversity of Mturk workers in demographics and country of origin makes the Mturk sample ideal 
to the study. Regarding the country of origin, MTurk provides access to workers from 190 
countries (https://requester.mturk.com/tour), which offers a convenient way to approach a 
culturally diverse population.  
In spite of the global composition, however, a study by Difallah, Filatova, and Ipeirotis 
(2018) reports that most of the Mturk workers are from the United States (75%), India (16%), 
Canada (1.1%), Great Britain (0.7%), Philippines (0.35%), and Germany (0.27%), featured by 
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the disproportionately high percentage of US and India. To avoid my sample being dominated by 
the US and Indian workers, I set quotas to each geographic region and run a pilot to assess the 
difficulty composing a relatively representative sample of the global population. The quotas were 
determined based on the data of population by region (as of 2017) provided by the World Bank – 
East Asia and Pacific (30.73%), South Asia (23.75%), Sub-Saharan Africa (14.09%), Europe and 
Central Asia (12.16%), Latin America and Caribbean (8.55%), Middle East and North Africa 
(5.9%), and North America (4.81%). The pilot recruited 134 respondents over two weeks. As 
expected, the quotas for South Asia and North America were filled quickly. Quotas for Europe 
and Central Asia as well as Latin America and Caribbean were filled at a lower rate. However, 
only a few respondents from East Asia and Pacific, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East and 
North Africa participated. This is consistent with previous findings that relatively few Mturk 
workers are from these regions (Difallah et al., 2018). The difficulty recruiting respondents from 
East Asia was a big concern especially given the high proportion of East Asians in the world 
population and the prevalence of superstition among business practices in this region.  
In order to help filling the quota of East Asia, I employed the panel service of 
Wenjuanxing (www.wjx.cn) to reach potential respondents from Mainland China. Wenjuanxing 
is the largest Chinese online survey platform and widely used by researchers to administer online 
surveys to the Chinese population (Zheng & Zheng, 2015). Wenjuanxing Panel has more than 
2.6 million registered survey participants nationwide, of which 48 percent are female, 70 percent 
are between the age of 21 to 40, 39.2 percent are company employees, followed by students 
(26.3%), managers (10.2 percent), scientific researchers (9.7%), government employees (4.2%), 
professionals (3.1%), self-employed (1.8%), and other (5.5%). Since the panel service required 
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the questionnaire to be administered in Chinese, the English questionnaire was translated into 
Chinese following the translation-back translation instructions (Brislin, 1986).   
The main questionnaire was administered on Mturk and Wenjuanxing during the same 
period of time. The initial sample included 1,053 Mturk workers and 430 Wenjuanxing Panel 
members. After removing responses that missed at least one attention check or more than 5 
percent3 of the total superstitious heuristic items, a sample of 1,124 respondents (694 Mturk 
respondents and 430 Wenjuanxing respondents) were retained for data analysis. I then randomly 
assigned 2/3 of the sample (i.e., 750 respondents) into a subsample for exploratory factor 
analysis (EFA) and the rest 1/3 (i.e., 374 respondents) for confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). 
The subsample sizes are sufficient based on the literature where recommendations for item-to-
response ratios for EFA range from 1:4 to 1:10, and a minimum size of 200 respondents is 
recommended for CFA (Hinkin, 1998).  
The questionnaire with scales for criterion-related validity test was administered four 
weeks later to 200 Mturk workers who had participated in the main questionnaire and were 
retained in the final sample. After dropping respondents that missed at least one attention check, 
166 respondents were included in the final sample.  
4.1.3 Scale Development and Validation 
My initial plan was to develop a scale that consists of both positive and negative items. 
Using the subsample that was allocated for exploratory factor analysis, I submitted all the 158 
items for an initial assessment of the underlying factor structure. Because the main questionnaire 
 
3 Five percent cutoff is a relatively conservative acceptable rate regarding missing data (Little, 
Jorgensen, Lang, & Moore, 2013; Schafer, 1999). 
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was administered in two languages (i.e., English and Chinese) to two different groups (i.e., 
Mturk workers and Wenjuanxing panel members), the two datasets could not be combined or 
treated as one dataset due to the lack of established measurement equivalence between the two 
languages and groups. As such, I used multiple-group exploratory factor analysis (MGEFA) 
(Morin, Marsh, & Nagengast, 2013; Muthén & Muthén, 2017) instead of the regular EFA. 
Unfortunately, results showed complicated factor structures that were difficult to make 
theoretical sense. I therefore decided to develop a positive scale and a negative scale instead.  
A notable finding from this step was that positive items, on average, received higher 
ratings than their negative counterparts. This is true for both the English group (diff = 0.132, 
t(693) = 9.340, p = 0.000) and the Chinese group (diff = 0.175, t(429) = 8.637, p = 0.000). The 
finding shows that, in general, people use positive superstitious heuristics more than negative 
superstitious heuristics in decision-making. 
4.1.3.1 Positive Superstitious Heuristics Scale (Positive SHS) 
4.1.3.1.1 Exploratory Analysis – MGEFA 
 
Sample 
The final sample used for developing the positive SHS was obtained by dropping from 
the initial sample responses that missed at least one of the attention checks that were placed 
among the positive items and responses with missing values on more than 5 percent of the 
positive items. A total of 1,179 respondents from 61 self-identified national cultures (see Table 
7) were retained, of which two thirds were randomly selected into a subsample for exploring the 
factor structure of the positive scale.  
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The subsample included 780 respondents, with 493 respondents from the English group 
(63.21%) and 287 respondents from the Chinese group (36.79%). 403 respondents were female 
(51.67%). The average age was 34.32 with a standard deviation of 10.78.   
The 780 respondents were from 54 self-identified national cultures and 7 geographic 
cultural clusters. A breakdown by national culture suggests that 204 respondents identified with 
the American culture (26.15%), 291 respondents identified with the Chinese culture (37.31%), 
109 respondents identified with the Indian culture (13.97%), and 176 respondents identified with 
other cultures (22.57%). A breakdown by geographic cultural cluster suggests that 305 
respondents were from the East Asia and Pacific cluster (excluding Australia and New Zealand) 
(39.10%), 226 respondents from the North America cluster (28.97%), 97 respondents from the 
Europe and Central Asia cluster (including Australia and New Zealand) (12.44%), 110 
respondents from the South Asia cluster (14.10%), 31 respondents from the Latin America 
cluster (3.97%), 5 respondents from the Sub-Saharan Africa cluster (0.64%), 4 respondents from 
the Middle East and North Africa cluster (0.51%), and 2 respondents did not specify cultural 
identity (0.26%). 
Method 
As noted earlier, because the main questionnaire was administered in two different 
languages (i.e., English and Chinese), the datasets could not be combined for regular EFA 
because measurement equivalence is not established between the two languages. As an 
alternative, MGEFA was used to explore the factor structure of the scale among the two groups 
separately yet simultaneously with the constraint of measurement equivalence.  
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Measurement equivalence, also referred to as measurement invariance, is a property of a 
measurement instrument indicating that the instrument measures the same thing in the same way 
across different respondent groups. In other words, respondents from different groups should 
give a similar response if they share a similar position on a particular attribute measured. The 
attribute can thus be meaningfully compared across these different groups (Davidov, Meuleman, 
Cieciuch, Schmidt, & Billiet, 2014; Johnson, 1998).  
The literature identifies three levels of measurement equivalence, with higher levels 
supporting more options of cross-group comparisons. The first and lowest level is configural 
equivalence, the establishment of which indicates that a same factor structure of the concept 
measured exists across groups. The second level is called metric equivalence, which requires not 
only the factor structure but also the factor loadings of the items to be equal across groups. 
Metric equivalence makes unit changes on the instrument meaningfully comparable among 
different groups. The third level is scalar (strong) equivalence, which demands equal item 
intercepts across groups on top of factor structures and loadings. The equality of item intercepts 
means that the instrument has the same origin among different groups, which makes the 
comparison of the means possible. In general, measurement equivalence is said achieved when 
the scalar equivalence is established (Davidov et al., 2014; Marsh et al., 2009; Meredith, 1993).   
Measurement equivalence is tested by observing the goodness-of-fit indices when 
specific parameters are constrained at relevant levels. Common indices used in the literature 
include the comparative fit index (CFI), the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), 
and the standardized root mean residual (SRMR) (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 
2004). Although Chi-squared statistic (c2) is also considered by researchers, it is highly sensitive 
to large sample size (N>200). As such, I mainly relied on the first three indices for model 
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evaluation. According to the literature, CFI>0.95 and 0.90 are considered as excellent and 
adequate fit, respectively, and RMSEA<0.06 and 0.08 are considered as excellent and adequate 
fit. SRMR<0.08 is considered as excellent model fit (F. Chen, Curran, Bollen, Kirby, & Paxton, 
2008; Hu & Bentler, 1999; Marsh et al., 2004).  
I used Mplus 8.2 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2017) to perform MGEFA. Mplus is a latent 
variable modeling program with powerful analysis capabilities including EFA, CFA, and 
structure equation modeling (SEM). It also has a superior feature in handling missing data with 
the option of full information maximum likelihood (FIML) to preserve statistical power which 
would be lost if incomplete data have to be dropped from analysis (Enders & Bandalos, 2001). 
Prior to performing MGEFA, several decisions needed to be made. The first was to 
choose an appropriate estimator. I first examined the normality of both the English and Chinese 
data. The Skewness and Kurtosis test was used for assessing univariate normality and the 
Mardia’s test was used for assessing multivariate normality (Wang & Wang, 2012). Based on the 
joint results of the Skewness and Kurtosis tests for univariate normality, none of the 79 positive 
items were normally distributed, either in the English group or the Chinese group, although 
stronger non-normality was observed in the English group. Similarly, results of the Mardia’s 
tests for both skewness and kurtosis suggested that the assumption of multivariate normality was 
violated in both groups with more severity in the English group. As such, an estimator that deals 
with non-normal data was required. Additionally, the English data did not meet the assumption 
of independence because the respondents were nested in national cultures. This interdependence 
in the data was also needed to be handled. The robust maximum likelihood estimator (MLR), 
which corrects for bias in standard errors and fit indices caused by non-normality and non-
 65 
independence of the data (Finney & DiStefano, 2006; Muthén & Muthén, 2017), was therefore 
considered ideal for my data analysis.    
A second decision was to choose the appropriate type of rotation in factor analysis. There 
are two general types of rotation, orthogonal and oblique. An orthogonal rotation generates 
factors that are uncorrelated with other, whereas an oblique rotation allows factors to be 
correlated or uncorrelated (Furr & Bacharach, 2013). I decided to use the oblique rotation in data 
analysis for the following reasons. Theoretically, the five dimensions of superstitious heuristics 
are likely to be correlated. An individual who uses one type of superstitious heuristics is likely to 
also use other types of superstitious heuristics due to the common driven force, namely, his or 
her superstitiousness. Empirically, results from correlation analyses suggested that items were 
correlated with each other across dimensions (pairwise correlation coefficients range from r = 
0.236 to 0.893 for the English data and range from r = 0.178 to 0.843 for the Chinese data). 
Methodologically, the oblique rotation allows the factors to be uncorrelated. If the extracted 
factors were in fact orthogonal, the oblique rotation should yield the same results as the 
orthogonal rotation. Based on these three reasons, the oblique rotation was deemed appropriate 
for the analysis. Accordingly, I used the Geomin rotation, which is Mplus’s default option for 
oblique rotation (Muthén & Muthén, 2017). 
A third decision was about the number of factors to retain. I selected the optimal number 
based on theory and the results of parallel analysis. Research (Hayton, Allen, & Scarpello, 2004; 
Henson & Roberts, 2006; Zwick & Velicer, 1986) has shown that parallel analysis yields more 
accurate results than conventional methods such as comparing eigenvalues with 1 (Kaiser, 1960) 
or eyeballing the scree plot (Cattell, 1966). Parallel analysis (Glorfeld, 1995; Horn, 1965) 
involves the comparison of the real data’s eigenvalues with eigenvalues of a set of randomly 
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generated correlation matrices with the same numbers of variables and observations as the real 
data. Any factor from the real data with an eigenvalue higher than the eigenvalue of its 
counterpart from the random correlation matrices is considered meaningful. As such, the optimal 
number of factors to retain is the total number of factors with eigenvalues exceeding the 
randomly generated eigenvalues. Using the parallel option in Mplus, I conducted parallel 
analysis to the English and Chinese dataset separately. For the English data, results showed that 
the first five eigenvalues from the real dataset exceeded the eigenvalues (both average and 95 
percentile) from the random matrices, suggesting a five-factor solution. For the Chinese data, 
however, the fifth eigenvalue was smaller than the randomly generated value (both average and 
95 percentile), suggesting a four-factor solution. A comparison of the four-factor model and the 
five-factor model, however, suggests that the five-factor solution is a better fit (c2(75) = 655.817, 
p=0.000). Since the five-factor structure also aligns with the theoretically derived dimensionality 
of superstitious heuristics, I concluded that retaining five factors was reasonable for the Chinese 
data. Therefore, I decided that a five-factor structure is optimal for the positive scale. 
 
Results 
All 79 positive items were submitted to MGEFA with the estimator being MLR, the type 
of rotation being Geomin, and the number of factors set to five. Measurement invariance was 
held at the scalar (strong) level, that is, equality of factor structure, factor loadings, and intercepts 
of the factor indicators (items) across the English and Chinese groups was imposed. Table 8 
presents the factor loadings of all 79 items in the two groups. Loadings over 0.40 are in bold (J. 
K. Ford, MacCallum, & Tait, 1986). As shown in Table 8, in both groups, most of the items 
loaded strongly on a single factor, and items that were created for the same dimension loaded on 
 67 
the same factor. For example, all the 16 birth-related items loaded on the first factor in both 
groups, with no cross-loading present by the 0.40 cutoff criteria. This clear loading pattern 
makes the factors easily interpretable. The first factor represents Birth Profile, the second factor 
Physical Attribute, the third factor Object/Act, the fourth factor Surrounding Environment, the 
fifth factor Paranormal Revelation. As such, the factor structure derived from the data matched 
with the dimensionality derived from the theory.     
The literature suggests that a retention of four to six items are suitable for a newly 
developed scale, with four items being the minimum for stable internal consistency and 
psychometric properties (Harvey et al., 1985; Hinkin, 1998; Saucier & Goldberg, 2002). 
Following this guidance, I decided to retain four items per subscale (factor) and thereby creating 
a 20-item positive scale of superstitious heuristics. Items to be retained were selected on the basis 
of two considerations. First, the item should strongly and uniquely reflect its main factor, which 
should be demonstrated by a strong single loading or a significant difference between the main 
loading and the cross loading (Hinkin, 1998). Second, the item should increase the coverage of 
the factor’s theoretical content. In other words, the selected items should capture as many 
theoretical facets of the factor as possible (Churchill, 1979). Based on these principles, I selected 
20 items (marked with asterisks in Table 8) and submitted to MGEFA to assess the factor 
structure and fit indices.  
Results of MGEFA showed a clear five-factor structure with no cross-loadings exceeding 
0.40 in both Chinese and English groups. All three indices indicated an excellent fit of the 
model: CFI=0.953, RMSEA=0.055 (90% CI = 0.048-0.062), SRMR=0.044. The result of 
excellent fit did not only support the five-factor structure in both groups, but it also demonstrated 
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measurement equivalence of the 20 items across the two groups. Therefore, I retained these 20 
items to construct the final positive scale.  
Now that measurement equivalence was established between the English and Chinese 
groups, I combined the two datasets (Byrne, 2004) to report factor loadings (Table 9), factor 
correlations (Table 10), and internal consistency reliabilities (Table 10). Factor loadings and 
correlations were obtained from an ordinary EFA estimated with MLR and Geomin rotation 
using the combined dataset. Fit indices from the EFA confirmed the excellent fit of the factor 
structure: CFI=0.992, RMSEA=0.029 (90% CI = 0.021-0.037), SRMR=0.011. The five-factor 
structure is also clearly demonstrated in Table 9. As for relationships among the factors, Table 
10 shows that the five factors are intercorrelated, with the smallest magnitude between Physical 
Attribute and Paranormal Revelation (r = 0.422) and the largest magnitude between Birth Profile 
and Object/Act (r = 0.752). The substantial correlations among the factors suggest that a 
meaningful total score of superstitious heuristics can be calculated from the scale for each 
respondent (Furr & Bacharach, 2013). The last column of Table 10 presents the internal 
consistency reliability for each of the five subscales assessed with Cronbach’s alpha  (Price & 
Mueller, 1986). Internal consistency reliability evaluates the extent to which the items that assess 
the same construct or dimension yield consistent results. All five subscales demonstrate high 
reliability well above the 0.70 minimum requirement for newly developed scales (Hinkin, 1998).  
Up to now, a 5-factor, 20-item positive SHS was developed through MGEFA. The factor 
structure of the scale demonstrated excellent fit, and the measurement equivalence of the scale 
was established between the English and Chinese languages. The five factors were 
intercorrelated as predicted, and the five subscales demonstrated high internal consistency 
reliability.  
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4.1.3.1.2 Confirmatory Analysis – Exploratory Structural Equation Modeling (ESEM) 
The purpose of this step was to use a new sample to 1) confirm the factor structure of the 
positive SHS developed in the previous step, and 2) test the invariance of the scale across 
language and culture.  
Sample 
The sample used for the confirmatory analysis was the other one third of the final sample 
(N=1,179). This subsample included 399 respondents, with 256 respondents from the English 
group (64.16%) and 143 respondents from the Chinese group (35.84%). 198 respondents were 
female (49.62%). The age of the sample had a mean of 33.49 and a standard deviation of 9.87.   
The 399 respondents are from 32 self-identified national cultures and 7 geographic 
cultural clusters. A breakdown by national culture suggests that 88 respondents identify with the 
American culture (22.06%), 146 respondents identify with the Chinese culture (36.59%), 62 
respondents identify with the Indian culture (15.54%), and 103 respondents identify with other 
cultures (25.81%). A breakdown by geographic cultural cluster indicates that 154 respondents 
are from the East Asia and Pacific cluster (excluding Australia and New Zealand) (38.60%), 99 
respondents from the North America cluster (24.81%), 57 respondents from the Europe and 
Central Asia cluster (including Australia and New Zealand) (14.29%), 65 respondents from the 
South Asia cluster (16.29%), 17 respondents from the Latin America cluster (4.26%), five 
respondents from the Sub-Saharan Africa cluster (1.25%), one respondent from the Middle East 
and North Africa cluster (0.25%), and one respondent did not reveal cultural identity (0.25%). 
Method 
 70 
Exploratory structural equation modeling (ESEM) was used to perform the confirmatory 
analysis. Because the data was collected in two languages (i.e., English and Chinese), I initially 
considered using multigroup confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA). However, MGCFA, like 
regular CFA, does not allow item cross-loadings. Instead, it forces all items to load only on their 
purported factors and sets cross-loadings on other factors to be zero. Researchers have criticized 
that this constraint imposed by CFA hinders a realistic presentation of the data and undermines 
goodness-of-fit of the model. ESEM, which provides the same methodological advantages of 
CFA (and MGCFA) while allowing factor loadings to be freely estimated, is proposed as a more 
flexible alternative for confirmatory analysis (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2009; Tóth-Király, Bõthe, 
Rigó, & Orosz, 2017). For this reason, I used ESEM instead of MGCFA in the study.  
The target rotation was used to allow but “target” cross-loadings to be zero. Specifically, 
the 20 items were specified in the model to load on their respective main factors while allowed to 
load on other factors. The targeted values for loadings on the other factors were set to be zero to 
guide the rotation (Muthén & Muthén, 2017; Tóth-Király et al., 2017). Like in the previous step, 
data was estimated using MLR to correct bias caused by non-normality and non-independence of 
the data (Finney & DiStefano, 2006; Muthén & Muthén, 2017). Scalar (strong) equivalence was 
imposed by holding factor loadings and intercepts to be equal. CFI, RMSEA, and SRMR were 
used to assess model fit.  
Results 
A clear five-factor structure emerged in both the English and Chinese groups. All of the 
20 items loaded on their purported factors. No cross-loadings exceeded 0.40. Indices from ESEM 
suggested an excellent fit of the specified model: CFI=0.967, RMSEA=0.051 (90% CI = 0.041-
0.061), SRMR=0.038. These results suggested that the factor structure of the scale obtained in 
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the previous step was robust to the new sample. Measurement equivalence of the scale between 
the English and Chinese groups was also confirmed.  
Now that the factor structure of the positive SHS and the scale’s measurement 
equivalence between the English and Chinese versions were confirmed by the new sample, I was 
interested in testing whether the scale is invariant across culture. To maximize possible sample 
size, I examined measurement equivalence between the sample for MGEFA and the sample for 
ESEM. Excellent model fit suggested measurement equivalence between the two samples: 
CFI=0.989, RMSEA=0.029 (90% CI = 0.023-0.034), SRMR=0.019. I hence combined the two 
samples (N=1,177) for further analysis.  
I first tested the invariance of the scale across national cultures. Due to insufficient 
sample size for most cultures – the fourth largest culture in the sample has only 33 respondents – 
the analysis was only feasible to three cultures; US (N=292), China (N=437), and India (N = 
169). Nevertheless, the three cultures represent 73.30% of the full sample. ESEM was performed 
with MLR estimation, target rotation, and scalar (strong) equivalence imposed across the three 
cultural groups. Indices suggested excellent fit: CFI=0.967, RMSEA=0.045 (90% CI = 0.039-
0.051), SRMR=0.038. As such, the equivalence of the scale was achieved among US, China, and 
India.  
I then tested the equivalence of the scale across geographic cultural clusters. Four clusters 
with sufficient sample size were included in the analysis: East Asia and Pacific cluster 
(excluding Australia and New Zealand) (n=459), North America cluster (n=325), South Asia 
cluster (n=173), and Europe and Central Asia cluster (including Australia and New Zealand) 
(n=154). The four clusters account for 94.39% of the full sample. ESEM results, again, 
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suggested excellent fit: CFI=0.965, RMSEA=0.045 (90% CI = 0.039-0.050), SRMR=0.042. The 
scale was therefore proven invariant across these four cultural clusters.  
In this step, the factor structure and measurement equivalence of the positive SHS were 
assessed with a new sample using ESEM. Results showed that the factor structure of the scale 
was robust to the new sample, equivalent between the English and Chinese languages, and 
invariant among the national cultures of US, China, and India, and across the East Asia & 
Pacific, North America, South Asia, and Europe & Central Asia clusters. 
4.1.3.1.3 Scale Validation   
Now that the factor structure of the positive SHS had been confirmed in different 
samples, languages, and cultures, the construct validity of the scale was further established in 
this stage by assessing its convergent, discriminant, and nomological validity.  
Sample 
As previously noted, data for examining convergent validity, discriminant validity, and 
the antecedents of superstitious heuristics were collected during the main questionnaire 
administration. Since measurement equivalence had been established between languages and 
samples, the combined sample was used for validation (N=1,179). Because respondents were 
randomly assigned to a subset of validation scales, sample sizes vary by variables included in the 
analysis. Data for examining the consequences of superstitious heuristics, that is, criterion-
related validity, were collected through a separate questionnaire administered to a group of 
Mturk workers four weeks after they had completed the main questionnaire. The final sample for 
criterion-related validity test was 166 respondents (48.19% female; Age: M=38.11, SD = 12.41).     
Convergent validity 
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The convergent validity of the positive SHS was assessed by its correlations with three 
major superstition scales in the literature: the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (RPBS) 
(Tobacyk, 2004), the Belief in Superstition Scale (BSS) (Fluke et al., 2014), and the Fatalistic 
Superstition Beliefs Inventory (FSBI) (Yang, 2007). According to Campbell and Fiske (1959, p. 
82), convergent validity is achieved when the correlations of similar constructs are “significantly 
different from zero and sufficiently large.” Cohen (1992) instructed the small, medium, large 
effect sizes in correlation analysis to be r = 0.10, 0.30, and 0.50, respectively. As such, I 
expected the correlations between the positive SHS and the three existing scales to be positive 
and large (around r = 0.50) as the evidence of convergent validity. The results are presented in 
Table 11. As expected, the positive SHS is substantially correlated with the RPBS (r = 0.619, p = 
0.000), BBS (r = 0.558, p = 0.000), and FSBI (r = 0.687, p = 0.000). All of its five subscales are 
also correlated with the three scales at medium to large magnitudes (ranging from r = 0.352 to 
0.673). The results provide strong support for the convergent validity of the positive SHS.  
Discriminant validity 
The discriminant validity of the positive SHS was first assessed by its correlations with 
the three classic heuristics, i.e., representativeness, availability, and anchoring (Kahneman, 
2003a; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Based on Campbell and Fiske (1959) and Cohen (1992), I 
expected the correlations between the positive SHS and the three heuristics to be close to zero 
(i.e., nonsignificant) or at a small magnitude (around r = 0.10) to establish discriminant validity. 
As previously noted, since there were no existing Likert scales for the three heuristics, each 
heuristic was measured by three questions used in previous laboratory experiments (the questions 
are presented in Appendix A). However, results showed a lack of internal consistency among 
these questions. The Cronbach’s alpha was 0.334 for representativeness, 0.415 for availability, 
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and 0.291 for anchoring. Two factors might have contributed to the low internal consistency. 
First, many of the questions were mathematical or statistical problems of which the answers are 
not readily available. Even reading and comprehending the questions per se could require 
cognitive efforts and time. Respondents might have been tempted to randomly pick an answer 
and move on, particularly for multiple-choice questions. Second, the large portion of missing 
data due to time constraints (especially in the case of anchoring) might have also led to low 
consistency. Considering these factors, I decided to measure each heuristic with its most classic, 
open ended question. The categorical prediction question was used for capturing 
representativeness, the question about the position of the letter r in English words was used for 
availability, and the task to estimate percentage based on a given number was used for anchoring 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). These questions successfully detected the prevalent use of their 
respective heuristics in the data: 50.18% of the respondents used the representativeness heuristic, 
90.15% used the availability heuristic, and 83.22% used the anchoring heuristic (M=-32.417, 
t(148)=-13.559, p = 0.000). The results provide support for the validity of these questions.   
The correlations between the positive SHS and the three heuristics are presented in Table 
12. The positive SHS and its five subscales are positively correlated with representativeness at a 
small magnitude (overall score: r = 0.180, p = 0.005; subscales ranging from r = 0.093 to 0.169). 
The scale is negatively correlated with anchoring (overall score: r = -0.190, p = 0.029; Physical 
Attribute: r = -0.206, p = 0.018; Surrounding Environment: r = -0.156, p = 0.074; Paranormal 
Revelation: r = -0.178, p = 0.042). The scale is not correlation with availability (overall score: r = 
0.008, p = 0.895). The results of small positive correlations, negative correlations, and no 
correlations suggest that the superstitious heuristic is distinct from the three classic heuristics in 
the literature.  
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The discriminant validity of the positive SHS was also assessed by its relationships with 
the Big Five (Barrick & Mount, 1991; J. Block, 1995). Because measurement invariance of the 
mini-IPIP Big Five scale was not established between the English and Chinese groups, 
correlation analyses were performed to each group separately. Results from the English group 
(Table 13) show that the positive SHS is marginally and positively correlated with extraversion 
(r = 0.160, p = 0.068), and this effect is derived from Physical Attribute (r = 0.188, p = 0.031), 
Object/Act (r = 0.172, p = 0.05), and Surrounding Environment (r = 0.184, p = 0.036). 
Object/Act is marginally, negatively correlated with conscientiousness (r = 0.165, p = 0.060). 
Paranormal Revelation is negatively correlated with openness (r = -0.178, p = 0.042). Results 
from the Chinese group (Table 14) show that the positive SHS is positively correlated with 
Extraversion (r = 0.117, p = 0.387), contributed by Birth Profile (r = 0.153, p = 0.007) and 
Object/Act (r = 0.148, p = 0.009). The scale and all five subscales are also positively correlated 
with agreeableness (overall score: r = 0.190, p = 0.001; subscales ranging from r = 0.137 to 
0.211). Additionally, Birth Profile is positively correlated with openness (r = 0.122, p = 0.030). 
Because the magnitudes of correlations in both groups are relatively small, the discriminant 
validity of the positive SHS from the Big Five is supported.  
Since the Big Five were measured with Likert scales, I was able to conduct EFA to 
provide further support for the distinction between the positive SHS and the Big Five. As the 
sample size of the English group is small (n = 131), the analysis was performed only to the 
Chinese group (n =313). The assessment was conducted with one Big Five dimension at a time. 
In the first EFA, the positive SHS and Extraversion were submitted. Results are presented in 
Table 15. All items loaded on their respective factors, showing a well-defined six factor 
structure. The Extraversion items constituted a factor separate from the five SHS factors, 
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providing evidence for discriminant validity. Indices also suggested an excellent fit of the model: 
CFI=0.982, RMSEA=0.040 (90% CI=0.031-0.048), SRMR=0.018. I further calculated the 
square root of average variance extracted (AVE) for each SHS subscale and extraversion. The 
square root of AVE was 0.735 for Birth Profile, 0.704 for Physical Attribute, 0.641 for 
Object/Act, 0.724 for Surrounding Environment, 0.737 for Paranormal Revelation, and 0.654 for 
Extraversion. Two measures are considered distinct from each other if their square roots of AVE 
are both larger than their correlation (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Since none of the correlations 
between the five SHS subscales and Extraversion (Column 2 of Table 14) exceed the square 
roots of AVE reported here, it can be concluded that the five SHS factors are different from 
Extraversion. I repeated the assessment to the other Big Five dimensions and found similar 
patterns (results not shown here). As such, the discriminant validity of the positive SHS from the 
Big Five was verified through multiple methods.  
Nomological validity 
The nomological validity of the positive SHS was evaluated by examining its 
relationships with antecedents and consequences suggested by exiting theory. Regression 
analysis was used. I began with antecedents which include demographics and psychological 
characteristics.  
Gender. Women scored higher than men on the positive SHS (b = 0.095, p = 0.071) as 
well as the subscales of Birth Profile (b = 0.197, p = 0.002), Object/Act (b = 0.112, p = 0.083), 
and Paranormal Revelation (b = 0.155, p = 0.007) (Table 16). The results are in line with 
previous findings that women hold stronger superstitious and paranormal beliefs than men (A. 
M. Gallup & Newport, 2008).  
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Age. Although the relationship between age and superstition is inconclusive in the 
literature (Vyse, 2013), younger people scored higher than older people on the positive SHS (b = 
-0.011, p = 0.000) and all five subscales (ranging from b = -0.008 to -0.017) in my data. This 
finding corresponds to the rising interest in spirituality among millennials and young adults 
(Coleman, 2017; Overstreet, 2010; Paul, 2018; Pew Research Center, 2018).  
Education. The relationship between education and superstition is also mixed in the 
literature. The traditional view that superstitious individuals tend to be less educated has been 
challenged by findings that superstition persists despite of education (Jahoda, 1968; Salter & 
Routledge, 1971; Subbotsky & Quinteros, 2002). In other words, education does not necessarily 
eliminate superstitious beliefs. Results from my data were more surprising – the more educated 
scored higher than the less educated on the positive SHS (b = 0.109, p = 0.000) and all five 
subscales (ranging from b = 0.095 to 0.144). The effect was robust when age was controlled for 
(overall score: b = 0.109, p = 0.000; subscales ranging from b = 0.095 to 0.144). The results were 
surprising but not unrealistic if one considers the fact that college students have long been 
identified as a highly superstitious group among the population and that social trends such as the 
New Age spirituality flourishes among college-educated individuals (Vyse, 2013).  
Religion. Compared to people without any religion, those endorsing Abrahamic religions 
scored lower on the positive SHS and/or the subscales, as indicated by a pattern of negative signs 
in the second to sixth columns of Table 17. Protestant Christians showed significantly lower 
scores on the whole scale (r = - 0.483, p = 0.000) and all five subscales (b ranging from -0.313 to 
-0.718). Similarly, Jews (r = -0.686, p = 0.010) and Muslims (r = -0.321, p = 0.021) scored lower 
on the whole scale and most of the subscales. This aligns with previous findings from the Harris 
Poll that Protestant Christians and Jews were less likely to endorse superstitious or paranormal 
 78 
beliefs as compared to the whole sample (Harris Poll, 2009). The results were also consistent 
with the prohibition on superstitious practices such as divination, witchcraft, and sorcery in the 
Bible and Quran. In contrast, people endorsing polytheistic religions scored higher on the 
positive SHS than those without any religion, as indicated by the positive signs in the three 
columns on the right (Table 17). Buddhists scored higher on the whole scale (r = 0.498, p = 
0.000) and all five subscales (b ranging from 0.330 to 0.590). Taoists (r = 0.523, p = 0.009) and 
Hindus (r = 0.375, p = 0.000) scored higher on the whole scale and most of the subscales. These 
results were obtained when religiosity was controlled for.  
Locus of control. People with an external locus of control did not score significantly 
higher than those with an internal locus of control on the positive SHS and the subscales (b = -
0.002, p = 0.907, Column 2 of Table 18). This finding is not totally surprising considering that 
while most studies found that people with an external locus control were more superstitious (e.g., 
Tobacyk & Milford, 1983), researchers also found a positive association between an internal 
locus control and superstition among personally involved believers (i.e., non-casual believers) 
(McGarry & Newberry, 1981). One explanation was that superstition offers a sense of control to 
those who are personally involved. Following this logic, the use of superstitious heuristics may 
promote in the person a sense of internal control over time. Another possible explanation is that 
people with an internal locus of control might actively use superstitious heuristics as an 
instrument to control decision outcomes. Along this line, since a major motive behind 
superstitious practices is to exert control, individual differences in desire for control might have 
been a more powerful predictor of superstitious heuristics.   
Analytic thinking. Analytic thinking was negatively related to scores on the positive SHS 
(b = -0.414, p = 0.009) and all five subscales (b ranging from -0.309 to -0.534; marginally 
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significant for Physical Attribute and Paranormal Beliefs) (Column 4 of Table 18). In other 
words, compared to those who are content to trust readily accessible intuitive beliefs, those who 
tend to analytically correct initially flawed intuitions were less likely to engage in superstitious 
heuristics. This is in line with previous findings that analytic thinking reduces superstitious 
beliefs (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007; Pennycook et al., 2012).  
Holistic culture. Holistic culture was coded 0 if respondents self-identified with the 
Western cultures (American, Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, and Western European 
cultures) and coded 1 if respondents self-identified with other non-Western cultures (Henrich, 
Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010b). A strong effect of the holistic-analytic culture division on 
superstitious heuristics was evident in the data. Respondents from holistic cultures scored 
significantly higher than their counterparts from analytical cultures on the positive SHS (b = 
0.805, p = 0.000) and all five subscales (b ranging from 0.611 to 0.981, p = 0.000) (Column 5 of 
Table 18). This result is consistent with previous findings that individuals from analytical 
cultures which feature logical reasoning and formal categorization are less likely to endorse 
superstitious thinking under general conditions (Subbotsky & Quinteros, 2002).  
Next, I assessed the criterion-related validity of the positive SHS by examining its 
performance in predicting consequence variables. Results are reported below.   
Decision speed. Those who scored higher on the positive SHS also reported higher 
decision speed (b = 0.430, p = 0.000). Scores on the five subscales also significantly predicted 
decision speed (b ranging from 0.220 to 0.312) (Table 19). The results correspond to the nature 
of the superstitious heuristic, that is, a decision shortcut which quickens the decision process.  
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Decision comprehensiveness. Different than expected, decision comprehensiveness was 
not predicted by scores on the positive SHS (b = 0.051, p = 0.615) or on any of the subscales 
(Table 20). Part of the reason might be that the inclusion of superstitious criteria in judgment and 
decision-making actually makes some respondents feel they are being comprehensive because 
they are utilizing additional information and evaluating the decision from different angles.  
Decision confidence. Scores on the positive SHS (b = 0.247, p = 0.001) and all five 
subscales (b ranging from 0.136 to 0.185) were positively associated with decision confidence in 
general. The effects were stronger when the outcome variable was decision confidence specific 
to luck (overall score: b = 0.583, p = 0.000; subscales: b ranging from 0.332 to 0.371) (Table 
20). People who relied more on superstitious heuristics were generally more confident in the 
decisions they made. They were particularly confident that their decisions would bring good luck 
and avoid bad luck. This is in line with the literature that superstition increases confidence 
(Darke & Freedman, 1997; Day & Maltby, 2003, 2005; Tsang, 2004a, 2004b).   
Self-efficacy in decision implementation. Self-efficacy in decision implementation was 
positively predicted by scores on the positive SHS (b = 0.168, p = 0.006) and the subscales 
expect Physical Attribute (b ranging from 0.108 to 0.151) (Table 20). People who used more 
superstitious heuristics were more positive that they would successfully carry out the decisions 
they made. This is consistent with previous findings that superstition increases self-efficacy 
(Damisch et al., 2010). 
Perceived control. Scores on the positive SHS (b = 0.246, p = 0.001) and all five 
subscales (b ranging from 0.140 to 0.183) were positively associated with perceived control over 
outcomes. The effects were stronger when perceived control was specific to luck (overall score: 
b = 0.556, p = 0.000; subscales: b ranging from 0.334 to 0.440) (Table 21). People who relied 
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more on superstitious heuristics felt they had more control over the outcomes of decisions they 
made. They especially felt having more control over luck and chance by making their choices. 
These results align with the literature that superstition increases perceived control (Hamerman & 
Morewedge, 2015; Nemeroff & Rozin, 2000; Tsang, 2004a, 2004b). 
 Decision effectiveness. Scores on the positive SHS were positively associated with self-
reported decision effectiveness (b = 0.171, p = 0.009). Scores on the subscales also predicted 
decision effectiveness, significantly or marginally significantly (b ranging from 0.083 to 0.169) 
(Table 21). Those who used more superstitious heuristics in decision-making were more likely to 
receive effective and successful results from their decisions. This is consistent with previous 
findings that superstition increases performance (Damisch et al., 2010).  
In summary, the above examinations show that most of the relationships between the 
positive SHS and both its antecedents and consequences are statistically pronounced and are in 
line with exiting theory and previous findings. For the antecedents, the positive SHS and its 
subscales (some or all depending on case) were successfully predicted by gender, age, education 
(in the direction opposite to the traditional view), religion, analytical thinking, and holistic 
culture as expected. Locus of control was the only predictor that failed to predict either the 
positive SHS or the subscales. As for the consequences, the positive SHS and its subscales (some 
or all, depending on case) successfully predicted decision speed, decision confidence (both in 
general and specific to luck), self-efficacy in decision implementation, perceived control (both in 
general and specific to luck), and decision effectiveness. Decision comprehensiveness was the 
only nonsignificant outcome variable. Overall, the results provide strong support for the 
nomological validity of the scale.  
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Up to this point, the convergent, discriminant, and nomological validity of the positive 
SHS was examined through its relationships with a variety of variables and constructs. Results 
from the analyses demonstrated that the positive SHS scale possesses strong construct validity.  
4.1.3.1.4 Discussion 
This section reports the procedure and results of the development and validation of the 
positive version of the Superstitious Heuristics Scale. The five-factor, 20-item positive SHS has 
shown a well-defined factor structure that is robust to different samples and invariant across 
language (i.e., English and Chinese) and culture. The scale has also demonstrated strong internal 
consistency reliability and construct validity.  
In the next section, I report the procedure and results of developing and validating the 
negative version of the SHS.  
4.1.3.2 Negative Superstitious Heuristic Scale (Negative SHS) 
4.1.3.2.1 Exploratory Analysis – MGEFA 
Sample 
The sample (N = 780) used for developing the negative SHS was identical to that used for 
the positive SHS. As the information of the sample was reported earlier, I will not repeat it here.  
Method 
As in the case of the positive SHS, Mplus 8.2 was employed for analysis here. Data were 
estimated using MGEFA with MLR and the Geomin rotation. Equality of parameters was 
imposed at the level of scalar (strong) equivalence. The number of factors to be retained was set 
to five, for results of parallel analysis suggested that a five-factor solution was optimal for both 
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English and Chinese groups. The same set of indices (i.e., CFI, RMSEA, and SRMR) and 
respective cutoff points were adopted to assess the fit of the models.     
Results 
Table 22 presents the factor loadings of the 79 negative items in two language groups. 
Loadings over 0.40 are in bold (J. K. Ford et al., 1986). As can be seen from both groups, most 
of the items loaded strongly on their main factors, making the factors readily interpretable. The 
first factor represents Birth Profile, the second factor Physical Attribute, the third factor 
Object/Act, the fourth factor Surrounding Environment, the fifth factor Paranormal Revelation.  
Based on factor loadings and domain coverages, I selected four items per factor to 
construct the 20-item negative SHS (chosen items were indicated with an asterisk in Table 22). 
Results from MGEFA indicated excellent fit of the model (CFI=0.971, RMSEA=0.044 (90% CI 
= 0.038-0.050), SRMR=0.043), providing support for the factor structure in both language 
groups and measurement equivalence between the groups. I combined the two groups to report 
factor loadings, factor correlations, and internal consistency reliabilities. Factor loadings and 
correlations were obtained from an ordinary EFA estimated with MLR and Geomin rotation. 
Indices from the EFA confirmed the excellent fit of the factor structure: CFI=0.991, 
RMSEA=0.030 (90% CI = 0.022-0.038), SRMR=0.012. The five-factor structure is clearly 
exhibited in Table 23, with no cross-loadings exceeding 0.40. The factors are intercorrelated, 
with the smallest magnitude between Physical Attribute and Paranormal Revelation (r = 0.446) 
and the largest magnitude between Birth Profile and Object/Act (r = 0.700) (Table 24). The 
substantial amount of correlations justifies a meaningful total score calculated from the scale 
(Furr & Bacharach, 2013). Cronbach’s alpha for each subscale is presented in the last column of 
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Table 24. All five subscales possess high internal consistency reliabilities well above the 0.70 
minimum requirement for new scales (Hinkin, 1998). 
In this step, the five-factor, 20-item negative SHS was developed through MGEFA. Like 
its positive counterpart, the negative SHS has demonstrated a well-defined factor structure that is 
invariant between English and Chinese languages. The factors were intercorrelated and each 
subscale demonstrated strong reliability.  
4.1.3.2.2 Confirmatory Analysis – ESEM 
The purpose of this step was to use a new sample to 1) confirm the factor structure of the 
negative SHS and 2) test the invariance of the scale across language and culture.  
Sample 
The sample used for the confirmatory analysis included 401 respondents, with 258 
respondents from the English group (64.34%) and 143 respondents from the Chinese group 
(35.66%). 201 respondents were female (49.62%). The age of the respondents had a mean of 
34.12 and a standard deviation of 11.37.   
The 401 respondents were from 32 self-identified national cultures and 7 geographic 
cultural clusters. A breakdown by national culture suggests that 97 respondents identified with 
the American culture (24.19%), 146 respondents identified with the Chinese culture (36.41%), 
56 respondents identified with the Indian culture (13.97%), and 102 respondents identified with 
other cultures (25.43%). A breakdown by geographic cultural cluster indicates that 153 
respondents were from the East Asia and Pacific cluster (excluding Australia and New Zealand) 
(38.15%), 108 respondents from the North America cluster (26.93%), 54 respondents from the 
Europe and Central Asia cluster (including Australia and New Zealand) (13.47%), 59 
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respondents from the South Asia cluster (14.71%), 18 respondents from the Latin America 
cluster (4.49%), seven respondents from the Sub-Saharan Africa cluster (1.25%), and two 
respondent from the Middle East and North Africa cluster (0.50%). 
Method 
Like in the case of the positive SHS, I conducted the confirmatory analysis using ESEM 
with MLR, target rotation, and parameter constraints held at the level of scalar (strong) 
equivalence. The same set of indices and cutoff points were used to assess model fit.  
Results 
A clear five-factor structure emerged in both the English and Chinese groups. All 20 
items loaded on their purported factors with no cross-loadings exceeding 0.40. Indices from 
ESEM indicated an excellent fit of the model: CFI=0.973, RMSEA=0.043 (90% CI=0.032-
0.053), SRMR=0.049. This suggested that the factor structure of the negative SHS obtained in 
the previous step was robust to the new sample. Measurement equivalence of the scale between 
the two languages was also confirmed.  
To test whether the negative SHS was also invariant across culture, I combined the 
samples for MGEFA and ESEM to maximize sample size (N = 1,181). The combination was 
justified by the evidence of measurement equivalence between the two samples (CFI=0.999, 
RMSEA=0.009 (90% CI = 0.000-0.019), SRMR=0.017).   
I first tested the invariance of the scale across three national cultures; US (N = 301), 
China (N = 437), and India (N = 165). Indices suggested excellent fit (CFI = 0.958, RMSEA = 
0.047 (90% CI = 0.041-0.053), SRMR = 0.051), offering support for measurement equivalence 
among the three cultures. Then I tested scale invariance across four geographic cultural clusters; 
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East Asia and Pacific cluster (excluding Australia and New Zealand) (N = 458), North America 
cluster (N = 334), South Asia cluster (N = 169), and Europe and Central Asia cluster (including 
Australia and New Zealand) (N = 151). ESEM results, again, suggested excellent fit: CFI = 
0.959, RMSEA = 0.046 (90% CI = 0.041-0.052), SRMR=0.049, providing evidence of 
measurement equivalence across the four cultural clusters.  
In this step, the factor structure and measurement equivalence of the negative SHS was 
evaluated with a new sample using ESEM. Results showed that the factor structure of the scale 
was robust to the new sample, equivalent between the English and Chinese languages, and 
invariant among the national cultures of US, China, and India, and across the East Asia and 
Pacific, North America, South Asia, and Europe and Central Asia clusters. 
4.1.3.2.3 Scale Validation   
In this step, the construct validity of the negative SHS was examined through assessing 
its convergent, discriminant, and nomological validity.  
Sample 
The combined sample (N = 1,181) was used for scale validation.  As respondents were 
randomly assigned to a subset of scales, sample sizes vary by variables included in the analysis. 
Data for examining criterion-related validity was identical with that used for evaluating the 
criterion-related validity of the positive SHS (n = 166, 48.19% female; Age: M=38.11, SD = 
12.41).  
Results 
Tables 25 to 35 present the scale validation outputs. Since the results were largely 
consistent with the positive SHS, I will omit detailed discussion here for space considerations but 
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only highlight where there were differences. Overall, the effect sizes of the positive SHS were 
slightly larger than those of the negative SHS. In the examination of discriminant validity, while 
the positive SHS was negatively correlated with Anchoring, the relationship between the 
negative SHS and Anchoring was negative but not significant. Also, while the correlation 
between the positive SHS and Extraversion was positive and marginally significant in the 
English sample and positive and significant in the Chinese sample, the relationship between the 
negative SHS and Extraversion was positive but nonsignificant in both samples. Moreover, while 
the positive SHS was uncorrelated with Neuroticism in either sample, there was a marginally 
positive correlation between the negative SHS and Neuroticism in the Chinese sample. In the 
examination of nomological validity, while the positive relationship between gender and the 
positive SHS was marginally significant, the positive relationship between gender and the 
negative SHS was significant. In addition, while the negative relationship between Muslim and 
the positive SHS was significant, the negative relationship between Muslim and the negative 
SHS was marginally significant. Other than these differences, the two SHSs exhibited consistent 
relationships with other constructs.  
In summary, the negative SHS, like its positive counterpart, demonstrated strong 
convergent, discriminant, and nomological validity.  
4.1.3.2.4 Discussion 
This section reports the procedure and results of the development and validation of the 
negative version of the Superstitious Heuristics Scale. The five-factor, 20-item negative SHS has 
shown a well-defined factor structure that is robust to different samples and invariant across 
language (i.e., English and Chinese) and culture. The scale has also demonstrated strong internal 
consistency reliability and construct validity.  
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4.1.3.3 Conclusion 
Up to now, a positive and a negative SHS were developed and validated. While items 
retained for each scale were different, both scales are psychometrically rigorous, and have 
demonstrated comparable goodness-of-fit in various model assessments. In addition, both scales 
showed similar patterns of relationships among the nomological network.  
Table 36 presents the descriptive statistics, correlations, and comparison of the two scales 
based on the sample of respondents who did not have missing values more than 5% of the total 
number of initial items (both positive and negative) or miss any attention check placed among 
the items (N = 1,124). The two scales are strongly correlated with each other (overall: r = 0.873, 
p = 0.000; subscales: r ranging from 0.712 to 0.792). For both scales, Surrounding Environment 
and Object/Act dimensions exhibit highest scores, indicating that these two types of superstitious 
heuristics are most used when people make decisions. In addition, the overall score and most of 
the subscores (expect for Paranormal Revelation) are higher on the positive SHS than the 
negative SHS (overall score: diff = 0.145, t(1123)=10.950, p = 0.000; subscales: diff ranging 
from 0.155 to 0.246) (Last column of Table 36). This suggests that people use more positive 
superstitious heuristics than negative ones in decision-making.  
In conclusion, the development and validation of the positive and negative SHSs have 
facilitated the study of the use of superstitious heuristics through enabling the measurement of 
this decision behavior. The findings based on the data collected using these scales from a global 
sample shed first light on the behavior by providing insights into its antecedents and 
consequences as well as people’s preferences regarding the nature and type of superstitious 
heuristics they use in decision-making.  
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4.2 Study 2 
The purpose of Study 2 was to test the antecedent model. Specifically, Study 2 used an 
experiment to investigate the effects of decision uncertainty, decision importance, and 
superstitious thinking on the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making. The 
experiment was carried out in China to take advantage of the prevalence and large variation in 
using superstitious heuristics.  
4.2.1 Experimental Design 
Among the three antecedents, superstitious thinking was measured as an individual 
difference, while decision uncertainty and decision importance were manipulated through 
experimental vignettes. I developed five strategic decisions scenarios in which a hypothetical 
company makes five sequential strategic decisions during and after an acquisition process. Each 
decision scenario follows a 2 (decision uncertainty: high vs. low) x 2 (decision importance: high 
vs. low) between-subjects design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four 
conditions and remained in the same condition throughout the five sequential scenarios. For 
example, once a participant was assigned to the high decision uncertainty and high decision 
importance condition in Scenario 1, he/she was assigned to the high-high conditions for the rest 
four scenarios. Before the main study, I conducted a pilot to 1) check the effectiveness of the 
manipulation of decision uncertainty and decision importance, and 2) detect potential 
confounding factors in the scenarios.  
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4.2.2 Pilot Study 
4.2.2.1 Sample and Procedure 
A sample of 144 Wenjuanxing panel members (58.33% female; age: M = 30.55, SD = 
8.22) participated in the pilot study. Participants were asked to imagine themselves as the 
company’s CEO in the decision process. For each of the five scenarios, participants were 
required to indicate the likelihood of basing their decision on the provided superstitious 
information and explain why in an open-ended question. They were also asked to rate the 
uncertainty and importance of each decision on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 = “Extremely 
low” to 7 = “Extremely high.”  
4.2.2.2 Results 
The manipulations were successful for both decision uncertainty and decision importance 
in all five scenarios. Participants in the high uncertainty condition reported higher decision 
uncertainty than did participants in the low uncertainty condition (Scenario 1: diff = 2.317, 
t(142)=9.728, p = 0.000, ES = 1.622; Scenario 2: diff = 1.595, t(142)= 5.742, p = 0.000, ES = 
0.957; Scenario 3: diff = 1.476, t(142)= 5.708, p = 0.000, ES = 0.951; Scenario 4: diff = 1.773, 
t(142)= 5.975, p = 0.000, ES = 0.995; Scenario 5: diff = 1.631, t(142)= 5.657, p = 0.000, ES = 
0.942). Similarly, respondents in the high importance condition reported higher decision 
importance than did respondents in the low importance condition (Scenario 1: diff = 2.358, 
t(142)= 10.476, p = 0.000, ES = 1.751; Scenario 2: diff = 2.239, t(142)= 9.499, p = 0.000, ES = 
1.586; Scenario 3: diff = 2.808, t(142)= 12.996, p = 0.000, ES = 2.166; Scenario 4: diff = 2.649, 
t(142)= 9.978, p = 0.000, ES = 1.662; Scenario 5: diff = 2.341, t(142)= 9.061, p = 0.000, ES = 
1.513).  
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The explanations participants provided in the open-ended question suggested a few 
confounding factors that affected their decision-making. For example, in the first scenario where 
the hypothetical company was to decide whether to diversify into a new industry, I specified the 
industry to be the biopharmaceutical industry in the high importance condition and the new 
material industry in the low importance condition. Some participants’ own knowledge and 
preference of these industries played a critical role in their decision-making. As such, I modified 
the scenario by using a general term of “Industry A” across all conditions. I also noticed that 
some decisions and superstitious heuristic dimensions fit together better than others. For 
example, participants naturally associated the choice of a new company location with concerns 
for Feng Shui. I rearranged the combinations accordingly, and the scenarios were made more 
closely mirroring the real-world cases reported in previous studies and news articles (Hernández 
& Zhang, 2019; Tsang, 2004a, 2004b). After these modifications, potential confounding factors 
were removed. Scenario 1 now features the Paranormal Revelation dimension with a decision 
about diversifying into a new industry. Scenario 2 features the Birth Profile dimension with a 
decision about acquiring a target company. Scenario 3 features the Physical Attribute dimension 
with a decision about hiring for a position. Scenario 4 features the Object/Act dimension with a 
decision regarding new product launch. Finally, Scenario 5 features the Surrounding 
Environment dimension through a decision regarding a new company location. The modified 
scenarios were used in the main study and are presented in Appendix B.  
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4.2.3 Main Study 
4.2.3.1 Sample and Procedure 
The initial sample for the main study included 53 middle managers who enrolled in an 
EMBA program at Shanghai Jiao Tong University and 265 middle managers who were recruited 
from the Wenjuanxing Panel. After dropping incomplete responses and those who failed more 
than one attention checks, 293 participants (Female = 53.24%, age: M = 34.33, SD = 5.21) were 
included in the final sample for data analysis.   
Participants were required to imagine themselves as the CEO of the hypothetical 
company and read each of the five strategic decision scenarios carefully. For each decision 
scenario, after reading the scenario, they were asked to indicate the extent to which they would 
base their decision on the superstitious information provided in the scenario. The scale ranged 
from 1 = “Not at all” to 5 = “A great deal.” This question was used to operationalize the use of 
superstitious heuristics for that scenario. After giving the rating, participants were asked to 
provide a brief explanation in an open-ended question for the rating they just gave. Then they 
were asked to rate the uncertainty and importance of the decision featured in the scenario on a 7-
point scale ranging from 1 = “Extremely low” to 7 = “Extremely high.” These questions were 
used as manipulation checks to gauge manipulation effectiveness. Following the manipulation 
checks, participants were asked to respond to a question about certain information provided in 
the scenario. The question was an attention check to indicate whether the participant read the 
scenario carefully. After the scenarios, participants responded to the FSBI questions (Yang, 
2007) which measured their superstitious thinking (i.e., the third antecedent variable). A sample 
item was, “To prosper, companies should consult Feng Shui masters or fortune tellers in all 
aspects.” The response anchors range from 1 = “Strongly disagree” and 6 = “Strongly agree.” 
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The Cronbach’s alpha was 0.939. Overall scores for superstitious heuristics (a = 0.879), decision 
uncertainty (a = 0.934), and decision importance (a = 0.949) were calculated across the five 
scenarios afterwards.  
Participants also provided information on their age, gender, education as well as 
information of their current company, including firm age, size (operationalized as the logarithm 
of the number of employees), industry, type (e.g., standalone or group company, well-established 
or startup), and ownership (e.g., state-owned, privately-held, foreign-owned, etc.). These factors 
might affect the use of superstitious heuristics and were included as control variables in data 
analysis. 
4.2.3.2 Data Analysis 
Hierarchical linear regression analysis was employed for data analysis. Each hypothesis 
was tested using both the overall and individual dimensions of superstitious heuristics as 
dependent variable. For each set of analysis, four regression models were estimated. The first 
was the baseline model with control variables only. The second model added the main effect 
variables. The third model further added the two-way interaction terms. The three-way 
interaction term was included in the fourth and full model. To reduce multicollinearity, I mean-
centered the main effect variables before creating the interaction terms and used the mean-
centered main effects in all models.   
4.2.3.3 Results 
Table 37 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables included in 
the study. A brief browse of the mean values of the individual superstitious heuristic dimensions 
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suggests that participants were most likely to use superstitious heuristics related to Surrounding 
Environment (M = 2.74), followed by superstitious related to Object/Act (M = 2.50), Birth 
Profile (M = 2.41), Physical Attribute (M = 2.37), and Paranormal Revelation (M = 2.08). This 
order is largely consistent with the findings from the global sample in Study 1 (expect for the 
switch of the order between Birth Profile and Physical Attribute).   
4.2.3.3.1 Manipulation Checks 
 
Both decision uncertainty and decision importance were successfully manipulated in all 
five scenarios. Participants in the high uncertainty condition reported higher decision uncertainty 
than did participants in the low uncertainty condition (Scenario 1: diff = 2.662, t(290) = 14.996, 
p = 0.000, ES = 1.756; Scenario 2: diff = 2.607, t(290)= 5.742, p = 0.000, ES = 1.774; Scenario 
3: diff = 2.574, t(290) = 15.273, p = 0.000, ES = 1.787; Scenario 4: diff = 2.781, t(290) = 15.591, 
p = 0.000, ES = 1.825; Scenario 5: diff = 2.454, t(290) = 13.384, p = 0.000, ES = 1.566; Overall: 
diff = 2.615, t(290) = 18.704, p = 0.000, ES = 2.189). Similarly, participants in the high 
importance condition reported higher decision importance than did participants in the low 
importance condition (Scenario 1: diff = 2.547, t(290) = 15.384, p = 0.000, ES = 1.802; Scenario 
2: diff = 2.722, t(290) = 16.521, p = 0.000, ES = 1.935; Scenario 3: diff = 3.091, t(290) = 19.128, 
p = 0.000, ES = 2.239; Scenario 4: diff = 3.160, t(290) = 18.007, p = 0.000, ES = 2.110; Scenario 
5: diff = 2.633, t(290) = 14.321, p = 0.000, ES = 1.674; Overall: diff = 2.824, t(142) = 20.192, p 
= 0.000, ES = 2.360). 
4.2.3.3.2 Hypothesis Testing 
Results of hypothesis testing are presented in Tables 38 to 40. Industry dummy variables 
were included in model estimations but omitted from the tables for the consideration of table 
length. 
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Among the control variables, gender was a positive predictor of the use of superstitious 
heuristics in most of the baseline models. This is in line with previous research that women are 
more superstitious than men (Vyse, 2013). Age was a positive predictor of the use of 
superstitious heuristics related to Surrounding Environment. In some of the models, participants 
who worked for firms owned by investors from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan were less likely 
to use superstitious heuristics as compared to their counterparts working at state-owned 
enterprises. 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that decision uncertainty is positively associated with the use of 
superstitious heuristics in strategic decision making. The coefficient of decision uncertainty is 
nonsignificant in all the main effect models, although the sign is mostly positive as predicted. 
Hypothesis 1 thus is not supported. 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that decision importance is positively associated with the use of 
superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making. The coefficient of decision importance is 
nonsignificant in most of the main effect models and is significantly negative in the model 
predicting superstitious heuristics related to Birth Profile (Model 2b of Table 38). Hypothesis 2 
is not supported.  
Hypothesis 3 predicts that decision maker’s superstitious thinking is positively associated 
with the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making. The coefficient of 
superstitious thinking is positive and significant in all the main effect models. Hypothesis 3 is 
therefore supported. 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that decision uncertainty strengthens the relationship between 
decision importance and the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making. The 
 96 
product term of decision importance and decision uncertainty is positive and marginally 
significant in the model predicting superstitious heuristics related to Birth Profile (Model 2c of 
Table 38), offering support for Hypothesis 4 at the 90% confidence level. The product term is 
nonsignificant in the models predicting the other dimensions or overall superstitious heuristics.    
Hypotheses 5 predicts that superstitious thinking strengthens the relationship between 
decision uncertainty and the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making. The 
product term of decision uncertainty and superstitious thinking is nonsignificant in all the 
models. Hypothesis 5 is therefore not supported. 
Hypothesis 6 predicts that superstitious thinking strengthens the relationship between 
decision importance and the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making. The 
product term of decision importance and superstitious thinking is nonsignificant in all the 
models. Hypothesis 6 is hence not supported. 
Hypothesis 7 predicts that decision importance, decision uncertainty, and superstitious 
thinking interact to increase the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making. The 
three-way interaction term is nonsignificant in all the full models. As such, Hypothesis 7 is also 
unsupported. 
In order to understand why most of the hypotheses were unsupported, I double checked 
the effectiveness of manipulation. While there were significant mean differences between 
treatment conditions for both decision uncertainty and decision importance (as indicated by the 
manipulation checks), I found that manipulation ineffectiveness occurred to some participants as 
I compared the actual ratings of decision uncertainty and importance with treatment conditions. 
By “manipulation ineffectiveness” I mean situations where participants who were assigned to 
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low treatment conditions rated “slightly high,” “moderately higher,” or “extremely high,” or 
participants who were assigned to high treatment conditions rated “slightly low,” “moderately 
low,” or “extremely low” on manipulation checks. 
Table 41 presents the percentage of manipulation ineffectiveness in each treatment 
condition. As shown in the table, manipulation was ineffective to a notable number of 
participants in most of the conditions. Moreover, the ineffectiveness rates were substantially 
higher in low treatment conditions than high treatment conditions, especially in the case of 
decision importance. This means that many participants, despite assigned to low treatment 
conditions, still considered the decision tasks quite important and uncertain. The reason might be 
related to the very nature of strategic decisions – strategic decisions are in general characteristic 
of high uncertainty and importance. In support of my speculation, I found that decisions on 
diversification (Scenario 1) and acquisition (Scenario 2) – two types of strategic decisions 
generally associated with high stakes and uncertainty – had the highest manipulation 
ineffectiveness rates in the low treatment conditions.   
The overall inflated perceptions of decision uncertainty and importance in the scenarios 
were also evident in the descriptive statistics. Across conditions, the median of uncertainty 
ratings ranges from 4 to 5, and the median of importance ratings ranges from 5 to 6 a 7-point 
scale for each scenario. The weakened statistical power of the data due to the fairly notable ratio 
of manipulation ineffectiveness and overall inflated perception of decision uncertainty and 
importance may help explain some of the nonsignificant results reported above.  
Internal analysis using manipulation check ratings 
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To avoid the influence of the partial manipulation ineffectiveness, I re-estimated the 
models using ratings of decision uncertainty and decision importance from the manipulation 
checks, instead of treatment conditions. The rationale is that manipulation checks recorded 
participants’ true perceptions of decision uncertainty and importance while they were responding 
to the superstitious heuristic questions. If decision uncertainty and decision importance really 
have no effects on the use of superstitious heuristics, there should be no significant results 
observed even when the rating data are used (Hauser, Ellsworth, & Gonzalez, 2018). Although 
this method is not based on the experimental design and is thus insufficient to establish causality, 
it provides additional insights into the relationships of interest.     
Results from re-estimated models are reported in Tables 42-44. Decision uncertainty was 
positive and marginally significant in the full model predicting overall superstitious heuristics 
(Model 1d of Table 42). For individual superstitious heuristic dimensions, decision uncertainty 
was a positive and significant predictor of superstitious heuristics related to Physical Attribute 
(Model 1b of Table 43) and Surrounding Environment (Model 1b of Table 44). It was also a 
positive and marginally significant predictor of superstitious heuristics related to Object/Act 
(Model 2b of Table 43). These results provide convergent support for Hypothesis 1. Meanwhile, 
decision uncertainty was found nonsignificant in the models predicting superstitious heuristics 
related to Birth Profile (Model 2b of Table 42) and Paranormal Revelation (Model 2b of Table 
44).   
Decision importance was found a positive and significant predictor of superstitious 
heuristics related to Surrounding Environment (Model 1b of Table 44) and a positive and 
marginally significant predictor of superstitious heuristics related to Object/Act (Model 2b of 
Table 43). These results lend support to Hypothesis 2. Decision importance was found 
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nonsignificant in the models predicting overall superstitious heuristics (Model 1b of Table 42) as 
well as superstitious heuristics related to Birth Profile (Model 2b of Table 42), Physical Attribute 
(Model 1b of Table 43), and Paranormal Revelation (Model 2b of Table 44).  
Superstitious thinking remained a robust, positive predictor of the use of superstitious 
heuristics in all models (Tables 42-44), providing support for Hypothesis 3.  
The product term of decision importance and decision uncertainty was significant but 
negative in predicting overall superstitious heuristics (Model 1c of Table 42). This is opposite to 
the direction predicted by Hypothesis 4. The product term was nonsignificant in the models 
predicting individual superstitious heuristic dimensions (Model 2c of Table 42, Model 1c and 
Model 2c of Table 43, Model 1c and Model 2c of Table 44). Hypothesis 4 thus is unsupported.  
Both the interaction of decision uncertainty and superstitious thinking and the interaction 
of decision importance and superstitious thinking remained nonsignificant in all the models, 
failing to support Hypotheses 5 and 6.  
Finally, the three-way interaction of decision importance, decision uncertainty, and 
superstitious thinking was marginally significant but negative in predicting superstitious 
heuristics related to Surrounding Environment (Model 1d of Table 44) and was nonsignificant in 
all the other models. Therefore, Hypothesis 7 was not supported.  
A summary of the hypothesis testing results can be found in Table 64. 
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4.2.3.4 Discussion 
The purpose of Study 2 was to use an experiment to investigate the effects of decision 
uncertainty, decision importance, and superstitious thinking on the use of superstitious heuristics 
in strategic decision-making. When using treatment conditions (i.e., manipulated decision 
uncertainty and decision importance) as independent variables, I found support for Hypothesis 3, 
which predicts the positive effect of superstitious thinking on the use of superstitious heuristics, 
and marginal support for Hypothesis 4, which predicts the moderating effect of decision 
uncertainty on the relationship between decision importance and the use of superstitious 
heuristics in strategic decision-making. The latter is particularly meaningful as it demonstrates 
the causal effect in which decision importance and decision uncertainty interact to increase the 
use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making.    
The nonsignificant results for the other hypothesized relationships, especially the main 
effects of decision uncertainty and decision importance, may have been caused by several 
factors. First, it might be partially due to the manipulation ineffectiveness among a notable 
proportion of the participants. Although results from manipulations checks indicate that both 
uncertainty and importance manipulations were successful, the manipulations did not work for 
some of the participants, especially those in the low treatment conditions. This could have 
undermined the statistical power of the data in detecting plausible relationships among the 
variables. The partial manipulation ineffectiveness might be caused by participants’ 
inattentiveness in reading the scenarios. It is also likely that some participants assessed the 
uncertainty and importance of the decisions based on their own perceptions or knowledge of 
strategic decisions from real world experience. After all, strategic decisions are by nature high 
stake and uncertain in general.  
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Second, the experimental design might also have contributed to the nonsignificant results 
to some extent. In the experiment, the participants were not required to make actual decisions but 
only indicate their perceptions of how they would make decisions in those hypothetical 
situations. In addition, decision uncertainty and decision importance were manipulated by 
describing the situations instead of actually building in uncertainty and importance into the 
decisions for participants to make. As a result, the manipulations might not be as strong as it 
could have been if the decision processes were actually simulated.   
Third, there is also a possibility that the nonsignificant results reflect the reality, meaning 
that the null hypotheses are true and that decision uncertainty and decision importance do not 
increase the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making. While acknowledging 
this possibility, I do not cling towards this conclusion because both the theories and the insights 
from previous qualitative studies (Tsang, 2004a, 2004b) suggest that decision uncertainty and 
decision importance are likely to be positively associated with the use of superstitious heuristics 
in decision-making. Moreover, these relationships found support later in the internal analyses 
using rated decision uncertainty and importance.      
When operationalizing decision uncertainty and decision importance using ratings from 
manipulation checks which reflect participants’ true perceptions at the decision moment, the 
three main effect hypotheses were all supported. Specifically, superstitious thinking remained a 
robust, positive predictor of both overall and individual dimensions of superstitious heuristics. 
Decision uncertainty was a significant and positive predictor of superstitious heuristics related to 
Physical Attribute and Surrounding Environment, and a marginally significant, positive predictor 
of overall superstitious heuristics and superstitious heuristics related to Object/Act. Decision 
importance was a significant and positive predictor of superstitious heuristics related to 
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Surrounding Environment and a marginally significant, positive predictor of superstitious 
heuristics related to Object/Act.  
Superstitious heuristics related to Birth Profile and Paranormal Revelation were predicted 
neither by decision uncertainty nor decision importance. Part of the reason might be that the two 
scenarios contain decisions related to acquisition and diversification, respectively, two types of 
strategic moves that are usually associated with high stakes and uncertainty. As a result, the two 
scenarios received the highest ratings on both decision uncertainty and decision importance with 
comparatively small variances. This might have limited the explanatory power of the two 
predictors in these scenarios. Another reason might be that superstitious heuristics related to 
Birth Profile and Paranormal Revelation were not the most relevant heuristics to decisions on 
acquisition and diversification. The results might have been different if other heuristics were 
featured in the scenarios.  
Superstitious heuristics related to Surrounding Environment and Object/Act were 
predicted most successfully among the five dimensions. This is consistent with the prevalent 
interest in Feng Shui and auspicious objects and practices (e.g., lucky days, numbers, colors, 
etc.) in the Chinese business setting.   
The inconsistent results for the interaction of decision importance and decision 
uncertainty were puzzling. To understand why it was the case, I read through the open-ended 
explanations provided by the participants and noticed that many respondents based their 
judgment only on one of the conditions. In other words, in their explanations some participants 
only mentioned the importance of the decision whereas some others only mentioned the 
uncertainty of the decision. Relatively few participants mentioned both. This isolation might 
have hindered a stable interaction between decision uncertainty and decision importance. While 
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the isolation is less likely in real decision-making practice, it occurred in the hypothetical 
experimental setting and might have contributed to the puzzling results of the interaction effect.  
Neither the interaction of decision uncertainty and superstitious thinking nor the 
interaction of decision importance and superstitious thinking was significant. The results, along 
with the largely nonsignificant three-way interaction, appear to suggest that, apart from how 
superstitious the decision-makers are, they tend to engage in superstitious heuristics in like 
manner when the decision is uncertain and/or important. However, this interpretation should be 
taken with caution. While the nonsignificant results fail to reject the null hypotheses, they do not 
necessarily support the null hypotheses. It is only a possibility that the nonsignificant results 
might be revealing the reality. There are also gaps between perceptions and actual behaviors and 
between experimental settings and real-world decision contexts. As noted earlier, participants 
only reported their perceptions of how they would make decisions in the hypothetical scenarios 
in an experimental setting. Thus, inferences about real strategic decision behaviors should be 
made with caution from the findings.          
4.2.4 Conclusion 
By manipulating decision uncertainty and decision importance through an experiment, a 
major purpose of Study 2 was to establish the causality between these two factors and the use of 
superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making. However, no statistically significant main 
effects were found between the treatment conditions.  
Suspecting that partial manipulation ineffectiveness among the sample had, to some 
extent, weakened the statistical power of the data, the internal analysis method using 
manipulation check ratings was employed to gain additional insights into the main effects. 
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Although this method is correlational in nature and thus insufficient to establish causality, the 
findings that decision uncertainty and decision importance are both positively associated with the 
use of superstitious heuristics provide support for the relationships of interest. Together with 
superstitious thinking, a robust predictor of superstitious heuristics in all analyses, the three 
hypothesized main effects were all supported. However, no consistent, significant interactions 
were found among the three antecedents.   
4.3 Study 3 
In Study 3, I conducted a survey to collect real world data from firm top managers to test 
my research models. The purpose of Study 3 was to 1) assess the generalizability of the findings 
in Study 2 about the antecedents, and 2) investigate the performance consequences of using 
superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making. 
4.3.1 Sample and Data Collection 
The survey was conducted at an EMBA program at Shanghai Jiao Tong University. 
Paper-and-pencil questionnaires were distributed during class sessions. An initial sample 
included 105 top managers enrolled in the program. These managers were CEOs, CFOs, or 
senior managers in diverse functional areas such R&D, marketing, product development, and so 
forth. Some of the respondents were also founders of their companies. This sample was used to 
examine both antecedent and consequence research models in the study. Since most variables 
contain missing values, the final sample for each analysis varies depending on the specific 
variables included in the regression model.  
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4.3.2 Positive SHS for Strategic Decision-making 
As noted in Study 1, people tend to rely more on positive superstitious heuristics than 
negative ones in decision-making. As such, I used the positive SHS in the survey of Study 3. 
Minor modifications were made to tailor the scale for the strategic decision context. Specifically, 
a time frame of 2016-2018 and the word “strategic” were added to the leading question. 
Accordingly, the leading question stated, “When making strategic decisions during 2016-2018, 
to what extent did you base your decisions on the following considerations as decision rules?” 
After data collection was completed, all 20 positive SHS items were submitted to ESEM for a 
confirmatory analysis of the scale’s factor structure in the strategic decision context. 
4.3.2.1 Sample 
After dropping respondents who did not respond to the positive SHS scale or missed all 
three attention checks, 97 respondents were included in the final sample.  
4.3.2.2 Results 
The confirmatory analysis was performed using ESEM with the MLR estimator and 
Target rotation. Results showed a well-defined five-factor structure. As can be seen from Table 
45, all items loaded on their purported factors with no cross-loadings exceeding 0.40. Fit indices 
were as follows: CFI = 0.951, RMSEA = 0.094 (90% CI = 0.073-0.115), SRMR = 0.013. While 
the RMSEA indicates inadequate fit (> 0.08), both CFI and SRMR suggest that the fit is 
excellent (CFI > 0.95, SRMR < 0.08). The slightly exceeding RMSEA might be a result of 
limited statistical power due to the small sample size (N = 97) since RMSEA is particularly 
sensitive to sample size (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Considering that the other two indices indicate 
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excellent fit and that a clear five-factor model emerged from the data, it is reasonable to believe 
that the factor structure of the positive SHS was valid in the strategic decision context.  
Table 46 presents the factor correlations and reliability of the positive SHS for strategic 
decision-making. As shown, all factors are intercorrelated. The correlation coefficients range 
from r = 0.273 to 0.655. The Cronbach’s alpha for the subscales ranges from 0.943 to 0.980. 
4.3.3 The Antecedents – Superstitious Heuristics Link (Hypotheses 1-7) 
4.3.3.1 Sample 
After dropping observations with missing data on the relevant variables and those who 
missed all three attention checks, 81 respondents (Female = 28.40%, Age: M = 37.95, SD = 
4.44) were included in the final sample for data analysis. Among the 81 respondents, 32.5% were 
CEOs and 29.63% were founders of the company. The average tenure in office was 5.03 years.  
4.3.3.2 Measures 
Dependent variable. Superstitious heuristics, as noted in the previous section, was 
measured using the positive SHS tailored for strategic decision-making (a = 0.830). A sample 
item was, “Whether a particular day is lucky.” The response anchors ranged from 1 = “Not at 
all” to 5 = “A great deal.” The time frame for superstitious heuristics was 2016-2018.  
Independent variables. Decision uncertainty was measured using the 6-item scale of 
environmental uncertainty developed by Swamidass and Newell (1987). A sample item was, 
“The actual users of our products were…” The response anchors ranged from 1 = “Never 
predictable” to 5 = “Always predictable” (a = 0.719). The time frame for decision uncertainty 
was 2016-2018.  
 107 
Decision importance was measured by the 6-item scale of environmental hostility 
developed by Covin, Slevin, and Heeley (2000). Environmental hostility was used as a proxy of 
decision importance based on the rationale that a single decision could be a matter of life and 
death in a highly hostile environment (Hambrick et al., 2005). A sample item of the scale was, 
“The failure rate of firms in my industry was high.” The response anchors ranged from 1 = 
“Strongly disagree” to 7 = “Strongly agree” (a = 0.735). The time frame for decision importance 
was 2016-2018.  
In order to alleviate potential common source bias typical to survey data, decision 
uncertainty and decision importance were operationalized not with individual ratings but using 
industry-average ratings of environmental uncertainty and hostility, respectively. The rationale is 
that industry-average ratings, computed by taking mean of the ratings of the same industry from 
multiple sources in the sample, depict a more objective picture of the firm’s industrial 
environment.  
Superstitious thinking was measured using the 6-point FSBI developed by Yang (2007). 
A sample item was, “To prosper, companies should consult Feng Shui masters or fortune tellers 
in all aspects.” The response anchors ranged from 1 = “Strongly disagree” to 6 = “Strongly 
agree” (a = 0.926). 
The scales of independent variables are presented in Appendix C. 
4.3.3.3 Control Variables 
As in Study 2, I controlled for respondents’ age, gender, education level, firm age, firm 
type, and firm ownership. Due to collinearity with the industry-average ratings of environmental 
uncertainty and hostility, industry dummies were not included in the model. Additionally, firm 
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size was unable to be included because both the number of employees and revenues, the two 
common measures of firm size in the literature, had data from less than 20 respondents. 
Nevertheless, the potential effect of firm size was able to be accounted for to some extent by the 
variable of firm type in the model. Firm type captures whether the firm was a standalone or a 
group company, a startup or a mature company. Generally speaking, a standalone company 
would be smaller than a group company, and a startup would be smaller than a mature company. 
Since respondents’ experience, power, and personal stake in the company could also affect their 
decision-making, I further included tenure in office and founder dummy as controls. 
To ensure the validity and reliability of the data, I doubled checked the public 
information of the companies of which the names were disclosed by the respondents in the 
survey. Overall, the survey data from the respondents were highly consistent with the 
information that was publicly available, providing evidence of good data quality. In cases of 
discrepancy (i.e., the respondent indicated the company was founded in 2004 while the founding 
year was recorded as 2003 in the information publicity system) or missing values, objective data 
were used instead. The use of objective data wherever possible was another effort to reduce 
common source bias. 
4.3.3.4 Data Analysis 
As in Study 2, hierarchical linear regression was employed for data analysis. Each 
hypothesis was tested using both the overall and individual dimensions of superstitious heuristics 
as dependent variable. For each set of analyses, four models were estimated. The first was the 
baseline model with control variables only. The second model includes the main effect variables. 
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Two-way interaction terms were added to the third model. The three-way interaction term was 
added to the fourth and full model.  
4.3.3.5 Results 
Table 47 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables included 
in the analysis. A browse of the mean values of superstitious heuristic variables suggests that 
superstitious heuristics related to Surrounding Environment (M = 2.21) and Object/Act (M 
=2.17) were used the most in strategic decision-making. This is consistent with findings from 
Studies 1 and 2.  
Tables 48-50 present the results of hypothesis testing with models predicting overall and 
different types of superstitious heuristics. Among the control variables, tenure in office is 
negatively related to overall superstitious heuristics (Model 1a of Table 48), superstitious 
heuristics related to Object/Act (Model 2a of Table 49), and superstitious heuristics related to 
Surrounding Environment (Model 1a of Table 50). This suggests that more experienced 
executives relied less on superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making. In terms of firm 
type, compared to their counterparts from standalone mature companies, executives from 
standalone startups and subsidiaries of a group company were less likely to use superstitious 
heuristics (overall) (Model 1a of Table 48), superstitious heuristics related to Birth Profile 
(Model 2a of Table 48), and superstitious heuristics related to Surrounding Environment (Model 
1a of Table 50). 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that decision uncertainty is positively associated with the use of 
superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making. The coefficient of decision uncertainty is 
positive but nonsignificant in all the models (Tables 48-50). Hypothesis 1 is not supported.  
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Hypothesis 2 predicts that decision importance is positively associated with the use of 
superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making. The coefficient of decision importance is 
positive and significant in models predicting superstitious heuristics related to Object/Act 
(Model 2b of Table 49) and Surrounding Environment (Model 1b of Table 50), providing 
support for Hypothesis 2. Decision importance is nonsignificant in the other models. The results 
are consistent with the findings of Study 2.  
Hypothesis 3 predicts that superstitious thinking is positively associated with the use of 
superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making. The coefficient of superstitious thinking is 
positive and significant in all models (Tables 48-50). Hypothesis 3 is thus supported.  
Hypothesis 4 predicts that decision uncertainty strengthens the relationship between 
decision importance and the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making. The 
product term of decision importance and decision uncertainty is positive and significant in 
models predicting overall superstitious heuristics (Model 1c of Table 48), and is positive and 
marginally significant in models predicting superstitious heuristics related to Physical Attribute 
(Model 1c of Table 49), Object/Act (Model 2c of Table 49), and Surrounding Environment 
(Model 1c of Table 50). These results lend support to Hypothesis 4. The interaction effects are 
plotted in Figures 3 to 6 using values of one standard deviation below (low level) and above 
(high level) the mean for both variables.  
Hypothesis 5 predicts that superstitious thinking strengthens the relationship between 
decision uncertainty and the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making. The 
product term of decision uncertainty and superstitious thinking is nonsignificant in most models 
and is marginally negative in the full model predicting superstitious heuristics related to 
Paranormal Revelation (Model 2d of Table 50). Hypothesis 5 is thus not supported. 
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Hypothesis 6 predicts that superstitious thinking strengthens the relationship between 
decision importance and the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making. The 
product term of decision importance and superstitious thinking is nonsignificant in all models 
(Table 48-50). Hypothesis 6 is therefore unsupported. 
Hypothesis 7 predicts a positive three-way interaction of decision importance, decision 
uncertainty, and superstitious thinking in predicting the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic 
decision-making. The three-way interaction term is positive yet nonsignificant in all models 
(Table 48-50). Hypothesis 7 is thus also unsupported.  
4.3.3.6 Discussion 
The first part of Study 3 used survey data from firm top managers to examine the 
relationships between the use of superstitious heuristics and its antecedents. Hypotheses were 
tested by regressing overall and individual superstitious heuristics on the antecedents and their 
interaction terms. As expected, decision importance was positively associated with the use of 
superstitious heuristics in strategic decision making (Hypothesis 2), and the relationship was 
strengthened by decision uncertainty (Hypothesis 4). The relationship between superstitious 
thinking and the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making remained positive 
and robust (Hypothesis 3). A summary of hypothesis testing results can be found in Table 64. 
The results of Study 3 exhibit quite convergent patterns with those found in Study 2. For 
the main effects, decision importance and superstitious thinking replicated the findings from 
Study 2. Although decision uncertainty was not found significant as it was in Study 2, the 
coefficients were consistently positive in all models. The nonsignificant results might be caused 
by insufficient statistical power due to the small sample size (N = 81). For the interaction effects, 
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the positive interaction of decision importance and decision uncertainty is consistent with the 
finding in Study 2 using treatment conditions as independent variable. The moderating effects of 
superstitious thinking remained mostly nonsignificant as in Study 2. The three-way interaction 
remained nonsignificant, although the coefficients were positive in all models of Study 3 as 
predicted. Like in Study 2, superstitious heuristics related to Birth Profile and Paranormal 
Revelation were not predicted by either decision uncertainty or decision importance. 
Superstitious heuristics related to Surrounding Environment and Object/Act remained most 
successfully predicted dimensions. Overall, these consistent patterns suggest that my findings on 
the antecedents of the use of superstitious heuristics were fairly robust across methods, measures, 
and samples.    
The positive interaction of decision importance and decision uncertainty is particularly 
meaningful. To gain more insights into the effect, I controlled for superstitious thinking and 
tested the interaction alone. The interaction term was positive and significant in predicting 
overall use of superstitious heuristics (b = 1.801, p < 0.05), and positive and marginally 
significant in predicting superstitious heuristics related to Physical Attribute (b = 2.383, p < 0.1), 
Object/Act (b = 2.491, p < 0.1), and Surrounding Environment (b = 2.394, p < 0.1). The plotted 
effects are not presented here as they are nearly identical with the plots shown in Figures 3 to 6. 
The predicated means at high levels of both decision uncertainty and importance (i.e., at one 
standard deviation above the mean for both variables) are 2.18, 2.30, 2.77, and 2.73 for overall 
superstitious heuristics and superstitious heuristics related to Physical Attribute, Object/Act, and 
Surrounding Environment, respectively. These results suggest that decision importance and 
decision uncertainty can interact to increase the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic 
decision-making to a moderate level independent of the decision-maker’s superstitiousness. In 
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other words, even for unsuperstitious strategic decision-makers, there is a fair chance (29.5% ~ 
44.3% based on the predicted means) that they might engage in superstitious heuristics when 
decision uncertainty and importance are both high.  
Overall, results from the first part of Study 3 provide support for the positive main effects 
of decision importance and superstitious thinking as well as the positive interaction effect of 
decision importance and decision uncertainty in predicting the use of superstitious heuristics in 
strategic decision-making. Moreover, the results from Study 3 demonstrate consistency with 
those from Study 2, which demonstrates the robustness of the findings.  
4.3.4 The Superstitious Heuristics – Consequences Link (Hypothesis 8-11) 
4.3.4.1 Sample 
The same survey data were used to test the superstitious heuristics – consequences link. 
After dropping observations with missing data on the relevant variables and those who missed all 
three attention checks, 82 respondents (Female = 26.83%, Age: M = 38.10, SD = 4.42) were 
included in the final sample for data analysis. Among the 82 respondents, 32.1% were CEOs and 
24% were founders of the company. The average tenure in office was 5.00 years. It is worth 
noting that the sample for analyses predicting firm performance includes only 72 respondents 
due to missing values on firm performance variables.   
4.3.4.2 Measures 
Independent variable. Superstitious heuristics, as described above, was measured using 
the positive SHS tailored for strategic decision-making (a = 0.820). The time frame for 
superstitious heuristics was 2016-2018.  
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Mediating variables. Decision speed was measured by the 3-item scale of decision speed 
based on Baum and Wally (2003) (Lin, Shi, Prescott, & Yang, In press). A sample item was, 
“Little time was wasted reaching a decision.” The response anchors ranged from 1 = “Strongly 
disagree” to 7 = “Strongly agree” (a = 0.873). Collective efficacy was measured by a scale 
adapted from Chen et al.’ (2001) 8-item New General Self-Efficacy (NGSE) scale. A sample of 
the adapted items was, “In carrying out the strategic decisions I made during 2016-2018, the 
implementation team believed that they would be able to successfully overcome many 
challenges.” The response anchors ranged from 1 = “Strongly disagree” to 5 = “Strongly agree” 
(a = 0.923). The time frame for mediating variables was 2016-2018.  
Moderating variables. Environmental unanalyzability was measured following 
Atuahene-Gima and Li (2004) with their scale of technology uncertainty. A sample item was, 
“The technology in our industry was changing quite rapidly.” The response anchors ranged from 
1 = “Strongly disagree” to 5 = “Strongly agree” (a = 0.917). To reduce the probability of 
common source bias, industry-average ratings of technology uncertainty was computed based on 
ratings from the same industry in the sample and was used to operationalize environmental 
analyzability. Holistic reasoning was measured using province-level data reported in Talhelm et 
al. (2014). In their science paper, Talhelm et al. (2014) surveyed over a thousand Chinese college 
students and constructed holistic reasoning scores for each province in China. These scores were 
used as secondary data to operationalize holistic reasoning in the present study. The time frame 
for moderating variables was 2016-2018.     
Dependent variables. Decision performance was operationalized through decision 
effectiveness which was measured using two items based on Dean and Sharfman (1996) and Ford 
and Gioia (2000). These items capture the success and effectiveness of the decisions made by the 
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respondents during 2016-2018. The leading question read, “Overall, the results of the strategic 
decision(s) I made in 2016-2018 were…” The response anchors ranged from 1 = “Completely 
unsuccessful” to 7 = “Completely successful” for the success item and from 1 = “Completely 
ineffective” to 7 = “Completely effective” for the effectiveness item (a = 0.892).  
Firm performance was operationalized through a subjective measure. Respondents were 
asked to evaluate their company’s performance at two points in time, 2015 and present, on five 
items compared to other firms in the same industry and at a similar stage of development. These 
items included return on assets (ROA), cash flow, sales growth, market share, and overall 
performance (Dess & Robinson, 1984; Hart & Banbury, 1994). The response anchors ranged 
from 1 = “Lowest performer” to 7 = “Highest performer.” Changes from 2015 to present were 
computed by taking difference of the two ratings and were labelled as improvement in ROA, 
cash flow, sales growth, market share, and overall performance, respectively. An overall score of 
improvement in firm performance was further computed by taking mean of the individual 
improvement scores (a = 0.869).  
To ensure the validity of the subjective measure, I also asked respondents to provide 
objective data on 1) change in ROA from 2015 to present, and 2) total assets and net income for 
each year in 2015-2018 (since financial data for 2019 were not yet available). Because response 
rates for these objective values were very low, I supplemented the values with archival data 
when the name of the firm was provided and the firm was publicly traded. Using data on total 
assets and net income, I computed ROA for each year in 2015-2018 as well as the change in 
ROA from 2015-2018. The results of correlation analyses showed that the subjective evaluation 
of improvement in firm performance was positively correlated with both objective change in 
ROA from 2015 to present reported by the respondents (r = 0.404, p = 0.037, n = 27) and 
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objective change in ROA from 2015-2018 computed using data on total assets and net income (r 
= 0.589, p = 0.027, n = 14). The substantial correlations between the subjective evaluation and 
objective values provide support for the validity of the subjective measure of firm performance. 
All the measures are presented in Appendix C. 
4.3.4.3 Control Variables 
As in the previous analyses, I controlled for respondents’ age, gender, education level, 
tenure in office, if founder of the company, firm age, firm type, industry, and ownership. 
4.3.4.4 Examination of Common Source Bias 
I used a number of methods to minimize potential concerns about common source bias in 
the data. First, I used archival (objective) and secondary data wherever possible. As noted earlier, 
for companies with names disclosed by the respondents, I compared the survey data with 
archival data that were publicly available. In cases of discrepancy or missing values, archival 
data were used. The moderator of holistic reasoning was operationalized with secondary data 
published in previous research. Second, I used ratings computed from multiple sources instead of 
self-reported ratings. For instance, the moderator of environmental unanalyzability was 
operationalized with industry-average ratings computed based on multiple ratings from the same 
industry. Third, as shown above, while firm performance was measured with subjective 
evaluations, these evaluations were strongly correlated with objective performance data, 
supporting the accuracy and objectivity of the subjective measure. Fourth, I conducted a 
Harman’s single-factor test (Atuahene-Gima & Li, 2004; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & 
Podsakoff, 2003) to all the variables measures involved in the analysis (i.e., superstitious 
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heuristics4, decision speed, collective efficacy, decision effectiveness, and improvement in firm 
performance measures). The results showed that there was not a single or general factor 
accounting for the majority of the covariance among the measures. Fifth, I submitted all the 
variable measures for a confirmatory factor analysis through ESEM. As shown in Table 51, all 
the items loaded on their main factors with no cross-loadings exceeding 0.40. With the inclusion 
of four correlated uniqueness (SE with OBJ, CE7 with CE8, CE2 with CE3, CE5 with CE7), the 
measurement model fitted the data satisfactorily well: CFI = 0.924, RMSEA = 0.078 (90% 
CI=0.055-0.098), SRMR=0.039. As such, efforts were made in different ways to minimize 
common source bias, and neither the single-factor test nor the confirmatory analysis via ESEM 
signaled a concern about common source bias in the data.  
4.3.4.5 Data Analysis 
The research framework is a moderated mediation model with two mediators. I employed 
the bootstrapping method developed by Preacher and Hayes (2008) to test the indirect effect of 
the use of superstitious heuristics on performance through the mediators. As an increasingly 
popular method for mediation analysis, bootstrapping, which is not normal theory based, is ideal 
for testing the indirect effect because indirect effects are often not normally distributed. The 
bootstrapping method computes confidence intervals, and mediation is established if zero is not 
contained in the interval. Because the mean of the bootstrapped distribution of the indirect effect 
does not exactly equal the estimated indirect effect, bias-corrected confidence intervals are also 
computed. Hayes and Scharkow (2013) recommended using bias-corrected confidence intervals 
 
4 To reduce the complexity of the model, only the first-order dimensions of superstitious 
heuristics were included.  
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when statistical power is a concern. Since the sample size of this study is small (N = 82), 
significance test was based on bias-corrected confidence intervals.   
I used seemingly unrelated regression analysis (UCLA: Statistical Consulting Group, 
n.d.; Zellner, 1962) to obtain coefficients needed to calculate the indirect effects of the use of 
superstitious heuristics on performance variables. For each analysis, three regression models 
were estimated simultaneously. The first model estimated the effect of superstitious heuristics on 
decision speed. The second model estimated the effect of superstitious heuristics on collective 
efficacy. The third model estimated the effect of decision speed and collective efficacy on 
performance variables with superstitious heuristics controlled for. The indirect effect of decision 
speed was computed by multiplying the coefficient of superstitious heuristics from the first 
model and the coefficient of decision speed from the third model. The indirect effect of 
collective efficacy was computed by multiplying the coefficient of superstitious heuristics from 
the second model and the coefficient of collective efficacy from the third model. The total 
indirect effect was computed by adding the two specific indirect effects together. Both specific 
and total indirect effects were then bootstrapped for significance test (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). 
4.3.4.6 Results 
Table 52 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables included 
in the analysis.  
4.3.4.6.1 Hypothesis Testing Using Decision Performance as Dependent Variable  
I started hypothesis testing using decision performance, operationalized with decision 
effectiveness, as dependent variable. Results are presented in Tables 53 to 55. Table 53 shows 
the results of regression analyses. Models 1a to 1c are for main effects and Models 2a to 2c are 
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for interaction effects. Tables 54 and 55 present the bootstrap results of the mediation and 
moderated mediation effects, respectively.   
Hypothesis 8 predicts that the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making 
is positively associated with performance through decision speed. As shown in Table 53, 
superstitious heuristics is positively and significantly associated with decision speed (Model 1a) 
while decision speed is positively and significantly associated with decision effectiveness 
(Model 1c). These results imply a possible indirect effect of superstitious heuristics on decision 
effectiveness through decision speed. To examine this possibility, the indirect effect was tested 
using bootstrapping. 
Table 54 presents the bootstrapped indirect effects with 5,000 resamples. As shown in the 
table, the 95% confidence interval of decision speed does not contain zero (95% CI = 0.001 to 
0.509), suggesting that the indirect effect of decision speed is significant. Hypothesis 8 is thus 
supported.  
Hypothesis 9 predicts that environmental unanalyzability strengthens the mediated 
relationship between the use of superstitious heuristics and performance through decision speed. 
As shown in Model 2c of Table 53, the product term of decision speed and environmental 
unanalyzability is not significant.  
Table 55 presents the bootstrapping results of the moderated mediation effects using 
5,000 resamples. As can be seen from the table, the indirect effect through decision speed is 
significant only when environment unanalyzability is at the medium level. Hypothesis 9 is 
therefore unsupported.  
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Hypothesis 10 predicts that the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-
making is positively associated with performance through collective efficacy. As shown in Table 
53, the relationship between superstitious heuristics and collective efficacy is positive and 
marginally significant (Model 1b of Table 53). The relationship between collective efficacy and 
decision effectiveness is also positive and marginally significant (Model 1c of Table 53). This 
indicates that a marginally significant indirect effect might exist.   
However, when this indirect effect was bootstrapped with 5,000 replications, the results 
show that zero was contained in both the 95% and 90% confidence intervals (95% CI = -0.038 to 
0.309, 90% CI = -0.019 to 0.263; Table 54), suggesting that the interact effect through collective 
efficacy is nonsignificant. Hypothesis 10 is thus unsupported.    
Hypothesis 11 predicts that holistic reasoning strengthens the mediated relationship 
between the use of superstitious heuristics and performance through collective efficacy. As 
shown in Model 2b of Table 53, the product term of superstitious heuristics and holistic 
reasoning is not significant. Bootstrapping results from Table 55 show that the conditional 
indirect effects through collective efficacy are not significant at any level of holistic reasoning. 
As such, Hypothesis 11 is not supported.  
In a multiple mediation model, besides specific indirect effects, it is meaningful to 
investigate the total indirect effects by the mediators together (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). As 
shown in Table 54, the total indirect effect of the use of superstitious heuristics on decision 
effectiveness through decision speed and collective efficacy combined is significant (95% CI = 
0.007 to 0.509). The results suggest that decision speed and collective efficacy, taken as a set, 
indeed mediate the effect of the use of superstitious heuristics on decision effectiveness. This 
offers support for the hypothesized multiple mediation model.  
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In addition to indirect effects, it is desirable to check if significant direct effect exists 
between the independent variable and the dependent variable. The direct effect of the use of 
superstitious heuristics on decision effectiveness is given in Model 1c of Table 53. As suggested 
by the coefficient, the use of superstitious heuristics has a negative and marginally significant 
direct effect on decision effectiveness.  
4.3.4.6.2 Hypothesis Testing Using Firm Performance as Dependent Variable  
In this section, hypotheses were tested using firm performance measures. Models were 
estimated with improvement in firm performance and each of the five individual measures (i.e., 
improvements in ROA, cash flow, sales growth, market share, and overall performance, 
respectively) as dependent variable. Results are shown in Tables 56-63. 
Tables 56-61 present the results of seemingly unrelated regression analyses. In each table, 
Models 1a to 1c are for main effects and Models 2a to 2c are for interaction effects. A browse of 
the tables indicates that decision speed is likely to mediate the relationship between the use of 
superstitious heuristics and improvement in market share. This is because the use of superstitious 
heuristics is positively associated with decision speed (Model 1a of Table 60) and decision speed 
is positively associated with improvement in market share (Model 1c of Table 60). Bootstrapping 
results suggest that this indirect effect through decision speed is marginally significant (90% CI 
= 0.009 to 0.515; Table 62), offering support for Hypothesis 8 at the 90 percent confidence level.   
The moderating effect of environment unanalyzability on the indirect relationship 
between superstitious heuristics and improvement in market share through decision speed was 
bootstrapped with 5,000 replications. As shown in Table 63, the indirect effect is nonsignificant 
when environmental unanalyzability is low but marginally significant when environmental 
unanalyzability is at medium and high levels. Moreover, the magnitude of the indirect effect 
 122 
increases as the value of environmental unanalyzability increases (b = 0.102, 0.177, and 0.252 at 
low, medium, and high levels of environmental unanalyzability). These results offer marginal 
support for Hypothesis 9 which predicts that environmental unanalyzability strengthens the 
indirect relationship between the use of superstitious heuristics and performance through 
decision speed.  
Results in the other tables suggest that decision speed does not seem to mediate the effect 
of superstitious heuristics on improvement in firm performance (Table 56) or any of the other 
individual measures (Tables 57, 58, 59, and 61). Bootstrapping results confirmed that the indirect 
effects through decision speed to improvement in firm performance and the other individual 
measures were nonsignificant (results not shown here). Bootstrapping results of moderated 
mediation also showed no significant conditional indirect effects through decision speed to these 
measures (results not shown here).  
As for the other hypothesized mediator – collective efficacy, results in Table 60 indicate 
collective efficacy does not mediate the relationship between the use of superstitious heuristics 
and improvement in market share. This is because both the link from superstitious heuristics to 
collective efficacy (Model 1b of Table 60) and the link from collective efficacy to improvement 
in market share (Model 1c of Table 60) are nonsignificant. Bootstrapping corroborated this 
observation (95% CI = -0.139 to 0.154; 90% CI = -0.108 to 0.116; Table 62). In addition, 
bootstrapping results from Table 63 show that the conditional indirect effects of superstitious 
heuristics on improvement in market share through collective efficacy are nonsignificant at all 
levels of holistic reasoning. This suggests that the moderating effect of holistic reasoning on the 
indirect relationship between the use of superstitious heuristics and improvement in market share 
through collective efficacy is not significant.  
 123 
The same results were observed for improvement in firm performance and the other 
individual measures. Bootstrapping results of mediation suggested that the indirect effects 
through collective efficacy to improvement in firm performance and the other individual 
measures were nonsignificant (results not shown here). Bootstrapping results of moderated 
mediation also showed no significant conditional indirect effects through collective efficacy to 
these measures (results not shown here). As such, hypotheses 10 and 11 are unsupported. 
With regard to total indirect effects, most of the total indirect effects were nonsignificant 
expect for improvement in market share. Results from Table 62 indicate that decision speed and 
collective efficacy together mediate the relationship between the use of superstitious heuristics 
and improvement in market share at the 90 percent confidence level (90% CI = 0.007 to 0.508), 
providing marginal support for the hypothesized multiple mediation model. 
As for direct effects, the use of superstitious heuristics had a positive, marginally 
significant direct effect on improvement in sales growth (Model 1c of Table 59), and the effect 
became significant in the full model (Model 2c of Table 59). Additionally, the use of 
superstitious heuristics demonstrated a positive, marginally significant effect on improvement in 
ROA in the full model (Model 2c of Table 57).  
4.3.4.7 Discussion 
The second part of Study 3 investigated the performance consequences of the use of 
superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making. Specifically, I examined whether the use of 
superstitious heuristics would affect decision performance (operationalized with decision 
effectiveness) and firm performance (operationalized with improvement in firm performance and 
five individual measures) through decision speed and collective efficacy. Results showed that 
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decision speed was a significant mediator of the positive relationship between the use of 
superstitious heuristics and decision effectiveness, and a marginally significant mediator of the 
positive relationship between the use of superstitious heuristics and improvement in market 
share. The latter indirect effect was positively, marginally moderated by environmental 
unanalyzability. A summary of hypothesis testing results can be found in Table 64. 
Taken as a set, decision speed and collective effectiveness significantly mediated the 
effect of the use of superstitious heuristics on decision effectiveness, and marginally mediated 
the effect of the use of superstitious heuristics on improvement in market share. These results 
suggest that decision speed and collective effectiveness together were meaningful mediators 
through which the use of superstitious heuristics affect performance consequences.  
In addition to the indirect effects, results showed that the use of superstitious heuristics 
had direct effects on several performance variables. There was a negative, marginally significant 
direct relationship between the use of superstitious heuristics and decision effectiveness. The use 
of superstitious heuristics also had a positive, marginally significant direct effect on 
improvement in sales growth, which became significantly positive in the full model. 
Furthermore, a marginally positive direct effect on improvement in ROA was found in the full 
model. A summary of non-hypothesized, significant direct effects is shown in Table 65. 
These findings suggest that the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-
making is indeed performance relevant. It influences both decision performance and firm 
performance, both indirectly and directly. With respect to indirect effects, the use of superstitious 
heuristics positively affects decision performance and firm performance through decision speed 
individually and through decision speed and collective efficacy jointly. With regard to direct 
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effects apart from the mediators, the use of superstitious heuristics directly affects decision 
performance in a negative manner while exerting direct positive influences on firm performance.    
The combined mediation through decision speed and collective efficacy is consistent with 
the theory-based underlying mechanisms. The heuristic nature of superstitious heuristics 
accelerates decision-making which in turn improves performance. The superstitious nature of 
superstitious heuristics promotes confidence and morale in decision implementation, which in 
turn increase performance. Decision speed, however, is the major contributor of the total 
mediated effect. As the significant mediator, decision speed likely improves performance 
through fast seizing of market opportunities and speedy strategic moves such as quick adoptions 
of promising products, technologies, or business models before their competitive advantages 
disappear (Baum & Wally, 2003; Jones et al., 2001). This helps explain why the mediation 
through decision speed is particularly strong for improvement in market share (as compared to 
the other firm performance measures), and why this mediated effect is stronger when the 
environmental is unanalyzable.   
The negative direct effect of the use of superstitious heuristics on decision effectiveness 
might be caused by the poor quality of decisions. After all, superstitious heuristics are based on 
beliefs unsupported by contemporary science. It is interesting to note that the direct effect of the 
use of superstitious heuristics on firm performance is by and large positive and most reflected in 
improvement in sales growth. The unidentified mechanism in this direct effect might be the 
market’s positive reaction as a result of the firm’s use of superstitious heuristics. In other words, 
the market might react favorably towards products or services with a superstitious appeal 
resulted from the firm’s decisions based on superstitious heuristics. For instance, the decisions of 
a developer company to pick an auspicious land and build apartment buildings according to feng 
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shui principles are likely to see notable sales increase when the market does care about such 
beliefs. This is in line with findings from marketing research that customers not only prefer but 
are also willing to pay premium for products or services with superstitious features (Kramer & 
Block, 2007; Yardley, 2006). Taking the direct effect on sales growth and indirect effect on 
market share together, it is interesting to find that the influence of the use of superstitious 
heuristics on firm performance is most prominent in market-based domains. 
The marginally significant moderating effect of environmental unanalyzability on the 
mediated relationship between superstitious heuristics and improvement in market share through 
decision speed is consistent with previous findings that the positive effect of decision speed on 
performance is stronger in high-velocity and turbulent environment (Baum & Wally, 2003; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Judge & Miller, 1991). The moderating effect of holistic reasoning was not 
significant in all the models. This might be caused by the low variance in the variable (SD = 
0.07). Because the survey was conducted in an EMBA program in Shanghai, a majority of the 
firms in the sample were located in Shanghai or nearby regions. The effect of holistic reasoning 
might have been stronger if the firms were from a variety of provinces.      
In addition to examining the hypothesized relationships, Study 3 demonstrated the 
validity of the positive SHS in the strategic decision context. The factor structure of the scale 
was supported by data from firm executives regarding their strategic decision behaviors. The 
convergent validity of the scale was demonstrated by the strong correlation between superstitious 
heuristics and superstitious thinking (r = 0.55, p = 0.000). The discriminant validity of the scale 
from other measures was demonstrated in the results of the confirmatory analysis through ESEM 
(Table 51). Lastly, the scale’s nomological validity was established through its significant 
relationships with the antecedents and consequences.  
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While I only used the positive SHS for the survey in Study 3, I believe that results would 
be similar if the negative SHS was used. This is because, based on results from Study 1, the two 
scales possess similar psychometric properties. More importantly, the results of scale validation 
showed that the two scales demonstrated largely consistent relationships with their antecedents 
and consequences in the nomological network.  
4.3.5 Conclusion 
   Study 3 tested the research models using survey data from firm top managers in real 
world practice. The first part of Study 3 exanimated the antecedents – superstitious heuristics 
link. The results provided support for several key hypotheses and replicated the results of Study 
2. The convergent results of Studies 2 and 3 suggest that my findings on the antecedents of the 
use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making are robust and generalizable. The 
second part of Study 3 examined the superstitious heuristics – consequences link. Results suggest 
that the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making does have performance 
consequences. It affects both decision performance and firm performance through direct and 
indirect paths. Finally, Study 3 also provided evidence for the validity of the positive SHS in the 
strategic decision context.  
5 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
5.1 Summary 
This dissertation focuses on a universal but largely ignored phenomenon in the strategic 
decision literature which I refer to as the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-
making. The use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making is prevalent in major 
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economies and leads to firm decisions that are sometimes puzzling to the existing theory. The 
dissertation sheds light on this phenomenon and offers theoretical and practical insights.  
This dissertation includes both conceptual and empirical efforts in understanding the 
phenomenon of interest. For the conceptual part, I explored the concept and typology of the 
superstitious heuristic based on the literature on heuristics and superstition. I mapped the 
superstitious heuristic into the existing heuristics literature and compared it with other types of 
heuristics that had been examined in the literature. The empirical part of the dissertation consists 
of three studies. In Study 1, I developed and validated a positive and a negative Superstitious 
Heuristic Scale with a global sample of respondents from over sixty national cultures. Both 
scales demonstrated psychometric soundness and achieved measurement equivalence across 
culture and language. In Studies 2 and 3, I conducted an experiment and a survey study in China 
to investigate the antecedents and consequences of using of superstitious heuristics in strategic 
decision-making. The experiment and the survey study provided convergent results concerning 
the role of decision uncertainty, decision importance, and superstitious thinking as the 
antecedents. I found that decision uncertainty, decision importance, and superstitious thinking 
were positively associated with the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making, 
and that decision uncertainty strengthened the relationship between decision importance and the 
use of superstitious heuristics. Results from the survey study also revealed the performance 
consequences of the use of superstitious heuristics. In terms of decision performance, the use of 
superstitious heuristics had a positive indirect effect on decision effectiveness through decision 
speed alone and through decision speed and collective efficacy combined. It also exhibited a 
negative direct effect on decision effectiveness. As for firm performance, the use of superstitious 
heuristics had a marginally significant, positive indirect effect on improvement in market share 
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through decision speed alone and through decision speed and collective efficacy combined. The 
former indirect effect was marginally stronger in unanalyzable environments. The use of 
superstitious heuristics also showed marginally significant, positive direct effects on 
improvements in sales growth and ROA. The conceptual and empirical endeavors of the 
dissertation offer theoretical, empirical, and practical contributions.   
5.2 Theoretical Contributions 
5.2.1 Contributions to Behavioral Strategy 
The use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making is an important 
phenomenon prevalent in many cultures including major economies (Cisek, 2012; Gunn, 1997; 
Palazzolo, 2005; Tsang, 2004a, 2004b) and exerts influences on firms’ strategic behaviors and 
performance (Tsang, 2004a, 2004b). However, the phenomenon has been largely neglected in the 
literature. As a result, much was unknown about the phenomenon, such as the nature of the 
superstitious heuristic, the factors leading to the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic 
decision-making, and the performance consequences of this decision practice. This dissertation 
addresses the research void by conceptualizing the superstitious heuristic, identifying its 
dimensionality, and exploring its antecedents and consequences in the strategic decision context. 
The findings confirmed the use of superstitious heuristics in real world strategic decision 
practices, validated its dimensionality, identified conditions under which the phenomenon is 
likely to occur, and more importantly, demonstrated that the phenomenon is indeed performance 
relevant. The dissertation thus sheds light on an important phenomenon in the strategic decision 
process and offers a new angle in theory to explain firm behavior and performance.  
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In a broad sense, the dissertation contributes to the behavioral strategy research in 
response to the call for more research endeavors that build the psychological foundation of 
strategic management (Powell et al., 2011; Schoemaker, 1990). More specifically, the 
dissertation contributes to the behavioral aspect of strategic decision-making, especially the use 
of heuristics in the strategic decision process. Over the past few decades, the behavioral aspect of 
strategic decision-making has made notable progress in uncovering the influence of firm 
executives’ psychological characteristics on strategic judgment and decision-making. However, 
most of the studies have focused on cognitive biases such as escalation (Staw, 1981), attribution 
(Salancik & Meindl, 1984), attention (Ocasio, 1997), hubris (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997), 
narcissism (Gerstner, König, Enders, & Hambrick, 2013), among others. Studies on the role of 
heuristics are comparatively limited. Up to now, heuristics research in strategic management has 
examined executive use of universal heuristics (i.e., heuristics studied in cognitive psychology) 
(Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Clapham & Schwenk, 1991; Anne S. Huff & Schwenk, 1990; 
Lovallo & Kahneman, 2003), executive use of expert intuition (Barnard, 1938; Khatri & Ng, 
2000; Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 2004; Simon, 1987), and firms’ idiosyncratic simple rules 
(Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011, 2014; Bingham et al., 2007; Eisenhardt & Sull, 2001; Maitland & 
Sammartino, 2015). Despite these remarkable endeavors, heuristics research remains relatively 
underdeveloped in behavioral strategy, and more efforts are called for to fully exploit the 
potential of behavioral decision theory in strategic management (Hodgkinson & Sparrow, 2002; 
Powell et al., 2011). This dissertation helps address this gap by conceptualizing the superstitious 
heuristic and exploring its role in the strategic decision context.   
The study of the superstitious heuristic does not only introduce a new type of heuristic, 
but it also challenges and expands the current understanding of heuristics by revealing new 
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mechanisms uniquely associated with the superstitious heuristic. Regarding the source of 
heuristics, current research views heuristics as the product of cognitive errors (Kahneman, 
2003a; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) or the result of practice and feedback learning over time 
(Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Eisenhardt & Sull, 2001; Simon, 1987). The superstitious 
heuristic, as a heuristic based on one’s belief system, offers additional insights. Specifically, the 
superstitious heuristic does not necessarily derive from cognitive errors but can be consciously 
intended because of psychological motives such as desire for control (Case et al., 2004; 
Rothbaum et al., 1982; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008). The superstitious heuristic is not necessarily 
a result of feedback learning either but can be driven solely by one’s superstitious beliefs. Even 
in the case of feedback learning, the development of superstitious heuristic is likely more 
susceptible to confirmation and attribution bias than the other types of heuristics because of its 
nature as a belief system-based heuristic (Festinger et al., 1956; Tsang, 2004a, 2004b). In 
examining the effect of heuristics on performance, current research often compares the use of 
heuristics with formal, rational decision process. Heuristics are believed to outcompete the latter 
with efficiency and effectiveness (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Eisenhardt & Sull, 2001; 
Gigerenzer, 2008) or lead to worse outcomes due to the sacrifice of comprehensiveness and 
accuracy (Holcomb et al., 2009; Piattelli-Palmarini, 1994; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974). 
The superstitious heuristic can influence performance not only through these mechanisms 
commonly shared with the other heuristics but also through psychological mechanisms that are 
uniquely associated with its superstitious nature, e.g., enhanced self/collective efficacy (Damisch 
et al., 2010). In these ways, the study of the superstitious heuristic advances the current 
understanding of heuristics.  
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The positive effect of the use of superstitious heuristics on performance found in the 
dissertation aligns with and contributes to the positive view of heuristics in the literature. As 
noted earlier, heuristics scholars hold opposite views of heuristics. The heuristics-and-biases 
research as well as its application in strategy research generally emphasize the negative 
consequences of heuristics. Researchers suggest that the use of heuristics, as a product of 
cognitive errors or illusions, often leads to biased judgment and decisions (Holcomb et al., 2009; 
Piattelli-Palmarini, 1994; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974). The other research streams, 
namely, the fast-and-frugal research (Gigerenzer, 2008; Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Goldstein, 
2008; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002), expert intuition (Barnard, 1938; Dane & Pratt, 2007; 
Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 2004; Simon, 1987), and simple rules (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011, 
2014; Eisenhardt & Sull, 2001), share in the positive view of heuristics that was pioneered by 
Simon (1947, 1955). These researchers commonly highlight the efficiency and effectiveness of 
heuristics as compared to comprehensive decision approaches that are more costly and time 
consuming (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Eisenhardt & Sull, 2001; Gigerenzer, 2008). The 
positive effect of superstitious heuristics on performance through decision speed provides 
additional support for the efficiency and effectiveness of heuristics with new evidence from a 
new type of heuristic. Not only that, the findings further reveal that the strength of heuristics can 
reside in its function of accelerating decision-making alone, independent of its content. Existing 
heuristics research that holds a positive view less often discusses the advantages of heuristics 
apart from their content. Rather, heuristics are deemed adequate or accurate often because they 
are learned know-hows from experience and thus can effectively capture important cues while 
avoiding overfitting (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011; Gigerenzer, 2008; Simon, 1987). In these 
discussions, heuristics, while easy and simple, are valid decision rules. By contrast, the content 
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of superstitious heuristics is invalid according to contemporary science. Thus, the study of 
superstitious heuristics provides an ideal opportunity to isolate and highlight the positive role of 
the accelerating feature of heuristics.      
The study of the superstitious heuristic also informs other research streams in the 
behavioral strategy literature. For example, the notion of the superstitious heuristic can be 
relevant to research on aspiration levels and risk-taking. This research stream suggests that firms 
adjust their aspirations based on their recent performance and performance of other firms in the 
same industry. When current performance falls below aspiration levels, firms start problemistic 
search which likely lead to risk-taking moves (Cyert & March, 1963; Greve, 1998, 2003; Harris 
& Bromiley, 2007). Superstitious heuristics could influence and be influenced by firms’ 
aspirations. On the one hand, since superstition enhances confidence and optimism, strategic 
decisions aligning with superstitious principles may increase firms’ expectations and ambitions 
for outcomes. On the other hand, when performance falls below aspiration levels, decreased 
confidence and a threatened sense of control may urge firms to engage in superstitious heuristics 
as a form of problemistic search for change. Superstitious heuristics may also affect firms’ risk-
taking. When a risk-taking initiative is derived from superstitious heuristics, it may be pursued 
with additional assertiveness and confidence. However, superstitious heuristics may also hinder 
risk-taking if the potential initiative is at odds with superstitious considerations.  
Likewise, the study of the superstitious heuristic can also be relevant to research on 
resource allocation and the trade-off between exploitation and exploration (March, 1991; 
O’Reilly & Tushman, 2013; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). Firms are generally biased in favor of 
exploitation than exploration due to greater certainty and control, as well as lower failure rates 
associated with the former than the latter (Benner & Tushman, 2002; March, 1991; Uotila, 
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Maula, Keil, & Zahra, 2009). Research also suggests that firms tend to be more innovative when 
they have sufficient (but not excessive) organizational slack (Geiger & Cashen, 2002; Nohria & 
Gulati, 1996). The study of the superstitious heuristic sheds light on an additional way that firms’ 
exploration may be affected. The use of superstitious heuristics may encourage firms to strive a 
better balance and undertake more exploratory efforts by reducing perceived uncertainty and 
enhancing confidence, optimism, and a sense of control. Superstitious heuristics (e.g., 
instructions from an authoritative superstitious source) may also urge firms to engage in 
exploration even when firms are in shortage of slack or motivation.  
The study of the superstitious heuristic can also be informative to research on conflict, 
politics, and intergroup bargaining in the strategic decision process. This research stream 
suggests that firms are political coalitions consisting of units with different goals and interests. 
As a result, conflicts, power struggles, negotiations, and accommodations are pervasive in 
strategic decision practice (Cyert & March, 1963; Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988; March, 1962). 
Superstition could play a role here if the culture is superstitious. For instance, the use of 
superstitious heuristics could serve as a useful tool to create common ground and achieve 
consensus among different parties with conflicting goals and interests. It could also be used to 
shape opinions, win support, and enhance bargaining power to influence a decision.    
Overall, the dissertation contributes to behavioral strategy by adding to the psychological 
foundations of strategy research. By conceptualizing and empirically investigating an important 
yet overlooked phenomenon, the study of superstitious heuristics in the strategic decision process 
advances research on the behavioral aspect of strategic decision-making and, in particular, 
relatively underdeveloped heuristics studies in strategy. The study of the superstitious heuristic 
expands the current understanding of antecedents and consequences of heuristics by revealing 
 135 
new mechanisms that are uniquely associated with the superstitious property of the heuristic. The 
findings offer support for the positive view of heuristics and highlight the strength of heuristics 
in improving performance by accelerating decision-making. Lastly, the study of the superstitious 
heuristic may also inform other research domains in behavioral strategy such as aspiration levels 
and risk taking, exploitation and exploration, and conflicts and politics in strategic decision 
process.  
5.2.2 Contributions to Behavioral Decision Theory  
The behavioral decision literature has studied a variety of heuristics including satisficing 
(Newell & Simon, 1972), representativeness, availability, anchoring (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974), recognition, take the best, imitate the majority and the successful (Gigerenzer, 2008; 
Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002), and expert intuition (Chase & Simon, 1973; Klein, 2015; Simon, 
1987). By coining the term “superstitious heuristic”, the dissertation adds to the behavioral 
decision literature a new family of heuristic. As repeatedly noted, the use of superstitious beliefs 
as decision rules in decision-making is prevalent in different cultures. Nevertheless, the 
behavioral decision research has not yet explored this type of heuristic. The findings of Study 1 
from a global sample indicate that the use of superstitious heuristics in decision-making is indeed 
a global phenomenon although the extent varies by individual and culture. Moreover, the results 
from Studies 2 and 3 suggest that one does not need to be strongly superstitious to engage in 
superstitious heuristics – even non-superstitious individuals have a potential to resort to 
superstitious heuristics under the right condition (e.g., high decision uncertainty and high 
decision importance). These findings confirm the importance of studying the superstitious 
heuristic by demonstrating the prevalence and influence of superstitious heuristics in a broad 
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range of decision situations. The findings also offer an additional illustration of the boundedness 
of human rationality which is the cornerstone of behavioral decision theory.  
Just like the aforementioned traditional heuristics that have been examined in behavioral 
decision literature, the superstitious heuristic also holds the potential to be applied to other 
research fields beyond psychology. While the dissertation investigates the use of superstitious 
heuristics in the context of strategic decision-making, the notion of the superstitious heuristic can 
be applied to many other research fields such as human resource management (regarding 
selection and promotion), marketing (regarding advertising and product purchase), finance 
(regarding financial investment), economics (regarding economic policy-making), political 
science (regarding attitudes towards political candidates or issues), media and communication 
(regarding framing and public opinions), and so forth. The role of superstition in decision-
making, while not strictly as a heuristic, has been studied in marketing, finance, and economics. 
Research has shown that superstitious beliefs substantially influence individuals’ preferences in 
the product market (L. Block & Kramer, 2009; Kramer & Block, 2007; Li, Hsieh, & Chang, 
2016; Luk et al., 2012), stock market (Hirshleifer et al., 2018; Ke et al., 2017; Lepori, 2009), real 
estate business (Antipov & Pokryshevskaya, 2015; Fortin et al., 2014), and commodity trading 
(Chung, Darrat, & Li, 2014). For the other domains, real world examples can be readily 
identified. For instance, in the case of human resource management, Tsang (2004a, 2004b) 
reported that some Chinese managers use physiognomy to make hiring decisions. In terms of 
political science and communication, political candidates in Japan would highlight their blood 
types if it was favored by the culture. This, supposedly, would provide a competitive advantage 
over their rivals because blood type plays a notable role in shaping Japanese voters’ attitudes 
towards candidates (R. Evans, 2012). As such, the existing research and real-world cases signal 
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the validity and potential for the utilization of the concept of the superstitious heuristic in these 
areas. The conceptualization of the superstitious heuristic thus opens up new avenues through 
which behavior decision theory facilitates the inquiry of decision-making in various research 
disciplines.  
5.2.3 Contributions to Superstition Research 
The study of superstitious heuristics contributes to the superstition research in several 
ways. First, the existing superstition literature lacks a systematic investigation of the role of 
superstition in decision-making context. As noted earlier, a majority of superstition research has 
focused on superstitious beliefs rather than superstitious behaviors. Among the studies that have 
investigated superstitious behaviors, most of the behaviors (e.g., carrying a lucky charm or 
performing special rituals for good luck) are not directly related to decision-making. This 
dissertation contributes to superstition literature by exclusively focusing on the determinant role 
that superstition plays in the decision process. Second, existing superstition research has largely 
focused on the general population or occupational groups such as athletes, college students, and 
gamblers (Vyse, 2013). Firm executives are not traditionally considered as a superstitious group 
in the literature. This dissertation extends superstition research to a new sample (i.e. firm 
executives) and a new setting (i.e. firm strategic decision-making).  
5.3 Empirical Contributions 
In this dissertation, I empirically demonstrated the validity of my conceptualization of the 
construct and dimensionality of the superstitious heuristic. As noted, a negative and positive SHS 
was developed through a global sample. Both scales confirmed the five-dimensional structure of 
the construct and demonstrated strong convergent, discriminant, and nomological validity. 
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Furthermore, both scales achieved measurement equivalence across culture and language. The 
positive SHS was further validated in the strategic decision context through a well-defined factor 
structure and significant relationships with its antecedents and consequences as theoretically 
predicted. As such, the dissertation makes empirical contributions in the following ways.  
First, by offering the validated construct and measurement of the superstitious heuristic to 
the strategic decision literature, the dissertation facilitates the investigation of the use of 
superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making. The confirmed multidimensional nature of 
the construct enabled me to detect the difference in the extent to which each dimension is 
employed in strategic decision-making as well as identify the most relied on dimensions. It also 
opens up research opportunities for investigating the interplay between different dimensions and 
different strategic decisions, as well as the differential effects of the dimensions on consequences 
under different contingencies. For instance, while testing the consequence model I examined 
how each dimension affected the consequences (results are not reported considering the length of 
the dissertation). I found that the use of superstitious heuristics related to Surrounding 
Environment failed to increase decision speed but promoted collective efficacy. In contrast, the 
use of superstitious heuristics related to Physical Attribute increased decision speed, but not 
collective efficacy. The two dimensions are thus likely to affect firm performance in different 
ways under different conditions. As such, since firms vary in the level of the five superstitious 
heuristic dimensions, suggesting the preference and involvement of different superstitious 
heuristics in strategic decision-making, the validated multidimensional nature of the construct 
enables the construction of the firm’s superstitious heuristic profile and the observation of 
performance consequences under different contingencies.   
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Second, the validated construct and measurement of the strategic heuristic also contribute 
to the behavioral decision literature. As noted early in the dissertation, the goal for scale 
development was to develop and validate a Superstitious Heuristic Scale that is applicable to 
different cultures and decision settings. The goal was achieved by 1) the evidence that both SHSs 
established measurement equivalence cross cultures and 2) the demonstration through the 
positive SHS in the strategic decision context that the SHSs can be easily applied to a specific 
decision setting and remain psychometrically sound. As such, since the introduction of the 
superstitious heuristic opens up new opportunities through which behavior decision theory 
facilitates the inquiry of decision behaviors in various research disciplines, the SHSs will 
hopefully facilitate exploitation of these opportunities in different cultures and decision settings. 
It would be interesting to investigate the antecedents and consequences of superstitious heuristics 
in different cultures and settings. It would also be interesting to explore the interactions between 
the dimensions of superstitious heuristic and decision settings. For instance, superstitious 
heuristics related to Physical Attribute and Birth Profile might be particularly relevant in shaping 
attitudes and preferences towards political candidates (R. Evans, 2012).  
Third, the validated construct and measurement of the superstitious heuristic further 
contribute to the superstition literature. The existing measures in superstition literature largely 
focus on operationalizing superstitious beliefs, but not behaviors. In addition, these measures 
only apply to a single culture or similar cultures. This dissertation contributes to the superstition 
literature by offering the SHSs which capture superstitious behaviors and are applicable to 
different cultures. Furthermore, the scales are invariant across culture and thus can be directly 
used in a new culture or for cross-cultural comparisons.  
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5.4 Managerial Implications 
The findings of the dissertations offer managerial implications regarding strategic 
decision-making and interfirm competition and cooperation. First, the performance consequences 
of the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making may provide insightful 
information to top executives. As reported, the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic 
decision-making demonstrated positive effects on decision performance and firm performance 
through decision speed and collective efficacy. In situations where formal, comprehensive 
analysis is infeasible or might substantially slow down decision-making, using superstitious 
heuristics may be a useful way to accelerate the decision process and thereby avoid potential 
negative consequences from indecisiveness or delay. This may be even more helpful in 
unanalyzable environments where comprehensive analysis does not add much useful 
information. Although collective efficacy was not a significant mediator by itself (possibly due 
to the limited sample size of Study 3), it did contribute to the significant total indirect effect 
through which performance was improved. More importantly, a marginally significant and 
positive relationship was found between the use of superstitious heuristics and collective 
efficacy. In situations where confidence and morale are critical in successfully implementing the 
decision and where decision implementors are superstitious, the use of superstitious heuristics in 
strategic decision-making might be helpful in promoting collective efficacy and ultimately 
performance. The use of superstitious heuristics also showed a positive direct effect on 
improvement in sales growth. The mechanism is suspected to be consumers’ favorable reaction 
towards superstitious elements that come from decisions based on superstitious heuristics. In 
situations where consumers are superstitious, the appropriate use of relevant superstitious 
heuristics might be desirable to improve market performance.  
 141 
Second, the phenomenon of using superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making 
offers implications for better interfirm competition and corporation. As noted, the empirical 
findings of the dissertation confirm that executives do use superstitious heuristics in strategic 
decision-making, at least in China. Considering the possible influence of social desirability bias 
and the fact that respondents could not report on the use of superstitious heuristics that occurred 
unconsciously, the use of superstitious heuristics in making strategic decisions might be more 
frequent in real world than reported in the data. The phenomenon is also likely to be observed in 
other countries where superstitious beliefs and practice are common. In this context, being aware 
of the role of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making provides an additional way for 
firm executives to better understand and predict the strategic moves of their competitor and/or 
partner firms. When these firms are from superstitious cultures or run by superstitious 
individuals, it might be worth paying attention to the specific superstitious beliefs endorsed by 
the culture or the key decision-makers of the firm. Such additional intelligence might be 
surprisingly useful for the focal firm to better position itself in completion and cooperation.  
5.5 Limitations and Future Research 
Despite of the abovementioned contributions, this dissertation has a number of 
limitations. First, the experiment in Study 2 failed to establish the causal effects of decision 
uncertainty and decision importance. As discussed earlier, the failure might have been caused by 
manipulation ineffectiveness to a notable portion of the participants. It may be also due to the 
experimental design which did not simulate a realistic decision-making process and, as a result, 
the manipulations were not as strong as it could have been. Future research can design 
experiments in which participants make actual decisions and decision uncertainty and 
importance are built into the decisions to make. Such design will likely make manipulations 
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realistic and thus more powerful, and also avoid the gap between perceptions and actual 
behaviors.  
Second, the findings of Study 3 were based on self-reported data and a small sample size. 
While the validity of the data was established by strong correlations between subjective 
measures and object data and by the absence of red flag for common source bias, self-reported 
data may still suffer from biases due to factors such as inaccurate memory or social desirability 
(Nederhof, 1985; Schwarz, 1999). The small sample size may have restrained the statistical 
power of the data in a variety of analyses including hypothesis testing. Considering these 
limitations, future research is encouraged to use objective data and larger samples to revisit the 
relationships of interest.  
Third, Study 3 did not examine the differential consequences of each individual 
dimension of superstitious heuristics. As noted earlier, I found preliminary evidence that the 
individual dimensions affected decision speed and collective efficacy differently. It is thus 
meaningful for future research to explore how each dimension brings different consequences in 
diverse situations. For example, there is likely to be interplays between the type (dimension) of 
superstitious heuristics and the type of strategic decisions. It will also be interesting to construct 
firms’ superstitious heuristic profiles based on their stand on each dimension and investigate how 
the profiles affect performance under different contingencies.  
Fourth, following the last point, the relationship between the use of superstitious 
heuristics (and each dimension) and performance can be affected by a variety of contingencies in 
addition to the two factors examined in Study 3 (i.e., environmental unanalyzability and holistic 
reasoning). Future research can explore the potential effects of other contingencies at different 
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levels. For instance, at the firm level, contingencies such as firm size may attenuate the effect of 
superstitious heuristics on performance because the influence of top managers on the firm may 
decrease as firm size increases.  
Fifth, the research models of the dissertation were tested in a Chinese setting, which 
cautions the generalization of the findings across cultures. Future research could revisit these 
models with data from other countries. For example, researchers can reexamine the relationships 
of interest in India. Since the cultural and institutional environments are relatively close between 
India and China, researchers should find similar patterns in the relationships. In addition, since 
the pervasiveness of the use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making is likely to 
vary by country, it would also be interesting to identify country-level factors that may contribute 
to this variance. For instance, the use of superstitious heuristics may be more frequently observed 
in countries where institutional uncertainty is high.  
Sixth, the dissertation did not consider the situations where superstitious heuristics are 
used along with other types of heuristics in the decision process. Future research could explore 
the use of superstitious heuristics in combination of other heuristics and compare the 
performance outcomes of superstitious heuristics versus other types of heuristics. Researchers 
could also compare the performance of using superstitious heuristics versus rational decision 
approaches. In addition, the dissertation only considered the use of superstition as a substitute 
(i.e., heuristic) for rational decision models. Future research could explore the use of superstition 
as a complement to rational decision approaches.  
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6 CONCLUSION 
The use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making is a prevalent 
phenomenon in many countries, including major economies. However, this phenomenon has not 
received much attention in strategic decision research. The present dissertation addresses this 
research gap by conceptualizing the construct of superstitious heuristic, developing scale 
instruments to measure it, and investigating the antecedents and consequences of the use of 
superstitious heuristics in the strategic decision context. In doing so, the dissertation advances 
current understandings of heuristics and strategic decision-making and offers a new angle to 
explain and predict firm strategic behavior and performance. Overall, this dissertation makes 
theoretical and empirical contributions to behavioral strategy, behavioral decision research, and 
superstition literature. It also provides managerial implications regarding strategic decision-
making and interfirm competition and cooperation.  
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7 TABLES 







Table 2 Superstitious Beliefs Studied in the Literature 
Belief objecta  Category of beliefs 
Altered states of consciousness (e.g., hallucinations)   
Alternative medicine *b Beliefs in the influence of objects or acts on future events or people 
Amulets and charms * Beliefs in the influence of objects or acts on future events or people 
Astral projection (spirit separated from the body)   
Astrology, lunar effects and horoscopes * Beliefs in the influence of birth profile on future events or people 
Card reading * Beliefs in paranormal revelations about future events or people 
Communication with the dead * Beliefs in paranormal revelations about future events or people 
Control of chance events by thoughts or behavior * Beliefs in the influence of objects or acts on future events or people 
Cosmic forces and energies (e.g., aura, pyramid power) * Beliefs in the influence of surrounding forces or energies on future events or people 
Creationism   
déjà vu   
Extraordinary life forms (e.g., the snowman of Tibet)   
Extrasensory perception (e.g., telepathy, precognition) * Beliefs in paranormal revelations about future events or people 
Extraterrestrial life (e.g., UFOs)   
Fate * Beliefs in the influence of birth profile on future events or people 
Feng shui * Beliefs in the influence of surrounding forces or energies on future events or people 
Ghosts, haunting, poltergeist   
Gods   
Hell and/or Heaven * Beliefs in the influence of objects or acts on future events or people 
Illusory rule detection * Beliefs in the influence of objects or acts on future events or people 
Karma and reincarnation * Beliefs in the influence of objects or acts on future events or people 
Law of contagion * Beliefs in the influence of objects or acts on future events or people 
Law of similarity * Beliefs in the influence of objects or acts on future events or people 
Luck-related rituals * Beliefs in the influence of objects or acts on future events or people 
Lucky numbers, colors or days * Beliefs in the influence of objects or acts on future events or people 
Omens (e.g., breaking a mirror, black cats) * Beliefs in the influence of objects or acts on future events or people 
Spiritual beings other than gods (e.g., angels, devils)   
Spiritual healing * Beliefs in the influence of objects or acts on future events or people 
Palm reading * Beliefs in the influence of physical attributes on future events or people 
Physiognomy * Beliefs in the influence of physical attributes on future events or people 
Plants’ ability to sense and communicate   
Prayer * Beliefs in the influence of objects or acts on future events or people 
Precognitive dreams * Beliefs in paranormal revelations about future events or people 
Psychic healing * Beliefs in the influence of objects or acts on future events or people 
Psychokinesis or levitation   
Witches and bewitchment (incl. spells, curses, etc.) * Beliefs in the influence of objects or acts on future events or people 
Note: a The list is adapted from Lindeman and Svedholm (2012). b These asterisks indicate that the beliefs can potentially be used to affect decision-making.      
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Table 3 Typology of the Superstitious Heuristic 
Category Description Belief object Example 
Superstitious heuristics 
related to Birth Profile   
Decision shortcuts based on theories, 
teachings, predictions, or suggestions 
related to supposed influences of 
one’s birth profile 
Destiny calculation; 
astrology, horoscopes 
Former U.S. president Ronald 
Reagan and his wife Nancy Reagan 
made major decisions including 
affairs of state based on an 
astrologer’s advises (Regan, 1988).    
Superstitious heuristics 
related to Physical 
Attribute 
Decision shortcuts based on theories, 
teachings, predictions, or suggestions 
related to supposed influences of 
one’s physical attributes 
Physiognomy, palmistry, 
body shape, blood type  
In Japan, many employers hire job 
candidates and assign tasks to 
employees based on their blood 
type (Evans, 2012).   
Superstitious heuristics 
related to Object/Act 
Decision shortcuts based on theories, 
teachings, predictions, or suggestions 
related to supposed influences of 
objects or acts 
Numbers, words, days, 
symbols, objects or 
properties of objects, 
rituals, human acts, animal 
acts 
Apartment buyers in Russia show a 
significant preference towards the 
7th floor and a great disfavor toward 
the 13th floor (Antipov & 
Pokryshevskaya, 2015). 
Superstitious heuristics 
related to Surrounding 
Environment 
Decision shortcuts based on theories, 
teachings, predictions, or suggestions 
related to supposed influences of 
forces or energies in the surrounding 
environment 
Feng shui, Vaastu Shastra, 
Pyramid power, aura, 
cosmic forces 
The management of a five-star 
hotel in Shanghai consulted a feng 
shui master for recommendations to 
turn around its failing business 
(Tsang, 2004a) 
Superstitious heuristics 
related to Paranormal 
Revelation 
Decision shortcuts based on theories, 
teachings, predictions, or suggestions 
related to supposed revelations from 
paranormal agents 
Card reading, casting of 
lots, consulting mediums 
or channelers 
Businessmen in Singapore and 
Hong Kong make strategic 
decisions based on results from the 
casting of lots (Tsang, 2004a). 
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Table 4 Mapping the Superstitious Heuristic into Existing Heuristics Literature 
 
 
Table 5 Sample Examples Provided by Respondents in Pretest 1 (Study 1) 
Category Example 
Birth Profile “Not dating someone based on their astrological identity” 
Physical Attribute “Someone not taking a job because it wasn't in their palm reading” 
Object/Act “Not getting surgery because it’s Friday the 13th” 
Surrounding Environment “Based on Feng shui Master, people avoid buying a house that the door facing the road that cause bad luck.” 
Paranormal Revelation “My grandmother would not marry her first love because she had a vision in a dream that he was from a family 




Table 6 Initial Negative Items with Results of Content Validity Test in Pretest 2 (Study 1) 
Index Item 
% of correct 
categorization 
bp1n Whether a particular year, month, date, or hour, depending on my birth, is unlucky for me 0.93 
bp2n Whether the decision can bring misfortune based on details of my birth 0.94 
bp3n Whether the decision is unsupported by my birth chart or astrological sign 0.89 
bp4n Whether the decision is made in an unlucky circumstance according to the year, month, date, or hour of my birth 0.91 
bp5n Whether a person was born in an undesirable year, month, date, or hour 0.98 
bp6n Whether a person’s birth chart or astrological sign is incompatible with that of important individuals related to the decision, including myself 0.88 
bp7n Whether a person’s birth chart or astrological sign suggests he/she will not get along with important individuals related to the decision, including myself 0.90 
bp8n Whether the year, month, date, or hour of a person’s birth suggests negative things about his/her personality 0.94 
bp9n Whether a person’s birth chart or astrological sign suggests negative things about his/her character (moral qualities) 0.92 
bp10n Whether the year, month, date or hour of a person’s birth indicates he/she lacks certain talents or abilities 0.96 
bp11n Whether the year, month, date or hour of a person’s birth indicates he/she is unlikely to succeed in his/her career 0.94 
bp12n Whether the year, month, date or hour of a person’s birth indicates he/she has bad luck with money 0.97 
bp13n Whether a person’s birth chart or astrological sign indicates he/she has bad fate 0.93 
bp14n Whether the year, month, date, or hour of a person’s birth is likely to bring bad luck 0.95 
bp15n Whether a certain birth chart or astrological sign may break the luck for attaining a particular goal 0.88 
bp16n Whether the decision is discouraged by an expert or theories on birth charts or astrological signs 0.74 
fa1n Whether a person’s physical appearance may bring bad luck 0.97 
fa2n Whether my facial characteristics suggest certain options are unlucky for me 0.93 
fa3n Whether some features of a person’s face or head imply negative things about his/her personality 0.93 
fa4n Whether some attributes of a person’s face or head suggest negative things about his/her character (moral qualities) 0.97 
fa5n Whether certain attributes of a person’s face or head indicate he/she lacks certain talents or abilities 0.95 
fa6n Whether some characteristics of a person’s face or head suggest he/she will have bad fate 0.89 
fa7n Whether some features of a person’s face or head suggest he/she is unlikely to succeed in his/her career 0.94 
fa8n Whether certain attributes of a person’s face or head suggest he/she will have bad luck with money 0.90 
fa9n Whether the decision is discouraged by an expert or theories on face reading 0.48 
fa10n Whether the decision is at odds with my palm lines 0.76 
fa11n Whether some features of a person’s palm lines or hands imply negative things about his/her personality 0.86 
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fa12n Whether a person’s palm lines or hands suggest negative things about his/her character (moral qualities) 0.83 
fa13n Whether certain attributes of a person’s palm lines or hands indicate he/she lacks certain talents or abilities 0.89 
fa14n Whether the attributes of a person’s palm lines or hands suggest he/she will have bad fate 0.85 
fa15n Whether some features of a person’s palm lines or hands suggest he/she is unlikely to succeed in his/her career 0.80 
fa16n Whether certain attributes of a person’s palm lines or hands suggest he/she will have bad luck with money 0.86 
fa17n Whether the decision is discouraged by an expert or theories on palm reading 0.42 
fa18n Whether the decision runs counter to my blood type 0.75 
fa19n Whether a person’s blood type reveals negative aspects of his/her personality 0.79 
fa20n Whether a person’s blood type reveals negative aspects of his/her character (moral qualities) 0.79 
fa21n Whether the decision is discouraged by an expert or theories on blood types 0.62 
fa22n 
Whether some attributes of a person’s face, head, palm lines, or blood type suggest he/she will not get along with important individuals related to the 
decision, including myself 0.92 
fa23n Whether some features of a person’s face, head, or palm lines may bring misfortune to important individuals related to the decision, including myself 0.92 
fa24n Whether certain physical attributes may hurt the luck for attaining a particular goal 0.87 
obj1n Whether a particular day is unlucky 0.67 
obj2n Whether a certain color is unlucky 0.70 
obj3n Whether certain colors hurt the luck of important individuals related to the decision, including myself 0.67 
obj4n Whether a certain number is unlucky 0.74 
obj5n Whether certain numbers hurt the luck of important individuals related to the decision, including myself 0.75 
obj6n Whether certain numbers may make the decision unlucky 0.76 
obj7n Whether a particular word or name is unlucky 0.69 
obj8n Whether certain words or names hurt the luck of important individuals related to the decision, including myself 0.73 
obj9n Whether certain words or names may break the luck for attaining a particular goal 0.75 
obj10n Whether some objects may bring bad fortune 0.87 
obj11n Whether certain objects may ruin the luck of important individuals related to the decision, including myself 0.84 
obj12n Whether certain objects may break the luck for attaining a particular goal 0.88 
obj13n Whether certain animals or plants may break the luck of important individuals related to the decision, including myself 0.74 
obj14n Whether certain animals or plants may break the luck for attaining a particular goal 0.71 
obj15n Whether a particular event may cause bad luck 0.88 
obj16n Whether a particular act may ruin good luck 0.84 
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obj17n Whether certain actions may result in misfortune in the future (Karma) 0.65 
obj18n Whether some actions may cause bad things to happen 0.82 
obj19n Whether certain actions may break the luck for attaining a particular goal 0.87 
obj20n Whether certain acts may ruin the luck of important individuals related to the decision, including myself 0.85 
obj21n Whether a person may bring bad luck to important individuals related to the decision, including myself 0.55 
se1n Whether a place breeds or gathers negative energy 0.81 
se2n Whether a location is cursed by negative energy around it 0.85 
se3n Whether the features of a location attract bad luck 0.85 
se4n Whether the energy of a place breaks the luck for attaining a particular goal 0.82 
se5n Whether the energy surrounding a place hurts occupants’ well-being 0.81 
se6n Whether the layout of a place undermines occupants’ luck in their career 0.85 
se7n Whether the attributes of a place undermine occupants’ luck with money 0.80 
se8n Whether unfortunate things happened in a place before 0.76 
se9n Whether a building is close to an unlucky place 0.88 
se10n Whether a place is at odds with the energy in its surrounding environment 0.93 
se11n Whether the surrounding environment of a place hurts the luck of important individuals related to the decision, including myself 0.90 
se12n Whether the decision will destroy the feng shui of a place 0.68 
se13n Whether the decision is discouraged by an expert or theories on feng shui 0.39 
pr1n Whether the decision is cautioned against by an omen 0.78 
pr2n Whether the decision violates revelations from divination 0.80 
pr3n Whether the choice is opposed by a diviner 0.79 
pr4n Whether the decision is opposed by those who can communicate with the dead 0.89 
pr5n Whether the decision is disapproved by someone who hears from a supernatural being 0.92 
pr6n Whether the choice violates the advice of those who can see into the future 0.76 
pr7n Whether the decision is opposed by a being outside the natural realm 0.68 
pr8n Whether the choice violates a supernatural revelation 0.85 
pr9n Whether the decision fails to consider the supernaturally revealed future of important individuals related to the decision, including myself 0.87 
pr10n Whether the choice fails to consider supernaturally revealed information about someone 0.85 
pr11n Whether the decision fails to consider the supernatural signs shown to me 0.81 
pr12n Whether the choice violates a divine instruction 0.75 
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Table 7 Sixty-one Self-identified National Cultures (Countries) in the Sample for Positive SHS 
Albania Egypt Jamaica Pakistan Sweden 
Argentina France Japan Panama Taiwan 
Australia Germany Kazakhstan Peru Trinidad and Tobago 
Bangladesh Ghana Kenya Philippines Turkey 
Brazil Greece Latvia Portugal United Kingdom 
Bulgaria Guyana Lebanon Puerto Rico United States 
Canada Honduras Lithuania Romania Uzbekistan 
China Hungary Macedonia Sierra Leone Venezuela 
Croatia India Mexico Singapore Zimbabwe 
Cuba Indonesia Montenegro Slovakia  
Cyprus Ireland Morocco South Africa  
Czech Republic Israel New Zealand South Korea  





Table 8 Factor Loadings of Positive SHS (MGEFA)  
 





















bp1p Whether a particular year, month, date, or hour, 
depending on my birth, is lucky for me 0.671 -0.049 0.264 0.075 -0.054 0.659 -0.051 0.251 0.065 -0.057 
bp2p Whether the decision can bring good fortune 
based on details of my birth 0.740 -0.069 0.220 0.032 0.019 0.708 -0.071 0.203 0.027 0.020 
bp3p Whether the decision is supported by my birth 
chart or astrological sign 0.841 -0.076 0.049 0.046 0.042 0.804 -0.078 0.045 0.039 0.043 
bp4p Whether the decision is made in a lucky 
circumstance according to the year, month, date, 
or hour of my birth 0.796 -0.008 0.099 0.046 0.035 0.725 -0.008 0.087 0.037 0.034 
bp5p Whether a person was born in a desirable year, 
month, date, or hour 0.786 -0.037 0.136 0.109 -0.062 0.702 -0.036 0.117 0.086 -0.059 
bp6p Whether a person’s birth chart or astrological 
sign is compatible with that of important 
individuals related to the decision, including 
myself 0.734 0.019 0.015 0.168 0.029 0.691 0.019 0.014 0.140 0.029 
bp7p Whether a person’s birth chart or astrological 
sign suggests he/she will get along well with 
important individuals related to the decision, 
including myself 0.764 0.040 -0.008 0.163 -0.020 0.723 0.041 -0.008 0.136 -0.020 
bp8p* Whether the year, month, date, or hour of a 
person’s birth suggests positive things about 
his/her personality 0.818 0.044 0.042 0.072 -0.041 0.786 0.045 0.039 0.061 -0.042 
bp9p Whether a person’s birth chart or astrological 
sign suggests positive things about his/her 
character (moral qualities) 0.780 0.064 0.040 -0.001 0.059 0.710 0.062 0.035 -0.001 0.057 
bp10p Whether the year, month, date or hour of a 
person’s birth indicates he/she has certain talents 
or abilities 0.807 0.006 -0.034 0.088 0.041 0.760 0.006 -0.031 0.073 0.042 
bp11p* Whether the year, month, date or hour of a 
person’s birth indicates he/she has certain talents 
or abilities 0.836 0.103 0.005 -0.002 0.026 0.776 0.102 0.004 -0.002 0.025 
bp12p Whether the year, month, date or hour of a 
person’s birth indicates he/she is likely to succeed 
in his/her career 0.817 0.076 0.027 0.026 0.013 0.770 0.076 0.024 0.022 0.013 
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bp13p* Whether the year, month, date or hour of a 
person’s birth indicates he/she has good luck with 
money 0.868 0.100 0.016 0.030 -0.049 0.818 0.100 0.014 0.025 -0.050 
bp14p Whether a person’s birth chart or astrological 
sign indicates he/she has good fate 0.798 0.068 0.110 0.013 0.025 0.711 0.065 0.094 0.010 0.024 
bp15p* Whether the year, month, date, or hour of a 
person’s birth is likely to bring good luck 0.848 0.064 0.036 0.000 0.027 0.786 0.063 0.033 0.000 0.027 
bp16p Whether a certain birth chart or astrological sign 
may increase the luck for attaining a particular 
goal 0.626 0.032 0.032 0.081 0.171 0.554 0.030 0.028 0.064 0.161 
fa1p* 
Whether a person’s physical appearance may 
bring good luck -0.101 0.554 0.266 0.264 -0.102 -0.093 0.540 0.235 0.214 -0.099 
fa2p 
Whether my facial characteristics suggest certain 
options are lucky for me 0.012 0.556 0.172 0.215 -0.014 0.012 0.570 0.160 0.183 -0.014 
fa3p* 
Whether some features of a person’s face or head 
imply positive things about his/her personality -0.059 0.581 0.175 0.194 -0.096 -0.061 0.634 0.173 0.176 -0.105 
fa4p* 
Whether some attributes of a person’s face or 
head suggest positive things about his/her 
character (moral qualities) -0.022 0.592 0.159 0.098 -0.078 -0.023 0.658 0.160 0.091 -0.087 
fa5p 
Whether certain attributes of a person’s face or 
head indicate he/she has certain talents or abilities -0.016 0.628 0.126 0.118 -0.022 -0.016 0.679 0.124 0.106 -0.024 
fa6p* 
Whether some characteristics of a person’s face 
or head suggest he/she will have good fate 0.022 0.633 0.131 0.145 0.021 0.021 0.662 0.124 0.126 0.022 
fa7p 
Whether some features of a person’s face or head 
suggest he/she is likely to succeed in his/her 
career 0.010 0.653 0.061 0.145 -0.013 0.010 0.711 0.060 0.131 -0.014 
fa8p 
Whether certain attributes of a person’s face or 
head suggest he/she will have good luck with 
money 0.130 0.622 0.105 0.079 0.015 0.124 0.627 0.096 0.066 0.016 
fa10p 
Whether the decision is in line with my palm 
lines 0.498 0.549 -0.081 -0.042 0.077 0.409 0.481 -0.065 -0.031 0.067 
fa11p 
Whether some features of a person’s palm lines 
or hands imply positive things about his/her 


























Whether a person’s palm lines or hands suggest 
positive things about his/her character (moral 
qualities) 0.486 0.557 -0.094 0.002 0.072 0.394 0.480 -0.073 0.001 0.062 
fa13p 
Whether certain attributes of a person’s palm 
lines or hands indicate he/she has certain talents 
or abilities 0.449 0.642 -0.116 -0.020 0.044 0.384 0.585 -0.096 -0.016 0.040 
fa14p 
Whether the attributes of a person’s palm lines or 
hands suggest he/she will have good fate 0.542 0.560 -0.060 -0.016 0.011 0.454 0.500 -0.049 -0.012 0.010 
fa15p 
Whether some features of a person’s palm lines 
or hands suggest he/she is likely to succeed in 
his/her career 0.503 0.607 -0.077 -0.026 0.010 0.418 0.537 -0.062 -0.019 0.009 
fa16p 
Whether certain attributes of a person’s palm 
lines or hands suggest he/she will have good luck 
with money 0.494 0.592 -0.038 -0.034 0.021 0.416 0.531 -0.031 -0.025 0.019 
fa18p Whether the decision aligns with my blood type 0.211 0.399 0.131 -0.127 0.227 0.173 0.349 0.104 -0.092 0.199 
fa19p 
Whether a person’s blood type reveals positive 
aspects of his/her personality 0.200 0.461 0.019 -0.017 0.230 0.168 0.411 0.016 -0.013 0.205 
fa20p 
Whether a person’s blood type reveals positive 
aspects of his/her character (moral qualities) 0.184 0.468 0.048 -0.080 0.258 0.157 0.424 0.040 -0.060 0.234 
fa22p 
Whether some attributes of a person’s face, head, 
palm lines, or blood type suggest he/she will get 
along well with important individuals related to 
the decision, including myself 0.182 0.570 0.116 -0.020 0.168 0.155 0.518 0.096 -0.015 0.152 
fa23p 
Whether some features of a person’s face, head, 
or palm lines may bring good fortune to 
important individuals related to the decision, 
including myself 0.232 0.491 0.126 -0.001 0.205 0.203 0.457 0.107 0.000 0.191 
fa24p 
Whether certain physical attributes may increase 
the luck for attaining a particular goal 0.058 0.462 0.130 0.163 0.110 0.057 0.485 0.124 0.143 0.116 
obj1p* Whether a particular day is lucky 0.324 0.018 0.538 0.051 0.025 0.283 0.017 0.453 0.039 0.023 
obj2p Whether a certain color is lucky 0.459 -0.050 0.577 0.033 -0.130 0.392 -0.045 0.476 0.025 -0.119 
obj3p 
Whether certain colors boost the luck of 
important individuals related to the decision, 
including myself 0.433 -0.024 0.518 0.042 0.002 0.395 -0.024 0.456 0.034 0.002 
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obj4p* Whether a certain number is lucky 0.369 -0.005 0.693 -0.099 -0.069 0.341 -0.005 0.618 -0.081 -0.068 
obj5p 
Whether certain numbers boost the luck of 
important individuals related to the decision, 
including myself 0.388 0.006 0.576 -0.035 0.034 0.371 0.007 0.531 -0.030 0.034 
obj6p 
Whether certain numbers may make the decision 
lucky 0.382 -0.023 0.641 -0.075 0.016 0.351 -0.023 0.568 -0.061 0.016 
obj7p* Whether a particular word or name is lucky 0.269 0.085 0.627 -0.077 0.069 0.250 0.084 0.563 -0.063 0.068 
obj8p 
Whether certain words or names boost the luck of 
important individuals related to the decision, 
including myself 0.248 0.120 0.566 -0.011 0.097 0.233 0.120 0.514 -0.009 0.097 
obj9p 
Whether certain words or names may increase the 
luck for attaining a particular goal 0.205 0.131 0.594 0.021 0.074 0.190 0.129 0.530 0.017 0.073 
obj10p* Whether some objects may bring good fortune 0.144 -0.017 0.531 0.197 0.017 0.146 -0.018 0.518 0.177 0.019 
obj11p 
Whether certain objects may enhance the luck of 
important individuals related to the decision, 
including myself 0.202 -0.009 0.530 0.198 0.082 0.203 -0.009 0.513 0.176 0.087 
obj12p 
Whether certain objects may increase the luck for 
attaining a particular goal 0.213 -0.004 0.517 0.189 0.085 0.208 -0.005 0.487 0.163 0.089 
obj13p 
Whether certain animals or plants may boost the 
luck of important individuals related to the 
decision, including myself 0.257 0.099 0.451 0.079 0.114 0.232 0.095 0.393 0.063 0.110 
obj14p 
Whether certain animals or plants may increase 
the luck for attaining a particular goal 0.238 0.123 0.425 0.119 0.067 0.219 0.120 0.379 0.097 0.065 
obj15p Whether a particular event may cause good luck 0.085 0.078 0.565 0.197 0.054 0.079 0.077 0.506 0.162 0.054 
obj16p Whether a particular act may enhance good luck -0.064 0.077 0.559 0.365 0.012 -0.057 0.073 0.481 0.288 0.011 
obj18p 
Whether some actions may cause good things to 
happen -0.138 -0.001 0.359 0.385 -0.005 -0.158 -0.001 0.396 0.389 -0.007 
obj19p 
Whether certain actions may increase the luck for 
attaining a particular goal -0.040 0.011 0.433 0.432 -0.013 -0.043 0.012 0.446 0.409 -0.014 
obj20p 
Whether certain acts may enhance the luck of 
important individuals related to the decision, 


























Whether a person may bring good luck to 
important individuals related to the decision, 
including myself 0.023 0.044 0.451 0.433 0.010 0.022 0.046 0.421 0.371 0.010 
se1p* Whether a place breeds or gathers positive energy -0.014 -0.041 -0.095 0.871 0.082 -0.015 -0.045 -0.096 0.806 0.091 
se2p* 
Whether a location is blessed by positive energy 
around it 0.049 -0.014 -0.079 0.866 0.072 0.051 -0.015 -0.079 0.801 0.080 
se3p 
Whether the features of a location attract good 
luck 0.045 0.041 0.006 0.847 -0.010 0.048 0.046 0.006 0.790 -0.011 
se4p* 
Whether the energy of a place increases the luck 
for attaining a particular goal 0.112 0.034 -0.034 0.849 -0.023 0.120 0.038 -0.035 0.802 -0.026 
se5p* 
Whether the energy surrounding a place boosts 
occupants’ well-being -0.02 0.007 -0.019 0.872 0.019 -0.022 0.008 -0.020 0.842 0.022 
se6p 
Whether the layout of a place boosts occupants’ 
luck in their career 0.102 0.064 0.062 0.68 0.058 0.107 0.072 0.063 0.632 0.065 
se7p 
Whether the attributes of a place boost occupants’ 
luck with money 0.112 0.037 0.075 0.722 0.000 0.118 0.042 0.077 0.676 0.000 
se8p 
Whether fortunate things happened in a place 
before 0.139 -0.046 0.147 0.702 -0.053 0.130 -0.046 0.133 0.583 -0.053 
se9p Whether a building is close to a lucky place 0.145 0.012 0.171 0.537 0.096 0.137 0.012 0.156 0.450 0.096 
se10p 
Whether a place is in harmony with the energy in 
its surrounding environment 0.059 -0.012 0.013 0.779 0.074 0.063 -0.013 0.014 0.733 0.083 
se11p 
Whether the surrounding environment of a place 
boosts the luck of important individuals related to 
the decision, including myself 0.097 0.061 0.058 0.693 0.074 0.097 0.065 0.056 0.619 0.079 
pr1p Whether the decision is supported by an omen 0.047 -0.010 0.218 0.171 0.460 0.045 -0.011 0.201 0.145 0.469 
pr2p 
Whether the decision follows revelations from 
divination 0.129 -0.011 0.095 0.124 0.534 0.123 -0.011 0.088 0.105 0.543 
pr3p Whether the choice is supported by a diviner 0.177 0.006 0.077 0.117 0.541 0.157 0.006 0.066 0.092 0.511 
pr4p* 
Whether the decision is supported by those who 
can communicate with the dead 0.059 -0.033 0.004 -0.056 0.809 0.053 -0.032 0.004 -0.045 0.780 
pr5p* 
Whether the decision is instructed by someone 
who hears from a supernatural being 0.015 -0.034 -0.012 0.024 0.862 0.014 -0.034 -0.011 0.020 0.859 
pr6p* 
Whether the choice follows the advice of those 
who can see into the future 0.030 0.022 0.012 -0.004 0.850 0.027 0.021 0.010 -0.003 0.811 
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Whether the choice follows a supernatural 
revelation -0.079 0.011 0.052 0.030 0.887 -0.072 0.011 0.046 0.024 0.860 
pr9p 
Whether the decision considers the supernaturally 
revealed future of important individuals related to 
the decision, including myself -0.010 0.056 0.011 0.050 0.848 -0.009 0.053 0.009 0.039 0.806 
pr10p 
Whether the choice considers supernaturally 
revealed information about someone -0.006 0.127 0.014 0.061 0.774 -0.005 0.124 0.013 0.049 0.755 
pr11p 
Whether the decision considers the supernatural 
signs shown to me 0.008 0.018 0.039 0.096 0.736 0.007 0.017 0.035 0.079 0.729 
pr12p Whether the choice follows a divine instruction 0.021 0.017 -0.053 0.103 0.674 0.020 0.018 -0.050 0.089 0.699 
Note: Absolute loadings over 0.40 in bold type. NEnglish = 493; NChinese = 287. MGEFA with robust maximum likelihood estimator and Geomin rotation. Scalar 
(strong) equivalence imposed. Factor 1 – Birth Profile; Factor 2 – Physical Attribute; Factor 3 – Object/Act; Factor 4 – Surrounding Environment; Factor 5 – 
Paranormal Revelation. Items with an asterisk (*) were included in the final 20-item positive scale.  
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Table 9 Positive SHS with Factor Loadings from EFA 
Index Item Factor 
  1 2 3 4 5 
bp8p Whether the year, month, date, or hour of a person’s birth 
suggests positive things about his/her personality 
0.794 
    
bp11p Whether the year, month, date or hour of a person’s birth 
indicates he/she is likely to succeed in his/her career 
0.880 
    
bp13p Whether a person’s birth chart or astrological sign indicates 
he/she has good fate 
0.880 
    
bp15p Whether a certain birth chart or astrological sign may 
increase the luck for attaining a particular goal 
0.915 
    




   
fa3p Whether some features of a person’s face or head imply 
positive things about his/her personality 
 
0.929 
   
fa4p Whether some attributes of a person’s face or head suggest 
positive things about his/her character (moral qualities) 
 
0.849 
   
fa6p Whether some characteristics of a person’s face or head 
suggest he/she will have good fate 
 
0.587 
   
















se1p Whether a place breeds or gathers positive energy  
   
0.915 
 
se2p Whether a location is blessed by positive energy around it  
   
0.895 
 
se4p Whether the energy of a place increases the luck for 
attaining a particular goal 
   
0.720 
 
se5p Whether the energy surrounding a place boosts occupants’ 
well-being 
   
0.796 
 
pr4p Whether the decision is supported by those who can 
communicate with the dead  
    
0.814 
pr5p Whether the decision is instructed by someone who hears 
from a supernatural being 
    
0.903 
pr6p Whether the choice follows the advice of those who can see 
into the future 
    
0.870 
pr8p Whether the choice follows a supernatural revelation  
    
0.751 
 
Note: Blanks represent absolute loadings under 0.40. N English + Chinese = 780. EFA with robust maximum likelihood 
estimator and Geomin rotation. Factor 1 – Birth profile; Factor 2 – Physical Attribute; Factor 3 – Object/Act; Factor 




Table 10 Factor Correlations and Reliability of Positive SHS 
 Factor 1 2 3 4 Cronbach’s 
alpha 
1 Birth Profile 
    
0.951 
2 Physical Attribute 0.578***    0.898 
3 Object/Act 0.752*** 0.589***   0.890 
4 Surrounding Environment 0.643*** 0.547*** 0.668***  0.934 
5 Paranormal Revelation 0.648*** 0.422*** 0.579*** 0.593*** 0.919 




Table 11 Correlations between Positive SHS and RPBS, BBS, FSBI 








Birth Profile 0.552*** 0.493*** 0.673*** 
Physical Attribute 0.372*** 0.352*** 0.525*** 
Object/Act 0.554*** 0.597*** 0.572*** 
Surrounding Environment 0.563*** 0.497*** 0.503*** 
Paranormal Revelation 0.540*** 0.385*** 0.516*** 
Superstitious Heuristic 0.619*** 0.558*** 0.687*** 




Table 12 Correlations between Positive SHS and Representativeness, Availability, Anchoring 








Birth Profile 0.168** 0.044 -0.143 
Physical Attribute 0.156* -0.071 -0.206* 
Object/Act 0.137* -0.039 -0.080 
Surrounding Environment 0.169** 0.045 -0.156† 
Paranormal Revelation 0.093 0.042 -0.178* 
Superstitious Heuristic 0.180** 0.008 -0.190* 





Table 13 Correlations between Positive SHS and Big Five (English) 




    
Birth Profile 0.051 -0.067 -0.054 0.016 -0.067 
Physical Attribute 0.188* -0.046 -0.076 0.029 -0.054 
Object/Act 0.172† 0.058 -0.165† 0.087 -0.031 
Surrounding Environment 0.184* 0.113 -0.011 0.060 -0.015 
Paranormal Revelation 0.072 -0.030 -0.061 -0.008 -0.178* 
Superstitious Heuristic 0.160† 0.013 -0.084 0.045 -0.077 




Table 14 Correlations between Positive SHS and Big Five (Chinese) 




    
Birth Profile 0.153** 0.137* 0.060 -0.021 0.122* 
Physical Attribute 0.085 0.153** -0.029 0.017 0.050 
Object/Act 0.148** 0.211*** 0.013 0.066 0.065 
Surrounding Environment 0.023 0.136* 0.028 0.058 0.048 
Paranormal Revelation 0.071 0.143* 0.020 0.079 0.071 
Superstitious Heuristic 0.117* 0.190** 0.018 0.048 0.087 





Table 15 EFA: Positive SHS and Extraversion (Chinese) 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 
bp8p 0.805      
bp11p 0.828      
bp13p 0.823      
bp15p 0.814      
fa1p  0.664     
fa3p  0.935     
fa4p  0.709     
fa6p  0.649     
obj1p   0.608    
obj4p   0.806    
obj7p   0.569    
obj10p   0.493    
se1p    0.809   
se2p    0.808   
se4p    0.777   
se5p    0.770   
pr4p     0.817  
pr5p     0.900  
pr6p     0.867  
pr8p     0.691  
e1      0.585 
e2      0.661 
e3      0.643 
e4      0.713 
Note: Blanks represent absolute loadings under 0.40. N Chinese = 313. EFA with robust maximum likelihood estimator 
and Geomin rotation. Factor 1 – Birth profile; Factor 2 – Physical Attribute; Factor 3 – Object/Act; Factor 4 –





Table 16 Regressions of Positive SHS on Gender, Age, and Education 
Scale/subscale Gender Age Education 
 
English + Chinese 
 (n=1,177) 
 English + Chinese 
(n=1,169) 
English + Chinese 
 (n=1,176) 
Birth Profile 0.197** -0.009** 0.144*** 
Physical Attribute -0.088 -0.008** 0.101*** 
Object/Act 0.112† -0.017*** 0.100** 
Surrounding Environment 0.099 -0.010* 0.106** 
Paranormal Revelation 0.155** -0.010*** 0.095** 
Superstitious Heuristic 0.095† -0.011*** 0.109*** 




Table 17 Regressions of Positive SHS on Religion 




Jewish Muslim Buddhist Hindu Taoist 
Birth Profile -0.489*** -0.126 -0.730* -0.560† -0.358* 0.573*** 0.651*** 0.693** 
Physical 
Attribute -0.491*** -0.233* -0.006 -0.575† -0.356* 0.330** 0.231* 0.194 
Object/Act  -0.718*** -0.263** -0.645* -1.105** -0.577** 0.590*** 0.099 0.625* 
Surrounding 
Environment -0.406*** 0.010 -0.082 -0.894* 0.015 0.453*** 0.592*** 0.551* 
Paranormal 
Revelation  -0.313** -0.022 -0.434 -0.296 -0.329* 0.545*** 0.303** 0.554* 
Superstitious 
Heuristics -0.483*** -0.127 -0.380 -0.686* -0.321* 0.498*** 0.375*** 0.523** 
Note: N English + Chinese = 1,088. The reference group is people without any religion. Religiosity is controlled for.  
† p <.1, * p < .05, ** p <. 01, ***p < .001 
 
 
Table 18 Regressions of Positive SHS on Locus of Control, Self-efficacy, and Analytic Thinking 




English + Chinese 
(n=247) 
English + Chinese 
(n=1,177) 
Birth Profile -0.004 -0.483* 0.837*** 
Physical Attribute -0.028† -0.309† 0.725*** 
Object/Act 0.017 -0.429* 0.981*** 
Surrounding Environment -0.009 -0.534** 0.871*** 
Paranormal Revelation 0.017 -0.316† 0.611*** 
Superstitious Heuristic -0.002 -0.414** 0.805*** 
† p <.1, * p < .05, ** p <. 01, ***p < .001 
 
 
Table 19 Regressions of Decision Speed, Use of Heuristics, and Decision Comprehensiveness on 
Positive SHS 






Birth Profile 0.312** 0.050 
Physical Attribute 0.312** 0.051 
Object/Act 0.309** -0.011 
Surrounding Environment 0.279** 0.037 
Paranormal Revelation 0.220* 0.036 
Superstitious Heuristic 0.430*** 0.051 
† p <.1, * p < .05, ** p <. 01, ***p < .001 
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Table 20 Regressions of Decision Confidence and Self-efficacy on Positive SHS 













Birth Profile 0.170** 0.332*** 0.108* 
Physical Attribute 0.136* 0.371*** 0.073 
Object/Act 0.185** 0.465*** 0.151** 
Surrounding Environment 0.168** 0.392*** 0.115* 
Paranormal Revelation 0.165** 0.394*** 0.117* 
Superstitious Heuristic 0.247** 0.583*** 0.168** 




Table 21 Regression of Perceived Control and Decision Effectiveness on Positive SHS 












Birth Profile 0.160** 0.334*** 0.101† 
Physical Attribute 0.140* 0.336*** 0.104† 
Object/Act 0.174** 0.440*** 0.129* 
Surrounding Environment 0.165** 0.382*** 0.083† 
Paranormal Revelation 0.183** 0.366*** 0.169** 
Superstitious Heuristic 0.246** 0.556*** 0.171** 






Table 22 Factor Loadings of Negative SHS (MGEFA) 
 





















bp1n Whether a particular year, month, date, or hour, 
depending on my birth, is unlucky for me 0.693 -0.092 0.141 0.129 0.011 0.609 -0.089 0.123 0.102 0.011 
bp2n Whether the decision can bring misfortune based 
on details of my birth 0.763 -0.037 0.017 0.143 0.024 0.675 -0.036 0.015 0.115 0.024 
bp3n* Whether the decision is unsupported by my birth 
chart or astrological sign 0.819 -0.032 -0.022 0.085 0.073 0.728 -0.032 -0.02 0.068 0.071 
bp4n Whether the decision is made in an unlucky 
circumstance according to the year, month, date, 
or hour of my birth 0.825 -0.064 0.007 0.072 0.075 0.715 -0.062 0.006 0.056 0.071 
bp5n Whether a person was born in an undesirable 
year, month, date, or hour 0.802 0.071 0.017 0.049 -0.022 0.689 0.068 0.014 0.038 -0.02 
bp6n Whether a person’s birth chart or astrological 
sign is incompatible with that of important 
individuals related to the decision, including 
myself 0.796 -0.057 0.024 0.11 0.057 0.687 -0.055 0.02 0.086 0.054 
bp7n Whether a person’s birth chart or astrological 
sign suggests he/she will not get along with 
important individuals related to the decision, 
including myself 0.757 0.007 0.1 0.07 0.028 0.663 0.007 0.087 0.055 0.027 
bp8n* Whether the year, month, date, or hour of a 
person’s birth suggests negative things about 
his/her personality 0.788 0.055 0.056 0.064 -0.014 0.64 0.05 0.045 0.047 -0.012 
bp9n Whether a person’s birth chart or astrological 
sign suggests negative things about his/her 
character (moral qualities) 0.797 0.023 0.001 0.099 0.015 0.653 0.021 0.001 0.073 0.014 
bp10n Whether the year, month, date or hour of a 
person’s birth indicates he/she lacks certain 
talents or abilities 0.742 0.076 -0.039 0.023 0.112 0.646 0.073 -0.034 0.018 0.107 
bp11n Whether the year, month, date or hour of a 
person’s birth indicates he/she is unlikely to 
succeed in his/her career 0.835 0.105 -0.06 0.05 0.027 0.722 0.1 -0.052 0.039 0.026 
bp12n Whether the year, month, date or hour of a 
person’s birth indicates he/she has bad luck with 



























bp13n* Whether a person’s birth chart or astrological 
sign indicates he/she has bad fate 0.84 0.028 0.049 0.001 0.027 0.702 0.026 0.041 0.001 0.025 
bp14n* Whether the year, month, date, or hour of a 
person’s birth is likely to bring bad luck 0.845 0.023 0.043 -0.002 0.035 0.724 0.022 0.037 -0.002 0.033 
bp15n Whether a certain birth chart or astrological sign 
may break the luck for attaining a particular goal 0.782 0.077 0.025 0.036 0.04 0.718 0.078 0.023 0.03 0.04 
bp16n Whether the decision is discouraged by an expert 
or theories on birth charts or astrological signs 0.669 -0.059 0.121 0.028 0.187 0.573 -0.056 0.103 0.022 0.175 
fa1n* 
Whether a person’s physical appearance may 
bring bad luck -0.084 0.632 0.185 0.154 -0.036 -0.069 0.57 0.15 0.114 -0.032 
fa2n 
Whether my facial characteristics suggest certain 
options are unlucky for me 0.001 0.628 0.129 0.118 0.023 0.001 0.58 0.108 0.089 0.021 
fa3n* 
Whether some features of a person’s face or head 
imply negative things about his/her personality -0.124 0.656 0.082 0.204 -0.036 -0.111 0.648 0.073 0.165 -0.035 
fa4n* 
Whether some attributes of a person’s face or 
head suggest negative things about his/her 
character (moral qualities) -0.132 0.673 0.086 0.165 -0.002 -0.118 0.668 0.077 0.133 -0.002 
fa5n 
Whether certain attributes of a person’s face or 
head indicate he/she lacks certain talents or 
abilities 0.023 0.702 -0.031 0.094 0.02 0.021 0.702 -0.028 0.077 0.019 
fa6n* 
Whether some characteristics of a person’s face 
or head suggest he/she will have bad fate 0.086 0.712 0.009 0.178 -0.016 0.071 0.655 0.008 0.134 -0.014 
fa7n 
Whether some features of a person’s face or head 
suggest he/she is unlikely to succeed in his/her 
career 0.009 0.734 -0.031 0.171 -0.021 0.008 0.704 -0.027 0.134 -0.02 
fa8n 
Whether certain attributes of a person’s face or 
head suggest he/she will have bad luck with 
money 0.218 0.674 0.05 0.023 -0.007 0.19 0.65 0.044 0.018 -0.006 
fa10n 
Whether the decision is at odds with my palm 
lines 0.449 0.387 0.063 -0.024 0.043 0.393 0.374 0.055 -0.019 0.041 
fa11n 
Whether some features of a person’s palm lines 
or hands imply negative things about his/her 
personality 0.468 0.45 -0.02 0.027 0.055 0.392 0.418 -0.017 0.021 0.05 
fa12n 
Whether a person’s palm lines or hands suggest 
negative things about his/her character (moral 



























Whether certain attributes of a person’s palm 
lines or hands indicate he/she lacks certain talents 
or abilities 0.439 0.48 -0.029 -0.025 0.069 0.388 0.47 -0.025 -0.02 0.067 
fa14n 
Whether the attributes of a person’s palm lines or 
hands suggest he/she will have bad fate 0.501 0.427 0.026 0.004 0.034 0.404 0.381 0.021 0.003 0.03 
fa15n 
Whether some features of a person’s palm lines 
or hands suggest he/she is unlikely to succeed in 
his/her career 0.502 0.411 0.029 -0.032 0.061 0.427 0.387 0.025 -0.025 0.057 
fa16n 
Whether certain attributes of a person’s palm 
lines or hands suggest he/she will have bad luck 
with money 0.557 0.431 -0.001 -0.053 0.055 0.475 0.407 0 -0.041 0.051 
fa18n 
Whether the decision runs counter to my blood 
type 0.289 0.472 -0.001 -0.096 0.161 0.233 0.419 -0.001 -0.07 0.141 
fa19n 
Whether a person’s blood type reveals negative 
aspects of his/her personality 0.279 0.584 -0.055 -0.026 0.1 0.209 0.485 -0.041 -0.018 0.082 
fa20n 
Whether a person’s blood type reveals negative 
aspects of his/her character (moral qualities) 0.241 0.591 -0.05 -0.04 0.086 0.197 0.536 -0.041 -0.03 0.077 
fa22n 
Whether some attributes of a person’s face, head, 
palm lines, or blood type suggest he/she will not 
get along with important individuals related to the 
decision, including myself 0.275 0.533 0.029 0.047 0.092 0.24 0.515 0.025 0.037 0.088 
fa23n 
Whether some features of a person’s face, head, 
or palm lines may bring misfortune to important 
individuals related to the decision, including 
myself 0.331 0.531 -0.006 0.036 0.073 0.278 0.493 -0.005 0.028 0.067 
fa24n 
Whether certain physical attributes may hurt the 
luck for attaining a particular goal 0.087 0.514 0.174 0.106 0.022 0.076 0.497 0.151 0.083 0.021 
obj1n Whether a particular day is unlucky 0.386 -0.009 0.451 0.095 -0.102 0.348 -0.008 0.406 0.078 -0.1 
obj2n Whether a certain color is unlucky 0.481 -0.015 0.447 0.02 -0.115 0.408 -0.015 0.379 0.015 -0.107 
obj3n 
Whether certain colors hurt the luck of important 
individuals related to the decision, including 
myself 0.466 0.033 0.495 -0.055 -0.076 0.409 0.032 0.434 -0.043 -0.073 





























Whether certain numbers hurt the luck of 
important individuals related to the decision, 
including myself 0.4 0.036 0.499 -0.007 -0.055 0.366 0.036 0.456 -0.005 -0.055 
obj6n 
Whether certain numbers may make the decision 
unlucky 0.35 0.045 0.536 -0.003 -0.07 0.306 0.044 0.468 -0.003 -0.067 
obj8n 
Whether certain words or names hurt the luck of 
important individuals related to the decision, 
including myself 0.202 0.154 0.623 -0.072 0.022 0.177 0.148 0.543 -0.057 0.021 
obj9n 
Whether certain words or names may break the 
luck for attaining a particular goal 0.218 0.149 0.607 -0.018 -0.02 0.189 0.143 0.525 -0.014 -0.019 
obj10n* Whether some objects may bring bad fortune 0.101 -0.044 0.662 0.155 0.003 0.092 -0.044 0.603 0.128 0.003 
obj11n* 
Whether certain objects may ruin the luck of 
important individuals related to the decision, 
including myself 0.13 0.003 0.707 0.057 0.103 0.116 0.003 0.632 0.046 0.101 
obj12n* 
Whether certain objects may break the luck for 
attaining a particular goal 0.151 0.014 0.69 0.06 0.059 0.139 0.014 0.634 0.05 0.059 
obj13n 
Whether certain animals or plants may break the 
luck of important individuals related to the 
decision, including myself 0.338 0.1 0.482 -0.017 0.043 0.289 0.094 0.41 -0.013 0.04 
obj14n 
Whether certain animals or plants may break the 
luck for attaining a particular goal 0.355 0.106 0.413 0.008 0.025 0.315 0.104 0.366 0.007 0.024 
obj15n Whether a particular event may cause bad luck 0.128 0.035 0.58 0.159 0.022 0.115 0.035 0.519 0.129 0.022 
obj16n Whether a particular act may ruin good luck 0.021 0.004 0.621 0.232 0.01 0.018 0.004 0.554 0.188 0.01 
obj18n 
Whether some actions may cause bad things to 
happen -0.164 -0.052 0.463 0.273 0.05 -0.196 -0.068 0.551 0.295 0.066 
obj19n* 
Whether certain actions may break the luck for 
attaining a particular goal -0.107 0.017 0.624 0.29 0.047 -0.101 0.017 0.587 0.247 0.048 
obj20n 
Whether certain acts may ruin the luck of 
important individuals related to the decision, 
including myself -0.07 -0.004 0.602 0.285 0.073 -0.065 -0.004 0.563 0.241 0.074 
obj21n 
Whether a person may bring bad luck to 
important individuals related to the decision, 
including myself -0.024 0.028 0.542 0.297 0.086 -0.022 0.028 0.493 0.245 0.086 
se1n* 
Whether a place breeds or gathers negative 



























Whether a location is cursed by negative energy 
around it 0.031 -0.024 -0.091 0.914 0.021 0.031 -0.026 -0.09 0.815 0.023 
se3n* Whether the features of a location attract bad luck 0.098 0.023 -0.031 0.829 -0.014 0.1 0.026 -0.032 0.768 -0.016 
se4n 
Whether the energy of a place breaks the luck for 
attaining a particular goal 0.059 0.084 0.016 0.789 0.014 0.058 0.091 0.016 0.698 0.015 
se5n* 
Whether the energy surrounding a place hurts 
occupants’ well-being 0.015 0.002 0.008 0.867 -0.037 0.015 0.002 0.008 0.789 -0.04 
se6n 
Whether the layout of a place undermines 
occupants’ luck in their career 0.131 0.136 0.117 0.643 -0.028 0.124 0.143 0.11 0.55 -0.029 
se7n 
Whether the attributes of a place undermine 
occupants’ luck with money 0.159 0.166 0.121 0.568 -0.027 0.154 0.177 0.116 0.495 -0.028 
se8n 
Whether unfortunate things happened in a place 
before -0.04 -0.058 0.213 0.659 0.051 -0.038 -0.061 0.202 0.565 0.053 
se9n Whether a building is close to an unlucky place 0.076 0.049 0.2 0.542 0.069 0.07 0.049 0.182 0.447 0.068 
se10n 
Whether a place is at odds with the energy in its 
surrounding environment 0.066 0.082 0.06 0.696 0.077 0.063 0.086 0.057 0.596 0.08 
se11n 
Whether the surrounding environment of a place 
hurts the luck of important individuals related to 
the decision, including myself 0.06 0.064 0.156 0.613 0.117 0.057 0.068 0.15 0.531 0.123 
pr1n 
Whether the decision is cautioned against by an 
omen 0.036 -0.005 0.194 0.152 0.502 0.033 -0.005 0.176 0.125 0.501 
pr2n* 
Whether the decision violates revelations from 
divination 0.099 0.029 0.114 0.098 0.552 0.095 0.031 0.109 0.085 0.579 
pr3n Whether the choice is opposed by a diviner 0.128 -0.042 0.171 0.058 0.59 0.114 -0.042 0.153 0.047 0.578 
pr4n* 
Whether the decision is opposed by those who 
can communicate with the dead -0.001 -0.025 0.059 0.044 0.772 -0.001 -0.024 0.052 0.035 0.744 
pr5n 
Whether the decision is disapproved by someone 
who hears from a supernatural being 0.053 -0.012 -0.005 0.074 0.835 0.044 -0.011 -0.004 0.056 0.765 
pr6n* 
Whether the choice violates the advice of those 
who can see into the future 0.023 0.032 0.052 -0.009 0.826 0.02 0.031 0.046 -0.008 0.798 
pr8n* 
Whether the choice violates a supernatural 






























Whether the decision fails to consider the 
supernaturally revealed future of important 
individuals related to the decision, including 
myself 0.031 0.138 0.012 -0.025 0.817 0.026 0.127 0.01 -0.019 0.742 
pr10n 
Whether the choice fails to consider 
supernaturally revealed information about 
someone 0.042 0.147 -0.006 -0.06 0.823 0.036 0.142 -0.006 -0.048 0.784 
pr11n 
Whether the decision fails to consider the 
supernatural signs shown to me -0.033 0.07 0.04 -0.003 0.831 -0.028 0.064 0.034 -0.002 0.759 
pr12n Whether the choice violates a divine instruction 0.002 -0.032 -0.034 0.053 0.703 0.002 -0.033 -0.031 0.045 0.712 
 
Note: Absolute loadings over 0.40 in bold type. NEnglish = 493; NChinese = 287. MGEFA with robust maximum likelihood estimator and Geomin rotation. Scalar 
(strong) equivalence imposed. Factor 1 – Birth Profile; Factor 2 – Physical Attribute; Factor 3 – Object/Act; Factor 4 – Surrounding Environment; Factor 5 – 
Paranormal Revelation. Items with an asterisk (*) were included in the final 20-item negative SHS.  
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Table 23 Negative SHS with Factor Loadings from EFA 
Index Item Factor 
  1 2 3 4 5 
bp3n Whether the decision is unsupported by my birth chart or 
astrological sign 
0.775 
    
bp8n Whether the year, month, date, or hour of a person’s birth 
suggests negative things about his/her personality 
0.788 
    
bp13n Whether a person’s birth chart or astrological sign indicates 
he/she has bad fate 
0.845 
    
bp14n Whether the year, month, date, or hour of a person’s birth is 
likely to bring bad luck 
0.857 
    




   
fa3n Whether some features of a person’s face or head imply 
negative things about his/her personality 
 
0.931 
   
fa4n Whether some attributes of a person’s face or head suggest 
negative things about his/her character (moral qualities) 
 
0.868 
   
fa6n Whether some characteristics of a person’s face or head 
suggest he/she will have bad fate 
 
0.555 
   





obj11n Whether certain objects may ruin the luck of important 














se1n Whether a place breeds or gathers negative energy 
 
   
0.871 
 
se2n Whether a location is cursed by negative energy around it 
 
   
0.922 
 
se3n Whether the features of a location attract bad luck 
 
   
0.751 
 
se5n Whether the energy surrounding a place hurts occupants’ 
well-being 
   
0.715 
 
pr2n Whether the decision violates revelations from divination 
 
    
0.584 
pr4n Whether the decision is opposed by those who can 
communicate with the dead 
    
0.802 
pr6n Whether the choice violates the advice of those who can see 
into the future 
    
0.920 
pr8n Whether the choice violates a supernatural revelation 
 
    
0.841 
Note: Blanks represent absolute loadings under 0.40. N English + Chinese = 780. EFA with robust maximum likelihood 
estimator and Geomin rotation. Factor 1 – Birth profile; Factor 2 – Physical Attribute; Factor 3 – Object/Act; Factor 




Table 24 Factor Correlations and Reliability of Negative SHS 
 Factor 1 2 3 4 Cronbach’s 
alpha 
1 Birth Profile 
    
0.912 
2 Physical Attribute 0.550*** 
   
0.885 
3 Object/Act 0.700*** 0.560*** 
  
0.910 
4 Surrounding Environment 0.588*** 0.492*** 0.691*** 
 
0.916 
5 Paranormal Revelation 0.660*** 0.446*** 0.602*** 0.534*** 0.903 




Table 25 Correlations between Negative SHS and RPBS, BBS, FSBI 








Birth Profile 0.533*** 0.513*** 0.641*** 
Physical Attribute 0.317*** 0.351*** 0.490*** 
Object/Act 0.545*** 0.557*** 0.454*** 
Surrounding Environment 0.545*** 0.525*** 0.418*** 
Paranormal Revelation 0.557*** 0.413*** 0.471*** 
Superstitious Heuristic 0.533*** 0.573*** 0.639*** 




Table 26 Correlations between Negative SHS and Representativeness, Availability, Anchoring 








Birth Profile 0.120† 0.016 -0.068 
Physical Attribute 0.036 -0.094 -0.096 
Object/Act 0.165* -0.017 -0.045 
Surrounding Environment 0.154* -0.012 -0.067 
Paranormal Revelation 0.165** 0.025 -0.109 
Superstitious Heuristic 0.161* -0.019 -0.092 





Table 27 Correlations between Negative SHS and Big Five (English) 




    
Birth Profile 0.024 -0.131 -0.050 0.078 -0.085 
Physical Attribute 0.178* -0.079 -0.048 0.001 -0.047 
Object/Act 0.139 0.044 -0.081 0.162† -0.122 
Surrounding Environment 0.138 0.110 -0.005 0.034 -0.025 
Paranormal Revelation -0.023 -0.017 -0.019 0.054 -0.149 
Superstitious Heuristic 0.111 -0.007 -0.047 0.080 -0.100 





Table 28 Correlations between Negative SHS and Big Five (Chinese) 




    
Birth Profile 0.115* 0.088 -0.014 0.010 0.064 
Physical Attribute -0.045 0.007 -0.084 0.104† -0.019 
Object/Act 0.062 0.162** -0.060 0.120* 0.118* 
Surrounding Environment -0.027 0.057 0.010 0.060 -0.020 
Paranormal Revelation 0.028 0.140* 0.048 0.108† 0.053 
Superstitious Heuristic 0.035 0.122* -0.025 0.107† 0.053 




Table 29 EFA: Negative SHS and Extraversion (Chinese) 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 
bp3n 0.558      
bp8n 0.615      
bp13n 0.788      
bp14n 0.705      
fa1n  0.577     
fa3n  0.909     
fa4n  0.690     
fa6n  0.584     
obj10n   0.710    
obj11n   0.937    
obj12n   0.808    
obj19n   0.452    
se1n    0.708   
se2n    0.882   
se3n    0.739   
se5n    0.557   
pr2n     0.604  
pr4n     0.797  
pr6n     0.829  
pr8n     0.803  
e1      0.568 
e2      0.668 
e3      0.638 
e4      0.698 
Note: Blanks represent absolute loadings under 0.40. N Chinese = 313. EFA with robust maximum likelihood estimator 
and Geomin rotation. Factor 1 – Birth Profile; Factor 2 – Physical Attribute; Factor 3 – Object/Act; Factor 4 –





Table 30 Regressions of Negative SHS on Gender, Age, and Education 
Scale/subscale Gender Age Education 
 
English + Chinese 
 (n=1,181) 
 English + Chinese 
(n=1,171) 
English + Chinese 
 (n=1,177) 
Birth Profile 0.165** -0.009*** 0.106*** 
Physical Attribute -0.092† -0.008** 0.081** 
Object/Act 0.082 -0.015*** 0.068* 
Surrounding Environment 0.163* -0.010*** 0.082** 
Paranormal Revelation 0.180** -0.007** 0.097*** 
Superstitious Heuristic 0.100* -0.010*** 0.087*** 




Table 31 Regressions of Negative SHS on Religion 




Jewish Muslim Buddhist Hindu Taoist 
Birth Profile -0.381*** -0.046 -0.603* -0.427 -0.238† 0.709*** 0.616*** 0.503* 
Physical 
Attribute -0.477*** -0.226* -0.077 -0.705* -0.381* 0.314** 0.020 0.426† 
Object/Act  -0.476*** -0.048 -0.432 -0.966** -0.154 0.570*** 0.265* 0.816** 
Surrounding 
Environment -0.312** 0.123 -0.060 -0.309 -0.122 0.452*** 0.462*** 0.500† 
Paranormal 
Revelation  -0.330*** -0.038 -0.508† -0.699* -0.311* 0.567*** 0.264** 0.562* 
Superstitious 
Heuristics -0.395*** -0.047 -0.336 -0.621** -0.241† 0.522*** 0.325*** 0.562** 
Note: N English + Chinese = 1,088. The reference group is people without any religion. Religiosity is controlled for.  
† p <.1, * p < .05, ** p <. 01, ***p < .001 
  
 
Table 32 Regressions of Negative SHS on Locus of Control, Self-efficacy, and Analytic 
Thinking 




English + Chinese 
(n=238) 
English + Chinese 
(n=1,181) 
Birth Profile 0.007 -0.287† 0.650*** 
Physical Attribute -0.025† -0.201 0.588*** 
Object/Act 0.010 -0.238 0.772*** 
Surrounding Environment 0.017 -0.546** 0.578*** 
Paranormal Revelation 0.013 -0.407* 0.609*** 
Superstitious Heuristic 0.004 -0.3* 0.639*** 
† p <.1, * p < .05, ** p <. 01, ***p < .001 
 
 
Table 33 Regressions of Decision Speed, Use of Heuristics, and Decision Comprehensiveness on 
Negative SHS 






Birth Profile 0.360** 0.008 
Physical Attribute 0.343** 0.005 
Object/Act 0.345*** -0.003 
Surrounding Environment 0.189* 0.019 
Paranormal Revelation 0.198† -0.026 
Superstitious Heuristic 0.410** 0.003 




Table 34 Regressions of Decision Confidence and Self-efficacy on Negative SHS 













Birth Profile 0.140* 0.437*** 0.080 
Physical Attribute 0.207** 0.402*** 0.101† 
Object/Act 0.152* 0.463*** 0.120* 
Surrounding Environment 0.104* 0.310*** 0.108* 
Paranormal Revelation 0.086 0.436*** 0.053 
Superstitious Heuristic 0.197** 0.597*** 0.140* 
† p <.1, * p < .05, ** p <. 01, ***p < .001 
 
 
Table 35 Regressions of Perceived Control and Decision Effectiveness on Negative SHS 












Birth Profile 0.158* 0.394*** 0.086 
Physical Attribute 0.150* 0.314** 0.164* 
Object/Act 0.182** 0.415*** 0.092 
Surrounding Environment 0.154* 0.316*** 0.059 
Paranormal Revelation 0.121† 0.310*** 0.126* 
Superstitious Heuristic 0.229** 0.519*** 0.148* 
† p <.1, * p < .05, ** p <. 01, ***p < .001 
 
 
Table 36 Descriptive Statistics, Correlations, and Comparisons of Positive SHS and Negative 
SHS 
Scale/subscale Positive SHS Negative SHS Correlation t-test 
 
Mean SD Mean SD  Mean difference 
Birth Profile 1.919 1.099 1.742 0.928 0.786*** 0.176*** 
Physical Attribute 2.057 1.019 1.863 0.918 0.765*** 0.194*** 
Object/Act 2.312 1.112 2.158 1.051 0.747*** 0.155*** 
Surrounding Environment 2.465 1.182 2.218 1.084 0.712*** 0.246*** 
Paranormal Revelation 1.751 0.987 1.799 0.973 0.792*** -0.048* 
Superstitious Heuristic 2.101 0.908 1.956 0.815 0.873*** 0.145*** 
Note: N English + Chinese = 1,124. The correlations and t-tests are between the positive and negative SHSs based on each 







Table 37 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Study 2) 
 Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Superstitious heuristics (overall)  2.42 0.94             
2 Superstitious heuristics related to Birth Profile 2.41 1.14 0.86            
3 Superstitious heuristics related to Physical Attribute 2.37 1.13 0.78 0.58           
4 Superstitious heuristics related to Object/Act 2.50 1.24 0.87 0.70 0.62          
5 Superstitious heuristics related to Surrounding Environment 2.74 1.22 0.83 0.61 0.52 0.65         
6 Superstitious heuristics related to Paranormal Revelation 2.08 0.96 0.78 0.64 0.48 0.56 0.59        
7 Decision uncertainty manipulated 1.50 0.50 0.07 -0.01 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.05       
8 Decision importance manipulated 1.50 0.50 0.02 -0.10 0.00 0.07 0.10 0.01 0.03      
9 Decision uncertainty rated (overall) 4.12 1.77 0.05 -0.06 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.74 0.17     
10 Decision uncertainty rated (Birth Profile) 4.29 1.96 0.04 -0.08 0.13 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.66 0.13 0.91    
11 Decision uncertainty rated (Physical Attribute) 3.90 1.93 0.04 -0.04 0.09 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.67 0.12 0.89 0.77   
12 Decision uncertainty rated (Object/Act) 3.99 2.06 0.02 -0.06 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.68 0.13 0.91 0.76 0.81  
13 Decision uncertainty rated (Surrounding Environment) 4.10 1.99 0.05 -0.04 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.62 0.21 0.86 0.70 0.72 0.77 
14 Decision uncertainty rated (Paranormal Revelation) 4.31 2.02 0.07 -0.05 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.66 0.16 0.87 0.81 0.69 0.72 
15 Decision importance rated (overall) 4.71 1.85 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.12 0.14 0.04 -0.01 0.76 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.07 
16 Decision importance rated (Birth Profile) 4.66 1.96 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.70 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.05 
17 Decision importance rated (Physical Attribute) 4.60 2.07 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.04 -0.03 0.75 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.07 
18 Decision importance rated (Object/Act) 4.68 2.18 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.15 0.14 0.05 0.00 0.73 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.06 
19 Decision importance rated (Surrounding Environment) 4.66 2.05 0.13 0.06 0.04 0.15 0.21 0.05 0.03 0.64 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.07 
20 Decision importance rated (Paranormal Revelation) 4.91 1.90 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.06 0.04 -0.01 -0.03 0.67 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.06 
21 Superstitious thinking 2.31 0.99 0.71 0.61 0.48 0.60 0.66 0.57 0.04 0.06 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.08 
22 Age 34.33 5.21 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.11 0.05 -0.02 -0.13 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 
23 Gender 0.53 0.50 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03 
24 Education        5.08 0.56 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.05 
25 Firm age 18.90 12.99 0.03 0.06 -0.01 0.02 0.06 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 0.00 
26 Firm size (log) 5.76 1.51 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 
  
 Variable 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
14 Decision uncertainty rated (Paranormal Revelation) 0.64             
15 Decision importance rated (overall) 0.15 0.14            
16 Decision importance rated (Birth Profile) 0.13 0.13 0.92           
17 Decision importance rated (Physical Attribute) 0.12 0.13 0.93 0.82          
18 Decision importance rated (Object/Act) 0.14 0.12 0.94 0.83 0.85         
19 Decision importance rated (Surrounding Environment) 0.15 0.16 0.90 0.78 0.80 0.84        
20 Decision importance rated (Paranormal Revelation) 0.15 0.07 0.87 0.77 0.74 0.76 0.70       
21 Superstitious thinking -0.02 -0.02 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.13 -0.01      
22 Age -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 0.04     
23 Gender 0.05 0.07 0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 0.14 -0.16    
24 Education        0.04 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.06 -0.10 -0.10 0.10   
25 Firm age -0.05 -0.04 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.28 -0.06 0.11  
26 Firm size (log) 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.10 -0.03 0.02 -0.04 0.14 0.29 






Table 38 HRA Predicting Superstitious Heuristics and Birth Profile Dimension (Treatment) (Study 2) 
Variable Superstitious heuristics Birth Profile 
 Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 1d Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c  Model 2d 
Age 0.012 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.000 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 
Gender 0.326** 0.116 0.114 0.119 0.304* 0.088 0.076 0.078 
Education -0.040 0.092 0.099 0.096 -0.018 0.115 0.120 0.119 
Firm age -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Firm size (log) 0.000 0.005 0.002 0.002 -0.021 -0.012 -0.014 -0.014 
Firm type: Standalone company, established 
                  (reference group) 
        
Firm type: Standalone company, startup -0.381 0.015 0.003 -0.002 -0.531† -0.149 -0.162 -0.163 
Firm type: Parent company of a group company -0.024 0.025 0.038 0.035 -0.291 -0.217 -0.191 -0.192 
Firm type: Subsidiary of a group company -0.093 0.072 0.077 0.084 -0.205 -0.016 -0.003 -0.001 
Ownership: State-owned 
                   (reference group) 
        
Ownership: Collectively-owned 0.308 0.204 0.178 0.181 0.343 0.216 0.165 0.166 
Ownership: Privately-held -0.103 -0.133 -0.140 -0.137 -0.143 -0.165 -0.183 -0.183 
Ownership: HMT-owned -0.530† -0.338 -0.361† -0.361† -0.512 -0.331 -0.365 -0.364 
Ownership: Foreign-owned (excluding HMT) -0.186 -0.252 -0.249 -0.245 -0.124 -0.230 -0.267 -0.266 
Ownership: Other 0.428 -0.327 -0.240 -0.286 0.275 -0.498 -0.409 -0.422 
         
Decision uncertainty manipulated  0.063 0.065 0.066  -0.093 -0.090 -0.089 
Decision importance manipulated  -0.020 -0.021 -0.019  -0.262* -0.265* -0.264* 
Superstitious thinking  0.657*** 0.651*** 0.653***  0.707*** 0.705*** 0.705*** 
Decision importance manipulated ´  





Decision uncertainty manipulated  ´ superstitious thinking   0.065 0.062   0.000 -0.001 
Decision importance manipulated  ´ superstitious thinking   -0.022 -0.014   -0.023 -0.021 
Decision importance manipulated ´  
decision uncertainty manipulated ´ superstitious thinking 
   
-0.112 
   
-0.033 
Intercept 1.919** 1.862** 1.809* 1.827** 2.222† 2.173* 2.138* 2.143* 
N 293 293 293 293 293 293 293 293 
F 1.69* 10.13*** 9.29*** 9.04*** 1.39† 6.55*** 6.11*** 5.93*** 
R2 0.172 0.580 0.582 0.582 0.146 0.472 0.477 0.478 
DR2 0.070 0.522 0.519 0.518 0.041 0.400 0.399 0.397 
Note: HRA = Hierarchical regression analysis. Industry dummies are not reported for the consideration of table length. HMT = Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. 







Table 39 HRA Predicting Physical Attribute and Object/Act Dimensions (Treatment) (Study 2) 
Variable Physical Attribute Object/Act 
 Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 1d Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c  Model 2d 
Age 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.015 0.013 0.013 0.013 
Gender 0.408** 0.233† 0.237† 0.248† 0.365* 0.126 0.125 0.121 
Education -0.005 0.110 0.120 0.115 0.008 0.161 0.169 0.171 
Firm age 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
Firm size (log) -0.017 -0.013 -0.018 -0.019 0.034 0.038 0.034 0.035 
Firm type: Standalone company, established 
                  (reference group) 
        
Firm type: Standalone company, startup -0.187 0.138 0.131 0.119 -0.556† -0.098 -0.108 -0.105 
Firm type: Parent company of a group company 0.214 0.259 0.259 0.252 0.110 0.158 0.169 0.172 
Firm type: Subsidiary of a group company -0.021 0.123 0.123 0.136 -0.015 0.167 0.172 0.168 
Ownership: State-owned 
                   (reference group) 
        
Ownership: Collectively-owned 0.468† 0.387† 0.366 0.372 0.175 0.066 0.037 0.035 
Ownership: Privately-held 0.105 0.096 0.089 0.095 -0.094 -0.127 -0.136 -0.138 
Ownership: HMT-owned -0.060 0.121 0.094 0.095 -0.699† -0.466 -0.492 -0.493 
Ownership: Foreign-owned (excluding HMT) -0.182 -0.252 -0.216 -0.208 -0.368 -0.433† -0.425 -0.428 
Ownership: Other 1.848 1.336 1.492 1.390 0.320 -0.499 -0.387 -0.355 
         
Decision uncertainty manipulated  0.172 0.175 0.179  0.175 0.177 0.176 
Decision importance manipulated  -0.062 -0.063 -0.057  0.055 0.054 0.052 
Superstitious thinking  0.528*** 0.514*** 0.519***  0.729*** 0.720*** 0.719*** 
Decision importance manipulated ´  





Decision uncertainty manipulated  ´ superstitious thinking   0.151 0.143   0.087 0.089 
Decision importance manipulated  ´ superstitious thinking   -0.089 -0.073   -0.044 -0.049 
Decision importance manipulated ´  
decision uncertainty manipulated ´ superstitious thinking 
   
-0.246 
   
0.077 
Intercept 3.126** 3.082** 2.984** 3.023** 0.825 0.758 0.691 0.679 
N 293 293 293 293 293 293 293 293 
F 1.57* 3.89*** 3.61*** 3.54*** 1.59* 6.16*** 0.564*** 5.48*** 
R2 0.162 0.346 0.351 0.353 0.164 0.456 0.458 0.458 
DR2 0.059 0.257 0.254 0.254 0.061 0.382 0.377 0.374 
Note: HRA = Hierarchical regression analysis. Industry dummies are not reported for the consideration of table length. HMT = Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. 







Table 40 HRA Predicting Surrounding Environment and Paranormal Revelation Dimensions (Treatment) (Study 2) 
Variable Surrounding Environment Paranormal Revelation 
 Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 1d Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c  Model 2d 
Age 0.027† 0.026* 0.026* 0.026* 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.009 
Gender 0.398** 0.148 0.148 0.161 0.155 -0.014 -0.017 -0.013 
Education -0.207 -0.052 -0.054 -0.060 0.022 0.127 0.140 0.138 
Firm age 0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008† -0.008† 
Firm size (log) -0.013 -0.010 -0.008 -0.008 0.019 0.023 0.017 0.017 
Firm type: Standalone company, established 
                  (reference group) 
        
Firm type: Standalone company, startup -0.170 0.319 0.317 0.305 -0.461† -0.138 -0.160 -0.164 
Firm type: Parent company of a group company 0.055 0.096 0.100 0.093 -0.208 -0.171 -0.147 -0.149 
Firm type: Subsidiary of a group company -0.041 0.139 0.140 0.156 -0.185 -0.055 -0.045 -0.040 
Ownership: State-owned 
                   (reference group) 
        
Ownership: Collectively-owned 0.335 0.217 0.228 0.235 0.221 0.135 0.092 0.094 
Ownership: Privately-held -0.245 -0.303† -0.294 -0.287 -0.136 -0.167 -0.174 -0.172 
Ownership: HMT-owned -0.912* -0.693* -0.683* -0.682* -0.470 -0.321 -0.361 -0.361 
Ownership: Foreign-owned (excluding HMT) -0.192 -0.236 -0.244 -0.235 -0.061 -0.108 -0.094 -0.091 
Ownership: Other 0.039 -0.975 -1.045 -1.158 -0.344 -0.999 -0.850 -0.885 
         
Decision uncertainty manipulated  0.047 0.044 0.049  0.014 0.016 0.018 
Decision importance manipulated  0.155 0.156 0.162  0.014 0.012 0.014 
Superstitious thinking  0.785*** 0.790*** 0.796***  0.538*** 0.527*** 0.528*** 
Decision importance manipulated ´  





Decision uncertainty manipulated  ´ superstitious thinking   -0.045 -0.054   0.133 0.130 
Decision importance manipulated  ´ superstitious thinking   0.067 0.085   -0.020 -0.014 
Decision importance manipulated ´  
decision uncertainty manipulated ´ superstitious thinking 
   
-0.273 
   
-0.086 
Intercept 2.158† 2.082* 2.117* 2.160* 1.263 1.215 1.116 1.130 
N 293 293 293 293 293 293 293 293 
F 1.66* 8.04*** 7.35*** 7.21*** 0.201 4.73*** 4.41*** 4.28*** 
R2 0.169 0.523 0.524 0.526 0.131 0.392 0.397 0.398 
DR2 0.067 0.458 0.452 0.453 0.024 0.309 0.307 0.305 
Note: HRA = Hierarchical regression analysis. Industry dummies are not reported for the consideration of table length. HMT = Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. 







Table 41 Manipulation Ineffectiveness Rates for Decision Uncertainty and Decision Importance (Study 2) 
















 Superstitious Heuristics  17.01% 11.49% 28.19% 4.11% 
Scenario 2 Birth Profile Choosing an acquisition 
target 
20.41% 8.78% 30.20% 4.79% 
Scenario 3 Physical Attribute Hiring new personnel  19.73% 6.76% 22.82% 5.48% 
Scenario 4 Object/Act Launching new product 10.88% 14.19% 16.78% 5.48% 
Scenario 5 Surrounding Environment Moving to a new 
company location 
14.29% 12.84% 23.49% 3.42% 
Scenario 1 Paranormal Revelation Diversifying into a new 
industry 







Table 42 HRA Predicting Superstitious Heuristics and Birth Profile Dimension (Ratings) (Study 2) 
Variable Superstitious heuristics Birth Profile 
 Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 1d Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c  Model 2d 
Age 0.012 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
Gender 0.326** 0.109 0.109 0.111 0.304* 0.081 0.093 0.087 
Education -0.040 0.081 0.068 0.066 -0.018 0.127 0.113 0.119 
Firm age -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Firm size (log) 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.021 -0.016 -0.016 -0.015 
Firm type: Standalone company, established 
                  (reference group) 
        
Firm type: Standalone company, startup -0.381 0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.531† -0.107 -0.123 -0.117 
Firm type: Parent company of a group company -0.024 0.000 -0.025 -0.026 -0.291 -0.237 -0.278 -0.275 
Firm type: Subsidiary of a group company -0.093 0.066 0.067 0.068 -0.205 -0.034 -0.037 -0.040 
Ownership: State-owned 
                   (reference group) 
        
Ownership: Collectively-owned 0.308 0.195 0.225 0.225 0.343 0.208 0.235 0.257 
Ownership: Privately-held -0.103 -0.155 -0.135 -0.136 -0.143 -0.217 -0.201 -0.182 
Ownership: HMT-owned -0.530† -0.352 -0.322 -0.323 -0.512 -0.346 -0.289 -0.279 
Ownership: Foreign-owned (excluding HMT) -0.186 -0.253 -0.206 -0.205 -0.124 -0.196 -0.157 -0.152 
Ownership: Other 0.428 -0.393 -0.375 -0.387 0.275 -0.644 -0.601 -0.535 
         
Decision uncertainty rated  0.037 0.038† 0.038†  -0.035 -0.037 -0.038 
Decision importance rated  0.021 0.024 0.024  0.006 0.007 0.008 
Superstitious thinking  0.656*** 0.646*** 0.647***  0.698*** 0.688*** 0.679*** 
Decision importance rated ´ decision uncertainty rated   -0.025* -0.025*   -0.022 -0.020 
Decision uncertainty rated  ´ superstitious thinking   0.022 0.022   0.013 0.015 
Decision importance rated  ´ superstitious thinking   -0.011 -0.011   -0.033 -0.036 
Decision importance rated ´ decision uncertainty rated 
´ superstitious thinking 
   
-0.003 
   
0.015 
Intercept 1.919** 1.966** 2.098** 2.106** 2.222† 2.116* 2.203* 2.142* 
N 293 292 292 292 293 292 292 292 
F 1.69* 10.28*** 9.76*** 9.48*** 1.39† 6.22*** 5.84*** 5.73*** 
R2 0.172 0.584 0.595 0.595 0.146 0.459 0.467 0.470 
DR2 0.070 0.528 0.534 0.532 0.041 0.386 0.387 0.388 
Note: HRA = Hierarchical regression analysis. Industry dummies are not reported for the consideration of table length. HMT = Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. 







Table 43 HRA Predicting Physical Attribute and Object/Act Dimensions (Ratings) (Study 2) 
Variable Physical Attribute Object/Act 
 Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 1d Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c  Model 2d 
Age 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.012 
Gender 0.408** 0.230† 0.216† 0.215† 0.365* 0.113 0.112 0.113 
Education -0.005 0.082 0.065 0.060 0.008 0.138 0.122 0.120 
Firm age 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
Firm size (log) -0.017 -0.013 -0.018 -0.018 0.034 0.032 0.033 0.032 
Firm type: Standalone company, established 
                  (reference group) 
        
Firm type: Standalone company, startup -0.187 0.154 0.175 0.171 -0.556† -0.162 -0.166 -0.165 
Firm type: Parent company of a group company 0.214 0.239 0.220 0.220 0.110 0.112 0.107 0.106 
Firm type: Subsidiary of a group company -0.021 0.114 0.114 0.120 -0.015 0.155 0.150 0.152 
Ownership: State-owned 
                   (reference group) 
        
Ownership: Collectively-owned 0.468† 0.380 0.389† 0.388† 0.175 0.035 0.049 0.050 
Ownership: Privately-held 0.105 0.105 0.117 0.116 -0.094 -0.195 -0.188 -0.189 
Ownership: HMT-owned -0.060 0.121 0.141 0.137 -0.699† -0.553† -0.554† -0.552† 
Ownership: Foreign-owned (excluding HMT) -0.182 -0.204 -0.136 -0.132 -0.368 -0.483† -0.471† -0.469† 
Ownership: Other 1.848 1.315 1.375 1.336 0.320 -0.662 -0.729 -0.744 
         
Decision uncertainty rated  0.073* 0.078* 0.078*  0.048† 0.050† 0.050† 
Decision importance rated  0.006 0.008 0.008  0.052† 0.057† 0.056† 
Superstitious thinking  0.531*** 0.515*** 0.518***  0.729*** 0.723*** 0.723*** 
Decision importance rated ´ decision uncertainty rated   -0.018 -0.019   -0.012 -0.013 
Decision uncertainty rated  ´ superstitious thinking   0.037 0.037   0.013 0.013 
Decision importance rated  ´ superstitious thinking   -0.011 -0.010   0.014 0.014 
Decision importance rated ´ decision uncertainty rated 
´ superstitious thinking 
   
-0.005 
   
-0.002 
Intercept 3.126** 3.276** 3.346** 3.377** 0.825 0.923 1.104 1.109 
N 293 292 292 292 293 292 292 292 
F 1.57* 3.97*** 3.75*** 3.64*** 1.59* 6.34*** 5.85*** 5.68*** 
R2 0.162 0.352 0.360 0.360 0.164 0.465 0.468 0.468 
DR2 0.059 0.263 0.264 0.261 0.061 0.391 0.388 0.385 
Note: HRA = Hierarchical regression analysis. Industry dummies are not reported for the consideration of table length. HMT = Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. 







Table 44 HRA Predicting Surrounding Environment and Paranormal Revelation Dimensions (Ratings) (Study 2) 
Variable Surrounding Environment Paranormal Revelation 
 Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 1d Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c  Model 2d 
Age 0.027† 0.027* 0.026* 0.027* 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.007 
Gender 0.398** 0.152 0.148 0.157 0.155 -0.027 -0.031 -0.026 
Education -0.207 -0.056 -0.058 -0.068 0.022 0.126 0.115 0.112 
Firm age 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.007 -0.009† -0.008† -0.008† 
Firm size (log) -0.013 -0.017 -0.015 -0.014 0.019 0.021 0.012 0.011 
Firm type: Standalone company, established 
                  (reference group) 
        
Firm type: Standalone company, startup -0.170 0.265 0.235 0.257 -0.461† -0.136 -0.145 -0.147 
Firm type: Parent company of a group company 0.055 0.060 0.051 0.046 -0.208 -0.184 -0.218 -0.225 
Firm type: Subsidiary of a group company -0.041 0.114 0.121 0.140 -0.185 -0.049 -0.030 -0.028 
Ownership: State-owned 
                   (reference group) 
        
Ownership: Collectively-owned 0.335 0.227 0.254 0.260 0.221 0.116 0.111 0.109 
Ownership: Privately-held -0.245 -0.304† -0.283 -0.279 -0.136 -0.193 -0.194 -0.197 
Ownership: HMT-owned -0.912* -0.684* -0.641* -0.639* -0.470 -0.331 -0.302 -0.313 
Ownership: Foreign-owned (excluding HMT) -0.192 -0.220 -0.195 -0.191 -0.061 -0.131 -0.111 -0.115 
Ownership: Other 0.039 -0.934 -0.950 -1.009 -0.344 -1.057 -0.994 -0.989 
         
Decision uncertainty rated  0.056* 0.053† 0.064*  0.014 0.015 0.014 
Decision importance rated  0.066* 0.066* 0.060*  0.009 0.015 0.015 
Superstitious thinking  0.767*** 0.768*** 0.793***  0.540*** 0.523*** 0.525*** 
Decision importance rated ´ decision uncertainty rated   -0.017 -0.024†   -0.016 -0.017 
Decision uncertainty rated  ´ superstitious thinking   -0.001 -0.002   0.039 0.038 
Decision importance rated  ´ superstitious thinking   -0.003 -0.004   -0.033 -0.032 
Decision importance rated ´ decision uncertainty rated 
´ superstitious thinking 
   
-0.021† 
   
-0.005 
Intercept 2.158† 2.297* 2.329* 2.351* 1.263 1.261 1.441† 1.474† 
N 293 292 292 292 293 292 292 292 
F 1.66* 8.60*** 7.94*** 7.88*** 0.201 4.74*** 4.56*** 4.43*** 
R2 0.169 0.540 0.544 0.550 0.131 0.393 0.406 0.407 
DR2 0.067 0.478 0.476 0.480 0.024 0.310 0.317 0.315 
Note: HRA = Hierarchical regression analysis. Industry dummies are not reported for the consideration of table length. HMT = Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. 




Table 45 Factor Loadings of Positive SHS for Strategic Decision-making (ESEM) 
Index Item Factor 
  1 2 3 4 5 
bp8p Whether the year, month, date, or hour of a person’s birth 
suggests positive things about his/her personality 
0.829 
    
bp11p Whether the year, month, date or hour of a person’s birth 
indicates he/she is likely to succeed in his/her career 0.961 
    
bp13p Whether a person’s birth chart or astrological sign indicates 
he/she has good fate 0.997 
    
bp15p Whether a certain birth chart or astrological sign may increase 
the luck for attaining a particular goal 0.921 
    
fa1p Whether a person’s physical appearance may bring good luck 
 
0.790 
   
fa3p Whether some features of a person’s face or head imply 
positive things about his/her personality 
 
0.986 
   
fa4p Whether some attributes of a person’s face or head suggest 
positive things about his/her character (moral qualities) 
 
0.944 
   
fa6p Whether some characteristics of a person’s face or head 
suggest he/she will have good fate 
 
0.824 
   
















se1p Whether a place breeds or gathers positive energy  
   
0.998 
 
se2p Whether a location is blessed by positive energy around it  
   
0.867 
 
se4p Whether the energy of a place increases the luck for attaining a 
particular goal 
   
0.890 
 
se5p Whether the energy surrounding a place boosts occupants’ 
well-being 
   
0.902 
 
pr4p Whether the decision is supported by those who can 
communicate with the dead  
    
0.875 
pr5p Whether the decision is instructed by someone who hears from 
a supernatural being 
    
0.985 
pr6p Whether the choice follows the advice of those who can see 
into the future 
    
0.953 
pr8p Whether the choice follows a supernatural revelation  
    
0.964 
Note: Blanks represent absolute loadings under 0.40. N = 97. ESEM with robust maximum likelihood estimator and Target 
rotation. Factor 1 – Birth Profile; Factor 2 – Physical Attribute; Factor 3 – Object/Act; Factor 4 –Surrounding Environment; 




Table 46 Factor Correlations and Reliability of Positive SHS for Strategic Decision-making 
 Factor 1 2 3 4 Cronbach’s 
alpha 
1 Birth Profile 
    
0.976 
2 Physical Attribute 0.631***    0.970 
3 Object/Act 0.300*** 0.504***   0.943 
4 Surrounding Environment 0.448*** 0.608*** 0.655***  0.972 
5 Paranormal Revelation 0.273*** 0.459*** 0.298*** 0.423*** 0.980 




Table 47 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Antecedents – Superstitious Heuristics) (Study 3) 
 Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Superstitious heuristics (overall)  
 1.85 0.77 
              
2 Superstitious heuristics related to 
Birth Profile 1.42 0.78 0.65       
       
3 Superstitious heuristics related to 
Physical Attribute 2.00 1.09 0.85 0.59      
       
4 Superstitious heuristics related to 
Object/Act 2.17 1.12 0.80 0.31 0.55     
       
5 Superstitious heuristics related to 
Surrounding Environment 2.21 1.11 0.86 0.42 0.59 0.74    
       
6 Superstitious heuristics related to 
Paranormal Revelation 1.46 0.89 0.68 0.31 0.52 0.38 0.46   
       
7 Decision uncertainty 
 3.74 0.20 -0.03 -0.05 0.09 -0.04 -0.12 0.02  
       
8 Decision importance 
 4.41 0.38 0.17 0.01 0.01 0.31 0.23 0.07 -0.44 
       
9 Superstitious thinking 
 2.05 1.01 0.55 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.50 0.36 0.03 -0.01     
  
10 Age 
 37.95 4.44 -0.12 -0.28 -0.17 0.02 -0.09 0.00 0.06 0.01 -0.08    
  
11 Gender 
 0.28 0.45 0.17 0.06 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.09 0.12 -0.17 0.20 -0.01   
  
12 Education        
 5.25 0.75 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.11 -0.06 0.19 -0.17 0.07 0.16 0.02 0.09  
  
13 Tenure 
 5.03 3.17 -0.11 0.03 -0.08 -0.16 -0.08 -0.09 0.10 -0.15 -0.01 0.09 -0.01 -0.10  
 
14 Founder 
 0.30 0.46 -0.01 0.21 -0.03 -0.11 0.01 -0.05 -0.23 0.00 -0.04 -0.25 -0.11 -0.03 0.23 
 
15 Firm age 
 13.06 9.32 -0.01 -0.10 0.04 0.05 -0.04 0.00 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.25 -0.03 0.03 0.09 -0.38 






Table 48 HRA Predicting Superstitious Heuristics and Birth Profile Dimension (Study 3) 
Variable Superstitious heuristics (Overall) Birth Profile 
 Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 1d Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c  Model 2d 
Age -0.015 -0.011 -0.014 -0.010 -0.038† -0.038* -0.031 -0.029 
Gender 0.191 0.042 0.011 -0.033 -0.060 -0.164 -0.220 -0.231 
Education 0.126 0.016 -0.017 -0.034 0.170 0.102 0.081 0.076 
Tenure -0.069* -0.057† -0.058* -0.056† -0.040 -0.035 -0.039 -0.038 
Founder 0.095 0.140 0.107 0.098 0.310 0.328 0.324 0.322 
Firm age -0.004 -0.006 -0.010 -0.015 -0.008 -0.008 -0.011 -0.013 
Firm type: Standalone company, established 
                  (reference group)         
Firm type: Standalone company, startup -0.654* -0.469† -0.416 -0.399 -0.777** -0.669* -0.678* -0.674* 
Firm type: Parent company of a group company -0.087 -0.099 -0.027 0.075 -0.275 -0.356 -0.309 -0.283 
Firm type: Subsidiary of a group company -0.542† -0.427 -0.412 -0.382 -1.012 -0.915** -0.956** -0.949** 
Firm type: Other -0.221 -0.592 -0.621 -0.540 -1.269 -1.603* -1.778* -1.757* 
Ownership: State-owned 
                   (reference group)         
Ownership: Collectively-owned -0.751 -0.928 -0.953 -0.967† -0.998** -1.108† -1.082† -1.085† 
Ownership: Privately-held 0.113 -0.163 -0.143 -0.148 -0.382 -0.551* -0.597* -0.598* 
Ownership: Foreign-owned (excluding HMT) -0.008 -0.199 -0.215 -0.216 0.094 -0.071 -0.081 -0.081 
Ownership: Mixed -0.560 -0.500 -0.529 -0.461 -0.795 -0.627 -0.662 -0.644 
Ownership: Other -0.337 -0.542 -0.412 -0.425 -0.272 -0.274 -0.345 -0.348 
         
Decision uncertainty  0.578 0.341 0.381  0.326 0.032 0.042 
Decision importance  0.279 0.161 0.211  -0.100 -0.168 -0.155 
Superstitious thinking  0.357*** 0.378*** 0.409***  0.299** 0.345*** 0.353*** 
Decision importance ´ decision uncertainty    1.788* 1.446   0.586 0.498 
Decision uncertainty ´ superstitious thinking   0.048 -0.412   0.405 0.286 
Decision importance ´ superstitious thinking   -0.021 -0.010   -0.259 -0.256 
Decision importance ´ decision uncertainty ´ 
superstitious thinking 
   
1.693 
   
0.435 
Intercept 2.402* 2.973** 3.344* 3.293** 3.080** 3.535*** 3.541** 3.527** 
F 1.32 2.57** 2.47** 2.41** 2.18* 2.82** 2.64** 2.49** 
R2 0.216 0.427 0.468 0.478 0.335 0.450 0.485 0.485 
DR2 0.057 0.261 0.278 0.279 0.181 0.290 0.301 0.290 
Note: HRA = Hierarchical regression analysis. HMT = Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. N = 81.  




Table 49 HRA Predicting Physical Attribute and Object/Act Dimensions (Study 3) 
Variable Physical Attribute Object/Act 
 Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 1d Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c  Model 2d 
Age -0.043 -0.046 -0.044 -0.036 0.013 0.023 0.017 0.026 
Gender 0.211 0.059 -0.016 -0.091 0.354 0.181 0.106 0.005 
Education 0.192 0.075 0.024 -0.006 0.140 0.009 0.023 0.008 
Tenure -0.068 -0.065 -0.070 -0.066 -0.107* -0.086† -0.087† -0.085 
Founder 0.118 0.206 0.168 0.153 -0.149 -0.083 -0.126 -0.144 
Firm age 0.000 0.000 -0.006 -0.015 0.002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.015 
Firm type: Standalone company, established 
                  (reference group)         
Firm type: Standalone company, startup -0.745 -0.596 -0.552 -0.524 -0.677 -0.427 -0.286 -0.255 
Firm type: Parent company of a group company 0.074 -0.015 0.093 0.267 -0.318 -0.195 -0.111 0.044 
Firm type: Subsidiary of a group company -0.382 -0.247 -0.267 -0.217 -0.607 -0.515 -0.446 -0.406 
Firm type: Other -0.257 -0.725 -0.900 -0.762 0.582 0.323 0.544 0.708 
Ownership: State-owned 
                   (reference group)         
Ownership: Collectively-owned -1.036† -1.240 -1.243 -1.267 -0.438 -0.661 -0.806 -0.863 
Ownership: Privately-held 0.029 -0.213 -0.229 -0.237 0.556 0.193 0.220 0.201 
Ownership: Foreign-owned (excluding HMT) -0.219 -0.464 -0.487 -0.488 0.186 0.038 -0.007 -0.010 
Ownership: Mixed 0.110 0.300 0.242 0.358 -0.632 -0.816 -0.803 -0.680 
Ownership: Other -0.793 -0.722 -0.647 -0.669 0.026 -0.521 -0.317 -0.355 
         
Decision uncertainty  0.989 0.515 0.584  0.683 0.263 0.222 
Decision importance  -0.120 -0.294 -0.208  0.920* 0.805* 0.890* 
Superstitious thinking  0.423** 0.480** 0.534***  0.296* 0.289* 0.340* 
Decision importance ´ decision uncertainty    2.289† 1.705   2.536† 2.174 
Decision uncertainty ´ superstitious thinking   0.358 -0.429   0.041 -0.777 
Decision importance ´ superstitious thinking   -0.237 -0.218   0.349 0.383 
Decision importance ´ decision uncertainty ´ 
superstitious thinking 
   
2.894 
   
2.949 
Intercept 3.235* 4.115** 4.508** 4.421** 1.471 1.915 2.094 1.935 
F 1.08 1.69† 1.70† 2.41** 1.01 1.70† 1.66† 1.65† 
R2 0.199 0.330 0.377 0.478 0.191 0.334 0.376 0.389 
DR2 0.014 0.135 0.156 0.279 0.002 0.137 0.150 0.153 
Note: HMT = Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. N = 81.  





Table 50 HRA Predicting Surrounding Environment and Paranormal Revelation Dimensions (Study 3) 
Variable Surrounding Environment Paranormal Revelation 
 Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 1d Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c  Model 2d 
Age -0.006 0.005 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.012 -0.004 
Gender 0.310 0.108 0.067 0.053 0.127 0.009 0.056 -0.021 
Education -0.098 -0.245 -0.269† -0.274† 0.232 0.154 0.102 0.071 
Tenure -0.103* -0.079† -0.076† -0.075† -0.028 -0.020 -0.023 -0.020 
Founder 0.103 0.136 0.095 0.092 0.101 0.116 0.065 0.050 
Firm age -0.008 -0.013 -0.017 -0.019 -0.005 -0.006 -0.008 -0.016 
Firm type: Standalone company, established 
                  (reference group)         
Firm type: Standalone company, startup -0.907* -0.622 -0.477 -0.471 -0.167 -0.036 -0.083 -0.054 
Firm type: Parent company of a group company -0.216 -0.165 -0.019 0.013 0.285 0.212 0.151 0.328 
Firm type: Subsidiary of a group company -0.963* -0.819† -0.730† -0.721† 0.244 0.351 0.309 0.360 
Firm type: Other -0.012 -0.441 -0.291 -0.266 -0.144 -0.502 -0.619 -0.478 
Ownership: State-owned 
                   (reference group)         
Ownership: Collectively-owned -0.980 -1.205 -1.282 -1.286 -0.321 -0.444 -0.443 -0.466 
Ownership: Privately-held 0.141 -0.268 -0.223 -0.225 0.210 0.010 0.082 0.074 
Ownership: Foreign-owned (excluding HMT) 0.014 -0.206 -0.254 -0.254 -0.117 -0.293 -0.248 -0.250 
Ownership: Mixed -1.252 -1.285 -1.287 -1.267 -0.229 -0.070 -0.123 -0.004 
Ownership: Other -0.510 -1.016 -0.782 -0.786 -0.146 -0.206 -0.010 -0.032 
         
Decision uncertainty  0.509 0.236 0.248  0.315 0.354 0.424 
Decision importance  0.722* 0.592 0.608  -0.022 -0.141 -0.053 
Superstitious thinking  0.436** 0.449** 0.459**  0.326** 0.312* 0.367** 
Decision importance ´ decision uncertainty    2.330† 2.226   1.836 1.240 
Decision uncertainty ´ superstitious thinking   0.164 0.023   -0.770 -1.572† 
Decision importance ´ superstitious thinking   0.285 0.288   -0.201 -0.182 
Decision importance ´ decision uncertainty ´ 
superstitious thinking 
   
0.518 
   
2.950 
Intercept 3.999* 4.551** 4.889** 4.874** 0.194 0.659 1.499 1.410 
F 1.34 2.55** 2.45** 2.30** 0.49 0.90 0.93 0.98 
R2 0.237 0.425 0.466 0.466 0.102 0.207 0.248 0.271 
DR2 0.061 0.258 0.275 0.264 -0.106 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 
Note: HRA = Hierarchical regression analysis. HMT = Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. N = 81.  





Table 51 Factor Loadings of Variable Measures in Study 3 (ESEM) 
Item Factor 
 1 2 3 4 5 
BP 0.658     
FA 0.900     
OBJ 0.559     
SE 0.666     
PR 0.557     
DS1  0.753    
DS2  0.721    
DS3  0.900    
CE1   0.757   
CE2   0.790   
CE3   0.780   
CE4   0.801   
CE5   0.744   
CE6   0.766   
CE7   0.588   
CE8   0.687   
DE1    0.841  
DE2    0.866  
ROA     0.765 
CASH     0.799 
SG     0.651 
MS     0.699 
OVERALL     0.906 
 
Note: Blanks represent absolute loadings under 0.40. N = 82. ESEM with robust maximum likelihood estimator and 
Target rotation. To reduce complexity, only first-order dimensions of superstitious heuristics are included.  
BP = Birth Profile; FA = Physical Attribute; OBJ = Object/Act; SE = Surrounding Environment;  PR = Paranormal 
Revelation; DS = decision speed; CE = collective efficacy; DE = decision effectiveness; ROA = improvement in 
ROA; CASH = improvement in cash; SG = improvement in sales growth; MS = improvement in market share; 
OVERALL = improvement in overall performance. Factor 1 – Superstitious heuristics; Factor 2 – decision speed; 





Table 52 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (Superstitious Heuristics – Consequences) (Study 3) 
 Variable N Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Decision effectiveness 82 5.08 1.01            
2 Improvement in firm performance 72 -0.04 0.84 0.22           
3 Improvement in ROA 72 0.00 0.89 -0.02 0.79          
4 Improvement in cash flow increase 71 -0.15 1.10 0.17 0.83 0.54         
5 Improvement in sales growth 72 -0.15 1.03 0.14 0.75 0.63 0.50        
6 Improvement in market share  72 0.07 1.10 0.29 0.78 0.49 0.54 0.37       
7 Improvement in overall performance 72 0.04 1.08 0.26 0.91 0.63 0.74 0.56 0.72      
8 Superstitious heuristics (overall) 82 1.81 0.75 0.02 -0.05 -0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.11 -0.05     
9 Decision speed 82 4.89 1.26 0.37 0.16 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.31 0.18 0.16    
10 Collective efficacy 82 3.84 0.60 0.42 0.14 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.22 0.15 0.15 0.48   
11 Environmental unanalyzability 82 3.65 0.43 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.04 -0.07 0.23 -0.10  
12 Holistic reasoning 82 0.82 0.07 -0.03 0.16 -0.01 0.29 0.10 0.13 0.15 -0.10 -0.10 -0.04 0.03 
13 Age 82 38.10 4.42 -0.21 -0.02 -0.10 -0.02 -0.04 0.05 0.02 -0.11 0.18 0.06 0.12 
14 Gender 82 0.27 0.45 -0.03 -0.14 -0.15 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 -0.14 0.15 0.14 -0.03 0.23 
15 Education        82 5.23 0.74 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.04 -0.11 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.18 0.10 -0.01 
16 Tenure 82 5.00 3.16 -0.08 0.06 -0.05 0.04 0.15 0.02 0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.27 0.19 
17 Founder 82 0.29 0.46 -0.18 -0.21 -0.18 -0.09 -0.19 -0.18 -0.20 0.03 -0.20 -0.48 0.09 
18 Firm age 82 13.06 9.25 -0.10 -0.27 -0.19 -0.33 -0.10 -0.24 -0.22 -0.03 -0.14 0.07 -0.03 
 
 
 Variable 12 13 14 15 16 17 
13 Age 0.39      
14 Gender 0.12 0.01     
15 Education        0.01 0.03 0.07    
16 Tenure 0.04 0.06 0.03 -0.07   
17 Founder 0.01 -0.27 -0.09 -0.02 0.23  
18 Firm age 0.10 0.27 -0.05 0.02 0.09 -0.38 
 





Table 53 SUR Predicting Decision Effectiveness (Study 3) 
Variable Main effect Interaction 













Age 0.085** 0.003 -0.073* 0.085** 0.002 -0.075* 
Gender 0.153 -0.172 -0.466* 0.153 -0.176 -0.450† 
Education 0.218 0.087 0.084 0.218 0.086 0.096 
Tenure 0.040 -0.026 -0.030 0.040 -0.026 -0.032 
Founder -0.359 -0.523** -0.380 -0.359 -0.538** -0.311 
Firm age -0.033* -0.006 -0.008 -0.033* -0.006 -0.008 
Firm type: Standalone company, established 
                  (reference group)       
Firm type: Standalone company, startup 0.477 -0.227 -0.711* 0.477 -0.220 -0.714* 
Firm type: Parent company of a group company 0.881† -0.001 -0.216 0.881† -0.007 -0.157 
Firm type: Subsidiary of a group company 1.104* 0.226 -0.946* 1.104* 0.229 -0.920* 
Firm type: Other -1.429 -0.171 -0.502 -1.429 -0.152 -0.591 
Ownership: State-owned 
                   (reference group)       
Ownership: Collectively-owned 1.873* 0.496 -0.541 1.873* 0.519 -0.603 
Ownership: Privately-held 0.368 0.173 -0.339 0.368 0.171 -0.305 
Ownership: Foreign-owned (excluding HMT) 0.565 0.167 -0.014 0.565 0.155 0.053 
Ownership: Mixed -0.246 0.163 0.735 -0.246 0.160 0.661 
Ownership: Other 0.577 0.028 -0.939 0.577 0.027 -0.940 
       
Superstitious heuristics (Overall) 0.436** 0.150† -0.231† 0.436** 0.151† -0.244† 
Decision speed   0.321**   0.317** 
Collective efficacy   0.363†   0.363† 
Environmental unanalyzability   -0.590   -0.417 
Holistic reasoning  0.780 1.248  0.872 1.022 
Decision speed ´ Environmental unanalyzability      -0.096 
Superstitious heuristics ´ Holistic reasoning     -0.314 1.090 
       
Intercept -5.660** 3.305*** 7.158*** -5.660** 3.317*** 7.181*** 
!2 62.70*** 57.46*** 65.68*** 62.70*** 57.65*** 66.84*** 
R2 0.433 0.410 0.445 0.433 0.411 0.449 
Note: SUR = Seemingly unrelated regression. Industry dummies are not reported for the consideration of table length. HMT = Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. N = 82.  




Table 54 Mediation of the Effect of Superstitious Heuristics on Decision Effectiveness through Decision Speed and Collective 
Efficacy (Study 3) 
Indirect Effect Observed Coefficient 95% Confidence Interval (BC) 90% Confidence Interval (BC) 
Decision speed 0.1401 0.001 0.509 0.019 0.445 
Collective efficacy 0.0545 -0.038 0.309 -0.019 0.263 
Total 0.1946 0.007 0.509 0.043 0.462 





Table 55 Moderated Mediation of the Effect of Superstitious Heuristics on Decision Effectiveness through Decision Speed and 
Collective Efficacy (Study 3) 






Indirect effect through decision speed at low environmental unanalyzability  0.156 -0.028 0.565 -0.001 0.484 
Indirect effect through decision speed at medium environmental unanalyzability 0.138 0.001 0.543 0.014 0.449 
Indirect effect through decision speed at high environmental unanalyzability 0.121 -0.028 0.640 -0.001 0.496 
Indirect effect through collective efficacy at low holistic reasoning 0.063 -0.045 0.422 -0.023 0.321 
Indirect effect through collective efficacy at medium holistic reasoning 0.055 -0.040 0.330 -0.019 0.268 
Indirect effect through collective efficacy at high holistic reasoning 0.047 -0.055 0.380 -0.034 0.293 






Table 56 SUR Predicting Improvement in Firm Performance (Study 3) 
Variable Main effect Interaction 















Age 0.066* -0.003 -0.055* 0.066* -0.003 -0.053* 
Gender -0.164 -0.169 -0.645** -0.164 -0.172 -0.618** 
Education 0.231 0.073 0.021 0.231 0.074 0.012 
Tenure 0.022 -0.051* 0.055† 0.022 -0.048* 0.051 
Founder -0.795† -0.454* -1.263*** -0.795† -0.507** -1.373*** 
Firm age -0.036* -0.014† -0.037** -0.036* -0.013 -0.034** 
Firm type: Standalone company, established 
                  (reference group)       
Firm type: Standalone company, startup -0.001 -0.470* 0.009 -0.001 -0.436† -0.042 
Firm type: Parent company of a group company 0.588 0.096 -0.229 0.588 0.070 -0.399 
Firm type: Subsidiary of a group company 0.493 0.122 -0.282 0.493 0.139 -0.362 
Firm type: Other -2.099† -0.333 -1.263 -2.099† -0.281 -1.138 
Ownership: State-owned 
                   (reference group)       
Ownership: Collectively-owned 1.779* 0.578 0.049 1.779* 0.684† 0.137 
Ownership: Privately-held -0.060 0.166 -0.259 -0.060 0.178 -0.277 
Ownership: Foreign-owned (excluding HMT) 0.589 0.229 -0.076 0.589 0.206 -0.163 
Ownership: Other 0.099 -0.095 -1.148* 0.099 -0.083 -1.108 
       
Superstitious heuristics (Overall) 0.554** 0.098 0.075 0.554** 0.096 0.090 
Decision speed   0.090   0.118 
Collective efficacy   -0.211   -0.253 
Environmental unanalyzability   0.458   0.030 
Holistic reasoning  1.550† 3.626**  1.883* 4.108** 
Decision speed ´ Environmental unanalyzability      0.262 
Superstitious heuristics ´ Holistic reasoning     -1.091 -1.401 
       
Intercept -4.241* 3.823*** 3.711* -4.241* 3.767*** 3.884* 
!2 71.96*** 66.62*** 79.94*** 71.96*** 68.82*** 85.43*** 
R2 0.500 0.476 0.526 0.500 0.481 0.543 
Note: SUR = Seemingly unrelated regression. Industry dummies are not reported for the consideration of table length. HMT = Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. N = 72.  




Table 57 SUR Predicting Improvement in ROA (Study 3) 
Variable Main effect Interaction 













Age 0.066* -0.003 -0.068* 0.066* -0.003 -0.065* 
Gender -0.164 -0.169 -0.492† -0.164 -0.172 -0.461† 
Education 0.231 0.073 -0.047 0.231 0.074 -0.056 
Tenure 0.022 -0.051* 0.038 0.022 -0.048* 0.031 
Founder -0.795† -0.454* -1.128** -0.795† -0.507** -1.082** 
Firm age -0.036* -0.014† -0.027† -0.036* -0.013 -0.027† 
Firm type: Standalone company, established 
                  (reference group)       
Firm type: Standalone company, startup -0.001 -0.470* 0.148 -0.001 -0.436† 0.058 
Firm type: Parent company of a group company 0.588 0.096 -0.120 0.588 0.070 -0.178 
Firm type: Subsidiary of a group company 0.493 0.122 -0.020 0.493 0.139 -0.113 
Firm type: Other -2.099† -0.333 -0.959 -2.099† -0.281 -1.000 
Ownership: State-owned 
                   (reference group)       
Ownership: Collectively-owned 1.779* 0.578 0.730 1.779* 0.684† 0.561 
Ownership: Privately-held -0.060 0.166 -0.043 -0.060 0.178 -0.090 
Ownership: Foreign-owned (excluding HMT) 0.589 0.229 0.242 0.589 0.206 0.229 
Ownership: Other 0.099 -0.095 -0.139 0.099 -0.083 -0.133 
       
Superstitious heuristics (Overall) 0.554** 0.098 0.252 0.554** 0.096 0.272† 
Decision speed   -0.025   -0.019 
Collective efficacy   -0.257   -0.245 
Environmental unanalyzability   0.736   0.710 
Holistic reasoning  1.550† 2.330  1.883* 1.881 
Decision speed ´ Environmental unanalyzability      0.185 
Superstitious heuristics ´ Holistic reasoning     -1.091 1.383 
       
Intercept -4.241* 3.823*** 4.296* -4.241* 3.767*** 4.320* 
!2 71.96*** 66.62*** 39.65† 71.96*** 68.82*** 41.43† 
R2 0.500 0.476 0.356 0.500 0.481 0.365 
Note: SUR = Seemingly unrelated regression. Industry dummies are not reported for the consideration of table length. HMT = Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. N = 72.  





Table 58 SUR Predicting Improvement in Cash Flow (Study 3) 
Variable Main effect Interaction 
 Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c 
 Decision Speed Collective 
efficacy 
Improvement 






in cash flow 
Age 0.066† -0.003 -0.036 0.066† -0.003 -0.036 
Gender -0.149 -0.132 -0.851** -0.149 -0.124 -0.844** 
Education 0.222 0.055 0.166 0.222 0.051 0.164 
Tenure 0.023 -0.047* 0.015 0.023 -0.043† 0.014 
Founder -0.788† -0.436* -1.436*** -0.788† -0.496* -1.438*** 
Firm age -0.036* -0.013 -0.052*** -0.036* -0.012 -0.052*** 
Firm type: Standalone company, established 
                  (reference group)       
Firm type: Standalone company, startup 0.005 -0.461* -0.257 0.005 -0.416† -0.273 
Firm type: Parent company of a group company 0.601 0.114 -0.474 0.601 0.087 -0.495 
Firm type: Subsidiary of a group company 0.506 0.149 -0.471 0.506 0.179 -0.489 
Firm type: Other -2.101† -0.331 -0.488 -2.101† -0.266 -0.484 
Ownership: State-owned 
                   (reference group)       
Ownership: Collectively-owned 1.799* 0.603 0.845 1.799* 0.742† 0.829 
Ownership: Privately-held -0.056 0.171 -0.007 -0.056 0.187 -0.015 
Ownership: Foreign-owned (excluding HMT) 0.591 0.234 -0.181 0.591 0.208 -0.189 
Ownership: Other 0.110 -0.083 -1.931** 0.110 -0.064 -1.927** 
       
Superstitious heuristics (Overall) 0.561** 0.110 -0.019 0.561** 0.110 -0.015 
Decision speed   0.050   0.052 
Collective efficacy   -0.186   -0.187 
Environmental unanalyzability   1.250   1.214 
Holistic reasoning  1.321 7.053***  1.652† 7.027*** 
Decision speed ´ Environmental unanalyzability      0.045 
Superstitious heuristics ´ Holistic reasoning     -1.345 0.082 
       
Intercept -4.196* 3.853*** 2.418 -4.196* 3.793*** 2.434 
!2 69.50*** 66.91*** 92.80*** 69.50*** 70.25*** 92.87*** 
R2 0.495 0.481 0.567 0.495 0.491 0.567 
Note: SUR = Seemingly unrelated regression. Industry dummies are not reported for the consideration of table length. HMT = Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. N = 71.  





Table 59 SUR Predicting Improvement in Sales Growth (Study 3) 
Variable Main effect Interaction 
 Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c 












Age 0.066* -0.003 -0.075* 0.066* -0.003 -0.067* 
Gender -0.164 -0.169 -0.495† -0.164 -0.172 -0.420 
Education 0.231 0.073 -0.056 0.231 0.074 -0.078 
Tenure 0.022 -0.051* 0.086* 0.022 -0.048* 0.078† 
Founder -0.795† -0.454* -1.123** -0.795† -0.507** -1.116** 
Firm age -0.036* -0.014† -0.021 -0.036* -0.013 -0.018 
Firm type: Standalone company, established 
                  (reference group)       
Firm type: Standalone company, startup -0.001 -0.470* -0.277 -0.001 -0.436† -0.477 
Firm type: Parent company of a group company 0.588 0.096 -0.279 0.588 0.070 -0.504 
Firm type: Subsidiary of a group company 0.493 0.122 0.094 0.493 0.139 -0.132 
Firm type: Other -2.099† -0.333 -2.021* -2.099† -0.281 -2.011 
Ownership: State-owned 
                   (reference group)       
Ownership: Collectively-owned 1.779* 0.578 0.103 1.779* 0.684† -0.146 
Ownership: Privately-held -0.060 0.166 -0.262 -0.060 0.178 -0.361 
Ownership: Foreign-owned (excluding HMT) 0.589 0.229 0.130 0.589 0.206 0.045 
Ownership: Other 0.099 -0.095 -0.640 0.099 -0.083 -0.600 
       
Superstitious heuristics (Overall) 0.554** 0.098 0.300† 0.554** 0.096 0.347* 
Decision speed   0.031   0.061 
Collective efficacy   -0.315   -0.322 
Environmental unanalyzability   0.291   -0.052 
Holistic reasoning  1.550† 1.702  1.883* 1.208 
Decision speed ´ Environmental unanalyzability      0.523* 
Superstitious heuristics ´ Holistic reasoning     -1.091 1.574 
       
Intercept -4.241* 3.823*** 4.648* -4.241* 3.767*** 4.814* 
!2 71.96*** 66.62*** 64.89*** 71.96*** 68.82*** 73.95*** 
R2 0.500 0.476 0.474 0.500 0.481 0.507 
Note: SUR = Seemingly unrelated regression. Industry dummies are not reported for the consideration of table length. HMT = Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. N = 72.  




Table 60 SUR Predicting Improvement in Market Share (Study 3) 
Variable Main effect Interaction 
 Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c 












Age 0.066* -0.003 -0.032 0.066* -0.003 -0.029 
Gender -0.164 -0.169 -0.785* -0.164 -0.172 -0.759* 
Education 0.231 0.073 0.046 0.231 0.074 0.036 
Tenure 0.022 -0.051* 0.060 0.022 -0.048* 0.056 
Founder -0.795† -0.454* -1.088* -0.795† -0.507** -1.318** 
Firm age -0.036* -0.014† -0.040* -0.036* -0.013 -0.035* 
Firm type: Standalone company, established 
                  (reference group)       
Firm type: Standalone company, startup -0.001 -0.470* 0.422 -0.001 -0.436† 0.395 
Firm type: Parent company of a group company 0.588 0.096 -0.166 0.588 0.070 -0.430 
Firm type: Subsidiary of a group company 0.493 0.122 -0.812† 0.493 0.139 -0.891† 
Firm type: Other -2.099† -0.333 -1.266 -2.099† -0.281 -1.012 
Ownership: State-owned 
                   (reference group)       
Ownership: Collectively-owned 1.779* 0.578 -1.318† 1.779* 0.684† -1.038 
Ownership: Privately-held -0.060 0.166 -0.805† -0.060 0.178 -0.804* 
Ownership: Foreign-owned (excluding HMT) 0.589 0.229 -0.389 0.589 0.206 -0.535 
Ownership: Other 0.099 -0.095 -0.776 0.099 -0.083 -0.708 
       
Superstitious heuristics (Overall) 0.554** 0.098 -0.202 0.554** 0.096 -0.189 
Decision speed   0.273*   0.319** 
Collective efficacy   0.006   -0.078 
Environmental unanalyzability   -0.145   -0.895 
Holistic reasoning  1.550† 3.928*  1.883* 5.115** 
Decision speed ´ Environmental unanalyzability      0.340 
Superstitious heuristics ´ Holistic reasoning     -1.091 -3.506† 
       
Intercept -4.241* 3.823*** 2.452 -4.241* 3.767*** 2.745 
!2 71.96*** 66.62** 61.10*** 71.96*** 68.82*** 69.75*** 
R2 0.500 0.476 0.459 0.500 0.481 0.492 
Note: SUR = Seemingly unrelated regression. Industry dummies are not reported for the consideration of table length. HMT = Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. N = 72.  




Table 61 SUR Predicting Improvement in Overall Performance (Study 3) 
Variable Main effect Interaction 
 Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 2a Model 2b Model 2c 












Age 0.066* -0.003 -0.068* 0.066* -0.003 -0.069* 
Gender -0.164 -0.169 -0.769** -0.164 -0.172 -0.774** 
Education 0.231 0.073 0.075 0.231 0.074 0.073 
Tenure 0.022 -0.051* 0.064 0.022 -0.048* 0.066† 
Founder -0.795† -0.454* -1.601*** -0.795† -0.507** -1.909*** 
Firm age -0.036* -0.014† -0.047** -0.036* -0.013 -0.042** 
Firm type: Standalone company, established 
                  (reference group)       
Firm type: Standalone company, startup -0.001 -0.470* -0.006 -0.001 -0.436† 0.064 
Firm type: Parent company of a group company 0.588 0.096 -0.193 0.588 0.070 -0.421 
Firm type: Subsidiary of a group company 0.493 0.122 -0.337 0.493 0.139 -0.320 
Firm type: Other -2.099† -0.333 -1.579 -2.099† -0.281 -1.250 
Ownership: State-owned 
                   (reference group)       
Ownership: Collectively-owned 1.779* 0.578 -0.258 1.779* 0.684† 0.242 
Ownership: Privately-held -0.060 0.166 -0.212 -0.060 0.178 -0.158 
Ownership: Foreign-owned (excluding HMT) 0.589 0.229 -0.224 0.589 0.206 -0.372 
Ownership: Other 0.099 -0.095 -2.301*** 0.099 -0.083 -2.234*** 
       
Superstitious heuristics (Overall) 0.554** 0.098 -0.014 0.554** 0.096 -0.022 
Decision speed   0.119   0.163 
Collective efficacy   -0.241   -0.348 
Environmental unanalyzability   0.159   -0.648 
Holistic reasoning  1.550† 4.235*  1.883* 6.062*** 
Decision speed ´ Environmental unanalyzability      0.170 
Superstitious heuristics ´ Holistic reasoning     -1.091 -5.455** 
       
Intercept -4.241* 3.823*** 4.384* -4.241* 3.767*** 4.683* 
!2 71.96*** 66.62*** 88.10*** 71.96*** 68.82*** 113.07*** 
R2 0.500 0.476 0.550 0.500 0.481 0.611 
Note: SUR = Seemingly unrelated regression. Industry dummies are not reported for the consideration of table length. HMT = Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. N = 72.  




Table 62 Mediation of the Effect of Superstitious Heuristics on Improvement in Market Share through Decision Speed and Collective 
Efficacy (Study 3) 
Indirect Effect Observed Coefficient 95% Confidence Interval (BC) 90% Confidence Interval (BC) 
Decision speed 0.1515 -0.005 0.675 0.009 0.515 
Collective efficacy 0.0006 -0.139 0.154 -0.108 0.116 
Total 0.1521 -0.013 0.634 0.007 0.508 





Table 63 Moderated Mediation of the Effect of Superstitious Heuristics on Improvement in Market Share through Decision Speed and 
Collective Efficacy (Study 3) 






Indirect effect through decision speed at low environmental unanalyzability  0.102 -0.102 0.772 -0.054 0.600 
Indirect effect through decision speed at medium environmental unanalyzability 0.177 -0.002 0.707 0.025 0.634 
Indirect effect through decision speed at high environmental unanalyzability 0.252 -0.010 1.021 0.021 0.920 
Indirect effect through collective efficacy at low holistic reasoning -0.014 -0.435 0.126 -0.274 0.091 
Indirect effect through collective efficacy at medium holistic reasoning -0.007 -0.255 0.080 -0.198 0.057 
Indirect effect through collective efficacy at high holistic reasoning -0.001 -0.206 0.147 -0.176 0.103 








Table 64 Summary of Hypothesis Testing Results (Studies 2 and 3) 
Hypothesis # Hypothesis Study # Results Dependent variable of model 
supporting hypothesis 
Method 
Antecedents à superstitious heuristics 
Hypothesis 1 Decision uncertainty is positively associated with the 
use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-
making. 
Study 2 Supported * Superstitious heuristics related 
to Physical Attribute; 
* Superstitious heuristics related 
to Surrounding Environment; 





* Superstitious heuristics 
(overall);  
* Superstitious heuristics related 
to Object/Act 
Study 3 Unsupported   
Hypothesis 2 Decision importance is positively associated with the 
use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-
making. 
Study 2 Supported Superstitious heuristics related 
to Surrounding Environment 
Using rated decision 
uncertainty and 
decision importance Marginally 
supported 
Superstitious heuristics related 
to Object/Act 
Study 3 Supported * Superstitious heuristics related 
to Object/Act; 
* Superstitious heuristics related 
to Surrounding Environment 
 
Hypothesis 3 Superstitious thinking is positively associated with the 
use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-
making. 
Study 2 Supported All models *Method using 
manipulated decision 
uncertainty and 
decision importance;  
 




Study 3 Supported All models  
Hypothesis 4 Decision uncertainty strengthens the relationship 
between decision importance and the use of 
superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making. 
Study 2 Marginally 
supported 
* Superstitious heuristics related 













* Superstitious heuristics related 
to Physical Attribute; 
* Superstitious heuristics related 
to Object/Act; 
* Superstitious heuristics related 
to Surrounding Environment 
 
Hypothesis 5 Superstitious thinking strengthens the relationship 
between decision uncertainty and the use of 
superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making. 
Study 2 Unsupported   
Study 3 Unsupported   
Hypothesis 6 Superstitious thinking strengthens the relationship 
between decision importance and the use of 
superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making.  
Study 2 Unsupported   
Study 3 Unsupported   
Hypothesis 7 Decision importance, decision uncertainty, and 
superstitious thinking interact to affect the use of 
superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-making. 
Specifically, the relationship between decision 
importance and the use of superstitious heuristics is the 
strongest when decision uncertainty and superstitious 
thinking are both high.  
Study 2 Unsupported   
Study 3 Unsupported   
Superstitious heuristics à consequences 
Hypothesis 8 The use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-
making is positively associated with performance 
through decision speed. 
Study 3 Supported Decision effectiveness  
Marginally 
supported 
Improvement in market share  
Hypothesis 9 The mediated relationship between the use of 
superstitious heuristics and performance through 
decision speed is strengthened by environmental 
unanalyzability.  
Study 3 Marginally 
supported 
Improvement in market share  
Hypothesis 
10 
The use of superstitious heuristics in strategic decision-
making is positively associated with performance 
through collective efficacy. 
Study 3 Unsupported   
Hypothesis 
11 
The mediated relationship between the use of 
superstitious heuristics and performance through 
collective efficacy is strengthened by holistic 
reasoning. 









Table 65 Significant Non-hypothesized Consequences (Direct Effects) (Study 3) 
Consequence variable Independent variable Result 
Decision effectiveness Superstitious heuristics (overall) Marginally significant 
Decision speed Superstitious heuristics (overall) Significant 
Collective efficacy Superstitious heuristics (overall) Marginally significant 
Improvement in ROA Superstitious heuristics (overall) Marginally significant in full model 























Figure 3 Interaction Effect of Decision Importance and Decision Uncertainty on  





Figure 4 Interaction Effect of Decision Importance and Decision Uncertainty on  


























































Figure 5 Interaction Effect of Decision Importance and Decision Uncertainty on  





Figure 6 Interaction Effect of Decision Importance and Decision Uncertainty on 
Superstitious Heuristics Related to Surrounding Environment (Study 3) 



















































9 APPENDIX A. MEASURES FOR SCALE VALIDATION (STUDY 1) 
9.1 Measures for Convergent Validity 
Revised Paranormal Beliefs Scale (Tobacyk, 2004) 
Please put a number next to each item to indicate how much you agree or disagree with that item. 
Use the numbers as indicated below. There are no right or wrong answers. This is a sample of 
your own beliefs and attitudes. Thank you. 
(1=Strongly Disagree; 7=Strongly Agree) 
1. The soul continues to exist though the body may die. 
2. Some individuals are able to levitate (lift) objects through mental forces. 
3. Black magic really exists. 
4. Black cats can bring bad luck. 
5. Your mind or soul can leave your body and travel (astral projection). 
6. The abominable snowman of Tibet exists. 
7. Astrology is a way to accurately predict the future. 
8. There is a devil. 
9. Psychokinesis, the movement of objects through psychic powers, does exist. 
10. Witches do exist. 
11. If you break a mirror, you will have bad luck. 
12. During altered states, such as sleep or trances, the spirit can leave the body. 
13. The Loch Ness monster of Scotland exists. 
14. The horoscope accurately tells a person’s future. 
15. I believe in God 
16. A person’s thoughts can influence the movement of a physical object. 
17. Through the use of formulas and incantations, it is possible to cast spells on persons. 
18. The number “13” is unlucky. 
19. Reincarnation does occur. 
20. There is life on other planets. 
21. Some psychics can accurately predict the future. 





23. Mind reading is not possible. 
24. There are actual cases of witchcraft. 
25. It is possible to communicate with the dead. 
26. Some people have an unexplained ability to predict the future. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Item 23 is reverse scored. Traditional Religious Belief = Mean of Items (1, 8, 15, 22); 
Psi = Mean of Items (2, 9, 16, 23); Witchcraft = Mean of Items (3, 10, 17, 24); 
Superstition = Mean of Items (4, 11, 18); Spiritualism = Mean of Items (5, 12, 19, 25) 
Extraordinary Life Forms = Mean of Items (6, 13, 20); Precognition = Mean of Items (7, 14, 21, 
26). 
 
Belief in Superstition Scale (BSS) (Fluke et al., 2014) 
(1=Strongly Disagree; 7=Strongly Agree) 
1. I have a good luck charm. 
2. When asked to choose a number, I tend to go with a lucky one. 
3. A good luck charm can change the outcome of chance events. 
4. Friday the 13th is unlucky. 
5. I avoid unlucky situations. 
6. I’ve been known to knock on wood. 
7. I often attempt to change my luck. 
8. Doing things a certain way can change your luck, for good or bad 
9. Trying to change your luck is a waste of time. 
 
Fatalistic Superstition Beliefs Inventory (Yang, 2007) 
(1=Strongly Disagree; 7=Strongly Agree) 
1. When facing important issues, one should consult the oracle. 
2. To prosper, companies should consult Feng Shui masters or fortune tellers. 
3. People will become sick if they offend spirits or ancestors. 
4. Prescriptions from consulting gods are effective in healing diseases.   





6. If the couple’s eight characters (ba zi) do not fit, they should not marry each other. 
7. If the couple do not marry on a lucky day on the lunar calendar, their marriage may be 
unhappy. 
8. A person’s career success must be a result of his or her good deeds in previous life. 
9. A sick person can recover by drinking magic water and incense ashes from the temple. 
10. If one’s ancestral grave is located at a good place according to Feng shui principles, he or she 
will become very successful and rich. 
 
9.2 Measures for Discriminant Validity 
Representativeness Heuristics (Bazerman & Moore, 2008; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, 1974) 
1. The following description is randomly drawn from a group consisting 30 engineers and 70 
lawyers. Please indicate your probability that the person described is an engineer, on a scale from 
0 to 100: _____. 
“Dick is a 30-year-old man. He is married with two children. A man of high ability and high 
motivation, he promises to be quite successful in his field. He is well liked by his colleagues.” 
 
2. A certain town is served by two hospitals. In the larger hospital, about forty-five babies are 
born each day. In the smaller hospital, about fifteen babies are born each day. As you know, 
about 50 percent of all babies are boys. However, the exact percentage of boys born varies from 
day to day. Sometimes it may be higher than 50 percent, sometimes lower. 
For a period of one year, each hospital recorded the days on which more than 60 percent 
of the babies born were boys. Which hospital do you think recorded more such days? 
 
a. The larger hospital 
b. The smaller hospital 
c. About the same (that is, within 5 percent of each other) 
 
3. You and your spouse have had three children together, all of them girls. Now that you are 
expecting your fourth child, you wonder whether the odds favor having a boy this time. What is 
the best estimate of your probability of having another girl? 
a. 6.25 percent (1 in 16), because the odds of getting four girls in a row is 1 out of 16 
b. 50 percent (1 in 2), because there is roughly an equal chance of getting each gender 







1. Consider the letter R in the English language. 
Is R more likely to appear in ____the first position or ____the third position? (check one) 
Your estimate for the ratio of the frequency with which the letter R appears in the first position 
versus the third position is _____:1.  
 
2. Consider the following: 
1) The frequency with which abstract words (thought, love) appear in written English. 
2) The frequency with which concrete words (door, water) appear in written English. 
Your estimate for the ratio of these two values is ___:1. 
 
3. Consider a group of 10 people who form committees of k members.  
How many different committees of 2 members can be formed? ______________ 
How many different committees of 8 members can be formed? ______________ 
 
Anchoring Heuristics5 
16. Please take 15 seconds to answer the following questions on each page. 
1-1a) Is the percentage of Sodium in the atmosphere of Mercury a) higher or b) lower than 10%? 
_____  
1-1b) Estimate the percentage of Sodium in the atmosphere of Mercury: ______________ 
 
5 I set time limits to some the questions to prevent respondents from finding answers by 
searching online or using a calculator.    
6 In the original experiment, the questions were about the percentage of African countries in the 
United Nations. Participants were first asked to indicate whether the percentage was higher or 
lower than a randomly given number (e.g., 10% or 65%). They were then asked to estimate the 
value of the percentage (See the review by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) for more details). In 
my questionnaire, however, since the use of anchoring heuristics could only be captured by 
observing whether the respondent provided values around different anchors (e.g., 10% or 65%), 
participants were asked to estimate the respective percentages of Sodium and Hydrogen in the 
atmosphere of Mercury. The reason to ask about the percentages of Sodium and Hydrogen in the 
atmosphere of Mercury is twofold. First, there is a relatively low chance that ordinary individuals 








1-2a) Is the percentage of Hydrogen in the atmosphere of Mercury a) higher or b) lower than 
65%? ________ 
1-2b) Estimate the percentage of Hydrogen in the atmosphere of Mercury: ________ 
 
2. Estimate the product (7 seconds for each problem) 
8 x 7 x 6 x 5 x 4 x 3 x 2 x 1 
10 x 9 x 8 x 7 x 6 x 5 x 4 
2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 x 7 x 8 x 9 
1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 x 7 x 8 
 
3. Which of the following would you rather bet on? 
a) drawing a red marble from a bag containing 50% red marbles and 50% percent while marbles. 
b) drawing a red marble seven times in succession, with replacement, from a bag containing 90% 
percent red marbles and 10% white marbles. 
 
Mini-IPIP scales for the Big Five Factors of Personality (Donnellan et al., 2006) 
Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future. Describe 
yourself as you honestly see yourself, in relation to other people you know of the same sex as 
you are, and roughly your same age. So that you can describe yourself in an honest manner, your 
responses will be kept in absolute confidence.  
(1 = Very Inaccurate; 5 = Very Accurate) 
1. (E) I Am the life of the party.  
2. (A) I sympathize with others’ feelings. 
3. (C) I get chores done right away.  
4. (N) I have frequent mood swings.  
5. (I) I have a vivid imagination.  
6. (E) I don’t talk a lot. (R)  
7. (A) I am not interested in other people’s problems. (R)  
8. (C) I often forget to put things back in their proper place. (R)  
9. (N) I am relaxed most of the time. (R) 





11. (E) I talk to a lot of different people at parties.  
12. (A) I feel others’ emotions. 
13. (C) I like order. 
14. (N) I get upset easily. 
15. (I) I have difficulty understanding abstract ideas. (R) 
16. (E) I keep in the background. (R) 
17. (A) I am not really interested in others. (R) 
18. (C) I make a mess of things. (R) 
19. (N) I seldom feel blue. (R) 
20. (I) I do not have a good imagination.  
9.3 Measures for Nomological Validity 
Locus of Control (Rotter, 1966)  
For each question select the statement that you agree with the most. 
1.  a. Children get into trouble because their patents punish them too much. 
b. The trouble with most children nowadays is that their parents are too easy with them. 
2.  a. Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to bad luck. 
b. People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make. 
3.  a. One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people don't take enough interest in 
politics. 
b. There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try to prevent them. 
4.  a. In the long run people get the respect they deserve in this world 
b. Unfortunately, an individual's worth often passes unrecognized no matter how hard he tries 
5.  a. The idea that teachers are unfair to students is nonsense. 
b. Most students don't realize the extent to which their grades are influenced by accidental 
happenings. 
6.  a. Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective leader. 
b. Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken advantage of their opportunities. 
7. a. No matter how hard you try some people just don't like you. 





8. a. Heredity plays the major role in determining one's personality. 
b. It is one's experiences in life which determine what they're like. 
9. a. I have often found that what is going to happen will happen. 
b. Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me as making a decision to take a definite 
course of action. 
10. a. In the case of the well-prepared student there is rarely if ever such a thing as an unfair test. 
 b. Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course work that studying in really 
useless. 
11. a. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little or nothing to do with it. 
 b. Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at the right time. 
12. a. The average citizen can have an influence in government decisions. 
 b. This world is run by the few people in power, and there is not much the little guy can do 
about it. 
13. a. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work. 
 b. It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to- be a matter of 
good or bad fortune anyhow. 
14. a. There are certain people who are just no good. 
 b. There is some good in everybody. 
15. a. In my case getting what I want has little or nothing to do with luck. 
 b. Many times we might just as well decide what to do by flipping a coin. 
16. a. Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was lucky enough to be in the right place 
first. 
b. Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability. Luck has little or nothing to do 
with it. 
17. a. As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the victims of forces we can neither 
understand, nor control. 
b. By taking an active part in political and social affairs the people can control world events. 
18. a. Most people don't realize the extent to which their lives are controlled by accidental 
happenings. 





19. a. One should always be willing to admit mistakes. 
b. It is usually best to cover up one's mistakes. 
20. a. It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes you. 
b. How many friends you have depends upon how nice a person you are. 
21. a. In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balanced by the good ones. 
b. Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance, laziness, or all three.  
22. a. With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption. 
b. It is difficult for people to have much control over the things politicians do in office. 
23. a. Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive at the grades they give. 
b. There is a direct connection between how hard 1 study and the grades I get. 
24. a. A good leader expects people to decide for themselves what they should do. 
b. A good leader makes it clear to everybody what their jobs are. 
25. a. Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me. 
b. It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an important role in my life. 
26. a. People are lonely because they don't try to be friendly. 
b. There's not much use in trying too hard to please people, if they like you, they like you. 
27. a. There is too much emphasis on athletics in high school. 
b. Team sports are an excellent way to build character. 
28. a. What happens to me is my own doing. 
b. Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over the direction my life is taking. 
29. a. Most of the time I can't understand why politicians behave the way they do. 
b. In the long run the people are responsible for bad government on a national as well as on a 
local level. 
Score one point for each of the following: 
2. a, 3.b, 4.b, 5.b, 6.a, 7.a, 9.a, 10.b, 11.b, 12.b, 13.b, 15.b, 16.a, 17.a, 18.a, 20.a, 
21. a, 22.b, 23.a, 25.a, 26.b, 28.b, 29.a. 
A high score = External Locus of Control 







New General Self-Efficacy Scale (G. Chen et al., 2001) 
(1=Strongly disagree; 5=Strongly agree) 
1. I will be able to achieve most of the goals that I have set for myself. 
2. When facing difficult tasks, I am certain that I will accomplish them. 
3. In general, I think that I can obtain outcomes that are important to me. 
4. I believe I can succeed at most any endeavor to which I set my mind. 
5. I will be able to successfully overcome many challenges. 
6. I am confident that I can perform effectively on many difficult tasks. 
7. Compared to other people, I can do most tasks very well. 
8. Even when things are tough, I can perform quite well. 
 
Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005) 
1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the 
ball cost? ____cents 
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 min to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 
100 widgets? _____minutes 
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days 




(1 = No control; 7 = Complete control) 
Perceived control in general 
1.In general, how much control do you think you have over the outcomes of your decisions? 
(Adapted from Case et al. (2004))  
2. By making your choices, how much control do you think you have exerted over the outcomes 
of your choices? (Adapted from Blakemore and Trościanko (1985))  
Perceived control specific to luck (Based on Fluke et al. (2014) and Rothbaum et al. (1982)) 
1. By making your choices, how much control do you think you have exerted over your luck?  








(1=Not at all confident; 5=extremely confident) 
Decision confidence in general 
1. In general, to what extent do you feel confident that the outcomes of your decisions will be 
satisfactory? (Adapted from Zakay and Tsal (1993))  
2. In general, to what extent do you feel confident that you are making the right choice? 
(Adapted from Dean and Sharfman (1993))  
Decision confidence specific to luck (Based on Vyse (2013) 
1. In general, to what extent do you feel confident that your choices will bring good luck? 
2. In general, to what extent do you feel confident that your choices will avoid bad luck? 
 
Self-efficacy in Decision Implementation (Adapted from Chen et al. (2001)) 
(1=Strongly disagree; 5=Strongly agree) 
Generally speaking, in carrying out my decisions, … 
1. I will be able to achieve most of the goals that I have set for myself. 
2. When facing difficult tasks, I am certain that I will accomplish them.  
3. I think that I can obtain outcomes that are important to me. 
4. I believe I can succeed at most any endeavor to which I set my mind. 
5. I will be able to successfully overcome many challenges. 
6. I am confident that I can perform effectively on many difficult tasks. 
7. Compared to other people, I can do most tasks very well.  
8. Even when things are tough, I can perform quite well. 
 
Decision Effectiveness 
1. In general, how effective are the results of your decisions? (Adapted from Ford and Gioia 
(2000)) 
(1=not at all effective; 5=extremely effective) 
2. In general, how successful are the results of your decisions? (Adapted from Dean and 
Sharfman (1996)) 
(1=not at all successful; 5=extremely successful) 





(1=poor; 2=fair; 3=good; 4=very good; 5=excellent) 
 
Decision Speed (Adapted from Souitaris and Maestro (2010)) 
(1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree) 
1. I prefer and tend to take my time when making decisions.  
2. I generally believe in making quick decisions. 
3. I place emphasis on speed when planning or thinking about decisions. 
 
Decision comprehensiveness (Adapted from Atuahene-Gima and Li (2004)) 
(1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree) 
1. I develop many alternative courses of action to achieve intended objectives. 
2. I consider many different criteria before deciding on which courses of action to take. 
3. I thoroughly examine multiple explanations for problems faced or opportunities available. 
4. I conduct multiple examinations for suggested course of action. 
5. I search extensively for possible alternative courses of action. 
 
Use of Heuristics (Based on Heuristics literature) 
(1 = Strongly disagree; 7 = Strongly agree) 
1. I use simple decision rules to simplify decision tasks.  
2. I use rules of thumb to make decisions quickly. 







10 APPENDIX B. SCENARIOS USED IN STUDY 2 
Introduction 
 
Heng Sheng Group is a medium sized company whose major business includes real estate, property management, and manufacturing. 
Heng Sheng is currently considering entering into a new industry through acquisition. You will take the role of Heng Sheng’s CEO 
and make a series of decisions.  
 
 
Scenario #1 (Paranormal Revelation) 
 
High uncertainty ´  
High importance 
High uncertainty ´  
Low importance 
Low uncertainty ´  
High importance 
Low uncertainty ´  
Low importance 
Due to increasing bubble risk 
in the real estate industry, 
Heng Sheng predicts 
decreasing growth potential in 
this industry. Therefore, the 
company is considering 
diversifying into a new and 
promising industry. Real estate 
represents a LARGE 
proportion of Heng Sheng’s 
profits, therefore choosing a 
new industry that substitutes 
for real estate is VERY 
IMPORTANT to the 
company’s long-term success. 
 
Industry A has been growing 
fast recently and shows great 
potential for the future. 
Due to increasing bubble risk 
in the real estate industry, 
Heng Sheng predicts 
decreasing growth potential in 
this industry. Therefore, the 
company is considering 
diversifying into a new and 
promising industry. Real estate 
represents a SMALL 
proportion of Heng Sheng’s 
profits, therefore choosing a 
new industry that substitutes 
for real estate is NOT VERY 
IMPORTANT to the 
company’s long-term success. 
 
Industry A has been growing 
fast recently and shows great 
potential for the future. 
Due to increasing bubble risk 
in the real estate industry, 
Heng Sheng predicts 
decreasing growth potential in 
this industry. Therefore, the 
company is considering 
diversifying into a new and 
promising industry. Real estate 
represents a LARGE 
proportion of Heng Sheng’s 
profits, therefore choosing a 
new industry that substitutes 
for real estate is VERY 
IMPORTANT to the 
company’s long-term success. 
 
Industry A has been growing 
fast recently and shows great 
potential for the future. 
Due to increasing bubble risk 
in the real estate industry, 
Heng Sheng predicts 
decreasing growth potential in 
this industry. Therefore, the 
company is considering 
diversifying into a new and 
promising industry. Real estate 
represents a SMALL 
proportion of Heng Sheng’s 
profits, therefore choosing a 
new industry that substitutes 
for real estate is NOT VERY 
IMPORTANT to the 
company’s long-term success. 
 
Industry A has been growing 
fast recently and shows great 





However, Heng Sheng lacks 
relevant technologies and 
managerial experience, and the 
regulations of this industry are 
HIGHLY AMBIGUOUS 
AND UNCERTAIN. Hence, it 
is VERY DIFFICULT TO 
PREDICT Heng Sheng’s 
development prospects in this 
industry.  
 
In the region where Heng 
Sheng is located, there is a 
famous temple, which is 
rumored to be very efficacious 
and attracts many business 
tycoons to visit. Your advisors 
consulted the temple through 
personal connections and 
received instructions regarding 
whether Heng Sheng should 
enter into Industry A. 
 
Considering 1) that the choice 
of a new industry is 
EXTREMELY CRUCIAL to 
Heng Sheng’s long-term 
growth, and 2) that its 
prospects in the new industry 
is HIGHLY 
UNPREDICTABLE, when 
deciding whether to enter 
Industry A, to what extent 
However, Heng Sheng lacks 
relevant technologies and 
managerial experience, and the 
regulations of this industry are 
HIGHLY AMBIGUOUS 
AND UNCERTAIN. Hence, it 
is VERY DIFFICULT TO 
PREDICT Heng Sheng’s 
development prospects in this 
industry.  
 
In the region where Heng 
Sheng is located, there is a 
famous temple, which is 
rumored to be very efficacious 
and attracts many business 
tycoons to visit. Your advisors 
consulted the temple through 
personal connections and 
received instructions regarding 
whether Heng Sheng should 
enter into Industry A. 
 
Considering 1) that the choice 
of a new industry HAS 
LIMITED INFLUENCE on 
Heng Sheng’s long-term 
growth, and 2) that its 
prospects in the new industry 
is HIGHLY 
UNPREDICTABLE, when 
deciding whether to enter 
Industry A, to what extent 
Moreover, Heng Sheng has 
relevant technologies and 
managerial experience, and the 
regulations of this industry are 
VERY CLEAR AND 
STABLE. Hence, IT IS 
VERY EASY TO PREDICT 
Heng Sheng’s development 
prospects in this industry. 
 
 
In the region where Heng 
Sheng is located, there is a 
famous temple, which is 
rumored to be very efficacious 
and attracts many business 
tycoons to visit. Your advisors 
consulted the temple through 
personal connections and 
received instructions regarding 
whether Heng Sheng should 
enter into Industry A. 
 
Considering 1) that the choice 
of a new industry is 
EXTREMELY CRUCIAL to 
Heng Sheng’s long-term 
growth, and 2) that its 
prospects in the new industry 
is HIGHLY 
PREDICTABLE, when 
deciding whether to enter 
Industry A, to what extent 
Moreover, Heng Sheng has 
relevant technologies and 
managerial experience, and the 
regulations of this industry are 
VERY CLEAR AND 
STABLE. Hence, IT IS 
VERY EASY TO PREDICT 
Heng Sheng’s development 
prospects in this industry. 
 
 
In the region where Heng 
Sheng is located, there is a 
famous temple, which is 
rumored to be very efficacious 
and attracts many business 
tycoons to visit. Your advisors 
consulted the temple through 
personal connections and 
received instructions regarding 
whether Heng Sheng should 
enter into Industry A. 
 
Considering 1) that the choice 
of a new industry HAS 
LIMITED INFLUENCE on 
Heng Sheng’s long-term 
growth, and 2) that its 
prospects in the new industry 
is HIGHLY 
PREDICTABLE, when 
deciding whether to enter 





would you, the CEO of Heng 
Sheng, base your decision on 
the instructions from the 
temple? 
would you, the CEO of Heng 
Sheng, base your decision on 
the instructions from the 
temple? 
would you, the CEO of Heng 
Sheng, base your decision on 
the instructions from the 
temple? 
would you, the CEO of Heng 
Sheng, base your decision on 
the instructions from the 
temple? 











Scenario #2 (Birth Profile) 
After Heng Sheng decided which new industry to enter, the company was informed that two companies, one located in City A and 
the other located in City B, are suffering from heavy losses, providing an ideal opportunity for Heng Sheng to enter the new 
industry through acquiring one of the companies. 
 
High uncertainty ´  
High importance 
High uncertainty ´  
Low importance 
Low uncertainty ´  
High importance 
Low uncertainty ´  
Low importance 
As Heng Sheng is considering 
its acquisition targets, someone 
visits a well-experienced 
fortune expert who is highly 
respected among business 
owners and leaders. The expert 
points out that the prosperity of 
a company is closely 
correlated with the overall 
fortune profile of its top 
management. Since Heng 
Sheng’s top management lacks 
the element of water, City A, 
which is surrounded by rivers, 
is more beneficial for Heng 
Sheng’s growth.  
 
Considering 1) that the 
acquired company will be in a 
STRATEGIC POSITION 
and its performance will be 
CRITICALLY 
IMPORTANT to Heng 
Sheng’s long-term growth, and 
2) that COMPLEX AND 
As Heng Sheng is considering 
its acquisition targets, someone 
visits a well-experienced 
fortune expert who is highly 
respected among business 
owners and leaders. The expert 
points out that the prosperity of 
a company is closely 
correlated with the overall 
fortune profile of its top 
management. Since Heng 
Sheng’s top management lacks 
the element of water, City A, 
which is surrounded by rivers, 
is more beneficial for Heng 
Sheng’s growth.  
 
Considering 1) that the 
acquired company will be in a 
SECONDARY POSITION 
and its performance HAS 
LIMITED INFLUENCE on 
Heng Sheng’s overall 
operations, and 2) that 
COMPLEX AND 
As Heng Sheng is considering 
its acquisition targets, someone 
visits a well-experienced 
fortune expert who is highly 
respected among business 
owners and leaders. The expert 
points out that the prosperity of 
a company is closely 
correlated with the overall 
fortune profile of its top 
management. Since Heng 
Sheng’s top management lacks 
the element of water, City A, 
which is surrounded by rivers, 
is more beneficial for Heng 
Sheng’s growth.  
 
Considering 1) that the 
acquired company will be in a 
STRATEGIC POSITION 
and its performance will be 
CRITICALLY 
IMPORTANT to Heng 
Sheng’s long-term growth,  
and 2) that SIMPLE AND 
As Heng Sheng is considering 
its acquisition targets, someone 
visits a well-experienced 
fortune expert who is highly 
respected among business 
owners and leaders. The expert 
points out that the prosperity of 
a company is closely 
correlated with the overall 
fortune profile of its top 
management. Since Heng 
Sheng’s top management lacks 
the element of water, City A, 
which is surrounded by rivers, 
is more beneficial for Heng 
Sheng’s growth.  
 
Considering 1) that the 
acquired company will be in a 
SECONDARY POSITION 
and its performance HAS 
LIMITED INFLUENCE on 
Heng Sheng’s overall 
operations, and 2) that 





CHANGEABLE factors (both 
internal and external) make it 
VERY DIFFICULT FOR 
HENG SHENG TO 
PREDICT its operation 
conditions and prospect after 
taking over the acquired 
company, when deciding on 
the acquisition target, to what 
extent would you, the CEO of 
Heng Sheng, base your 
decision on the fortune 
expert’s advice? 
CHANGEABLE factors (both 
internal and external) make it 
VERY DIFFICULT FOR 
HENG SHENG TO 
PREDICT its operation 
conditions and prospect after 
taking over the acquired 
company, when deciding on 
the acquisition target, to what 
extent would you, the CEO of 
Heng Sheng, base your 
decision on the fortune 
expert’s advice? 
STABLE factors (both internal 
and external) make it VERY 
EASY FOR HENG SHENG 
TO PREDICT its operation 
conditions and prospect after 
taking over the acquired 
company, when deciding on 
the acquisition target, to what 
extent would you, the CEO of 
Heng Sheng, base your 
decision on the fortune 
expert’s advice? 
factors (both internal and 
external) make it VERY 
EASY FOR HENG SHENG 
TO PREDICT its operation 
conditions and prospect after 
taking over the acquired 
company, when deciding on 
the acquisition target, to what 
extent would you, the CEO of 
Heng Sheng, base your 
decision on the fortune 
expert’s advice? 











Scenario #3 (Physical Attribute) 
High uncertainty ´  
High importance 
High uncertainty ´  
Low importance 
Low uncertainty ´  
High importance 
Low uncertainty ´  
Low importance 
After having officially taken 
over of the newly acquired 
company, Heng Sheng is 
planning on hiring a CFO from 
outside the company to LEAD 
the restructuring of the 
acquired company and 
integrating it into Heng Sheng.  
 
 
There is a candidate who 
seems competitive. However, 
since this cross-industrial 
acquisition is very big and 
complex, it is VERY HARD 
TO PREDICT whether the 
candidate is competent enough 
to effectively LEAD the 
restructuring and integration 
process.  
 
You have several advisors who 
have expertise in 
physiognomy. They analyze 
the candidate’s moral 
character, personality, 
capabilities, and fate based on 
his facial attributes, and make 
a clear suggestion on whether 
After having officially taken 
over of the newly acquired 
company, Heng Sheng is 
planning on hiring a logistics 
manager from outside the 
company to ASSIST the 
restructuring of the acquired 
company and integrating it into 
Heng Sheng.  

There is a candidate who 
seems competitive. However, 
since this cross-industrial 
acquisition is very big and 
complex, it is VERY HARD 
TO PREDICT whether the 
candidate is competent enough 
to effectively ASSIST the 
restructuring and integration 
process.  

You have several advisors who 
have expertise in 
physiognomy. They analyze 
the candidate’s moral 
character, personality, 
capabilities, and fate based on 
his facial attributes, and make 
a clear suggestion on whether 
After having officially taken 
over of the newly acquired 
company, Heng Sheng is 
planning on hiring a CFO from 
outside the company to LEAD 
the restructuring of the 
acquired company and 
integrating it into Heng Sheng.  
 
 
There is a candidate who 
seems competitive. And based 
on his education background 
and work experience, it is 
VERY EASY TO PREDICT 
whether the candidate is 
competent enough to 
effectively LEAD the 
restructuring and integration 
process. 

You have several advisors who 
have expertise in 
physiognomy. They analyze 
the candidate’s moral 
character, personality, 
capabilities, and fate based on 
his facial attributes, and make 
a clear suggestion on whether 
After having officially taken 
over of the newly acquired 
company, Heng Sheng is 
planning on hiring a logistics 
manager from outside the 
company to ASSIST the 
restructuring of the acquired 
company and integrating it into 
Heng Sheng.  

There is a candidate who 
seems competitive. And based 
on his education background 
and work experience, it is 
VERY EASY TO PREDICT 
whether the candidate is 
competent enough to 
effectively ASSIST the 
restructuring and integration 
process.  

You have several advisors who 
have expertise in 
physiognomy. They analyze 
the candidate’s moral 
character, personality, 
capabilities, and fate based on 
his facial attributes, and make 





or not the candidate should be 
hired.   
 
Considering 1) that CFO is a 
position with SUBSTANTIAL 
POWER AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES, which 
has a PROFOUND influence 
on the company, and 2) that it 
is UNCLEAR and 
DIFFICULT TO PREDICT 
whether the candidate is 
competent for the position, 
when deciding whether to hire 
the candidate, to what extent 
would you, the CEO of Heng 
Sheng, base your decision on 
your advisors’ suggestion that 
is according to physiognomy? 
or not the candidate should be 
hired.   
 
Considering 1) that logistics 
manager is a position with 
SMALL POWER AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES, which 
has a LIMITED influence on 
the company, and 2) that it is 
UNCLEAR and DIFFICULT 
TO PREDICT whether the 
candidate is competent for the 
position, when deciding 
whether to hire the candidate, 
to what extent would you, the 
CEO of Heng Sheng, base 
your decision on your 
advisors’ suggestion that is 
according to physiognomy?

or not the candidate should be 
hired.   
 
Considering 1) that CFO is a 
position with SUBSTANTIAL 
POWER AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES, which 
has a PROFOUND influence 
on the company, and 2) that it 
is CLEAR and EASY TO 
PREDICT whether the 
candidate is competent for the 
position, when deciding 
whether to hire the candidate, 
to what extent would you, the 
CEO of Heng Sheng, base 
your decision on your 
advisors’ suggestion that is 
according to physiognomy?
or not the candidate should be 
hired.   
 
Considering 1) that logistics 
manager is a position with 
SMALL POWER AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES, which 
has a LIMITED influence on 
the company, and 2) that it is 
CLEAR and EASY TO 
PREDICT whether the 
candidate is competent for the 
position, when deciding 
whether to hire the candidate, 
to what extent would you, the 
CEO of Heng Sheng, base 
your decision on your 
advisors’ suggestion that is 
according to physiognomy?











Scenario #4 (Object/Act) 
Heng Sheng has almost completed the post-acquisition restructuring and integration. As market potential for the new industry 
grows, Heng Sheng feels launching a new product at the proper timing will help seize the opportunity and increase market share. 
 
As Heng Sheng is considering the timing to launch the new product, someone in the company consults a famous master on 
metaphysics. It is rumored that the master helped many companies turn around, while some other companies went bankrupt after 
rejecting his advice.  
 
The master particularly emphasizes the important role of “timing” in the success and failure of companies’ strategic moves. 
Incorporating principles in the I Ching and the nature of the new product, the master points out the best launching timing for the 
new product.  
High uncertainty ´  
High importance 
High uncertainty ´  
Low importance 
Low uncertainty ´  
High importance 
Low uncertainty ´  
Low importance 
Considering 1) that the launch 
timing IS CRITICAL to the 
success of this new product, 
and this new product’s success 
is CRUCIALLY 
IMPORTANT for Heng 
Sheng gaining a foothold in the 
new industry, and 2) that the 
market’s direction  
is FULL OF 
UNCERTAINTY, and it is 
HARD TO PREDICT the 
best timing to launch this new 
product, when deciding on 
when to launch the new 
product, to what extent would 
you, the CEO of Heng Sheng, 
base your decision on the 
Considering 1) that the launch 
timing HAS LIMITED 
INFLUENCE on the success 
of this new product, and this 
new product’s success is NOT 
IMPORTANT for Heng 
Sheng gaining a foothold in the 
new industry; 2) that the 
market’s direction is FULL 
OF UNCERTAINTY, and it 
is HARD TO PREDICT the 
best timing to launch this new 
product, when deciding on 
when to launch the new 
product, to what extent would 
you, the CEO of Heng Sheng, 
base your decision on the 
Considering 1) that the launch 
timing IS CRITICAL to the 
success of this new product, 
and this new product’s success 
is CRUCIALLY 
IMPORTANT for Heng 
Sheng gaining a foothold in the 
new industry, and 2) that the 
market’s direction  
is FULL OF CERTAINTY, 
and it is EASY TO PREDICT 
the best timing to launch this 
new product, when deciding on 
when to launch the new 
product, to what extent would 
you, the CEO of Heng Sheng, 
base your decision on the 
Considering 1) that the launch 
timing HAS LIMITED 
INFLUENCE on the success 
of this new product, and this 
new product’s success is NOT 
IMPORTANT for Heng 
Sheng gaining a foothold in the 
new industry; 2) that the 
market’s direction is FULL 
OF CERTAINTY, and it is 
EASY TO PREDICT the best 
timing to launch this new 
product, when deciding on 
when to launch the new 
product, to what extent would 
you, the CEO of Heng Sheng, 
























Scenario #5 (Surrounding Environment) 
To cope with the increasingly fierce market competition, the acquired company needs to move to a region where the cost of land is 
cheaper to build modernized plants.  
In the suburb there is an idle industrial park that enjoys subsidies from the local government. However, several companies, which 
were previously located in this park, went bankrupt in succession, and multiple accidental deaths and injuries took place during their 
operations. 
Several well-respected feng shui masters have evaluated the feng shui of the industrial park and reached a consistent conclusion. 
High uncertainty ´  
High importance 
High uncertainty ´  
Low importance 
Low uncertainty ´  
High importance 
Low uncertainty ´  
Low importance 
Considering 1) that the 
acquired company is in A 
CRITICALLY 
IMPORTANT, 
STRATEGIC POSITION in 
Heng Sheng’s growth strategy; 
2) that the company’s 
operation conditions and 
prospect after moving is 
FULL OF UNCERTAINTY 
AND HARD TO PREDICT, 
when deciding on whether to 
choose the industrial park, to 
what extent would you, the 
CEO of Heng Sheng, base 
your decision on the feng shui 
masters’ conclusion? 
Considering 1) that the 
acquired company is in A 
LESS IMPORTANT, 
SECONDARY POSITION in 
Heng Sheng’s growth strategy; 
2) that the company’s 
operation conditions and 
prospect after moving is 
FULL OF UNCERTAINTY 
AND HARD TO PREDICT, 
when deciding on whether to 
choose the industrial park, to 
what extent would you, the 
CEO of Heng Sheng, base 
your decision on the feng shui 
masters’ conclusion? 
Considering 1) that the 
acquired company is in A 
CRITICALLY 
IMPORTANT, 
STRATEGIC POSITION in 
Heng Sheng’s growth strategy; 
2) that the company’s 
operation conditions and 
prospect after moving is 
CLEARLY FORESEEABLE 
AND EASY TO PREDICT, 
when deciding on whether to 
choose the industrial park, to 
what extent would you, the 
CEO of Heng Sheng, base 
your decision on the feng shui 
masters’ conclusion? 
Considering 1) that the 
acquired company is in A 
LESS IMPORTANT, 
SECONDARY POSITION in 
Heng Sheng’s growth strategy; 
2) that the company’s 
operation conditions and 
prospect after moving is 
CLEARLY FORESEEABLE 
AND EASY TO PREDICT, 
when deciding on whether to 
choose the industrial park, to 
what extent would you, the 
CEO of Heng Sheng, base 
your decision on the feng shui 
masters’ conclusion? 














11 APPENDIX C. MEASURES IN STUDY 3 
Environmental Uncertainty (Swamidass & Newell, 1987) 
(1 = Never predictable; 5 = Always predictable) 
1. Actual users of our products 
2. Competitors of our supply of raw materials and parts 
3. Competitors of our customers 
4. Government regulations controlling our industry 
5. The public’s political views and attitudes towards our industry 
6. Our relationships with trade unions 
 
Environmental Hostility (Adapted from Covin et al., (2000))  
(1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree) 
1. The failure rate of firms in my industry was high. 
2. My industry was very risky such that one bad decision could easily threaten the viability of my 
business unit. 
3. Competitive intensity was high in my industry. 
4. Customer loyalty was low in my industry. 
5. Severe price wars were characteristic of my industry. 
6. Low profit margins were characteristic of my industry. 
 
Fatalistic Superstition Beliefs Inventory (Yang, 2007) 
(1=Strongly Disagree; 7=Strongly Agree) 
1. When facing important issues, one should consult the oracle. 
2. To prosper, companies should consult Feng Shui masters or fortune tellers. 
3. People will become sick if they offend spirits or ancestors. 
4. Prescriptions from consulting gods are effective in healing diseases.   
5. One should consult the fortune teller before making important decisions. 
6. If the couple’s eight characters (ba zi) do not fit, they should not marry each other. 






8. A person’s career success must be a result of his or her good deeds in previous life. 
9. A sick person can recover by drinking magic water and incense ashes from the temple. 
10. If one’s ancestral grave is located at a good place according to Feng shui principles, he or she 
will become very successful and rich. 
 
Decision Speed (Adapted from Lin et al. (In press)) 
1. I resolved key questions quickly. 
2. Little time was wasted reaching a decision. 
3. I usually could identify the critical issues very rapidly. 
 
Collective-efficacy (Adapted from Chen et al. (2001)) 
(1=Strongly disagree; 5=Strongly agree) 
In carrying out the strategic decisions I made during 2016-2018, the implementation team 
believe that… 
1. they would be able to achieve most of the goals. 
2. they would accomplish difficult tasks.  
3. they could obtain important outcomes. 
4. they could succeed at most any endeavor to which they set their mind. 
5. they would be able to successfully overcome many challenges. 
6. they could perform effectively on many difficult tasks. 
7. compared to other people, they could do most tasks very well.  
8. even when things are tough, they could perform quite well. 
 
Environmental Unanalyzability (Atuahene-Gima & Li, 2004) 
(1=Strongly disagree; 5=Strongly agree) 
1. The technology in our industry was changing quite rapidly. 
2, Technological changes provided big opportunities in our industry. 
3. A large number of new product ideas have been made possible through technological 
breakthroughs in our industry. 






Decision Effectiveness (Adapated from Dean and Sharfman (1996) and Ford and Gioia (2000)) 
1. Overall, the results of the strategic decision(s) I made in 2016-2018 were… 
1 = Completely unsuccessful; 7 = Completely successful (Adapted from Dean and Sharfman 
(1996)) 
1 = Completely ineffective; 7 = Completely effective (Adapted from Ford and Gioia (2000)) 
 
Firm performance (Based on Dess and Robinson (1984); Hart and Banbury (1994)) 
1. (1) Please assess your company’s performance in 2015 on the following items, compared to 
other companies in the same market and at a similar stage of development.  
(1 = Lowest performers; 7 = Highest performers) 
1. Return on assets (ROA = net income/total assets) 
2. Cash flow 
3. Sales growth 
4. Market share 
5. Overall performance 
 
(2) Please assess your company’s performance in present on the following items, compared to 
other companies in the same market and at a similar stage of development.  
(1 = Lowest performers; 7 = Highest performers) 
1. Return on assets (ROA = net income/total assets) 
2. Cash flow 
3. Sales growth 
4. Market share 
5. Overall performance 
 
 
2. Please provide the following information of your company’s financial performance. 
(1) Change in return on assets (ROA = net income/total assets) from 2015 to present 
(2) Total assets for each year in 2015-2018 
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